themfelves; and how fhould they know you? How is it poffible they fhould have opportunities of knowing you better than you know yourself? A man can never gain a right knowledge of himself from the opinion of others, which is for various, and generally fo ill-founded. For men commonly judge by outward appearances, or inward prejudice, and therefore think and fpeak of us very much at random. Again, others are inclined to judge of themselves by the conduct of their fuperiors, who have opportunities of knowing, acting and being better; and yet, without vanity be it spoken, (fay they) we ፡ are not behind-hand with them.' But what then? Perhaps neither they nor you are what the obligations of your character indifpenfibly require, and what you must be ere you can be happy. But confider how eafily this argument may be retorted. You are better than fome, you fay, who have greater opportunities and advantages of being good than you have; and therefore your ftate is fafe. you yourself have greater opportunities of being good than fome others have, who nevertheless excel you; and therefore, by

But

the

the fame rule, your ftate cannot be safe. Again; others judge of themselves by the common maxims of the vulgar world, concerning honour and honefty, virtue and intereft; which maxims, tho' generally corrupt and very oppofite to those of reafon, confcience and Scripture, men will follow as a rule, for fake of the latitude it allows them: And fondly think, that if they ftand right in the opinion of the lowest kind of men, they have no reafon to be fevere upon themselves. Others, whofe fentiments are much more delicate and refined, they imagine, may be mistaken, or may overstrain the matter. In which perfuafion they are confirmed, by obferving how feldom the confciences of the generality of men fmite them for those things which fcrupulous judges condemn as heinous crimes. It is unnecessary to declare how falfe and pernicious a rule this is. Again, others may judge of themfelves and their state by the fudden impreffions they have had, or ftrong impulses upon their fpirits, which they attribute to the finger of GOD; and by which they have been so exceedingly affected as to make no doubt but that it was the inftant of their

S 2

their converfion. But whether it was

or

by their

• But

not, can never be known but by the conduct of their after-lives. In like manner, others judge of their good state good frames; tho' very rare, it may be, and very tranfient; foon paffing off like a morning cloud, or as the early dew. we should not judge of ourselves by that which is unufual or extraordinary with us; but by the ordinary tenor and drift of our lives. A bad man may appear good in fome good mood; and a good man may feem bad in certain ' extraordinary falls; to judge of a bad man by his best hours, and a good man by his worst, is the way to be deceived in them both (n).' And the fame way may you be deceived in yourself.-Pharaoh, Ahab, Herod and Felix, had their respective softenings, their tranfitory fits of goodness; yet they remain upon record under the blackeft characters.

6

Thefe, then, are falfe rules of judgment; and to truft to, or try ourselves by, them, leads to fatal felf-deception.

(6.) In the business of felf-examination, you must be extremely careful not to judge

* Baxter's Direct. pag. 876.

by

by wrong rules, and that you do not judge wrong by right rules; whereof you should endeavour to be well acquainted. The office of a judge is not only to collect the evidence and circumftances of facts, but to be well-skilled in the laws by which thofe facts are to be examined.

The only certain rules by which we can know ourselves, are Reafon and Scripture. Some choose to set aside these rules, as too fevere, too ftiff to bend to their perverseness, too ftraight to measure their crooked ways! are against reason, when reafon opposes them; decrying it as carnal reafon and againft Scripture, when Scripture is against them, defpifing it as a dead letter. And thus, rather than be convinced they are wrong, they reject the only means that can fet them right.

As fome fet aside thefe rules, fo others dispose them one against the other: Reafon against Scripture, and Scripture against reason. When they are both given us by the GoD of our natures, not only as perfectly confiftent, but as proper to explain and illuftrate each other, to prevent our mistaking either; and to be, when taken together, (as they always fhould) the most S 3 complete

complete and only rule by which to judge both of ourselves, and every thing belonging to our falvation, as reasonable and fallen

creatures.

(1.) Then one part of that rule, which GOD hath given to judge of ourselves by, is right reafon by which I do not mean the reasoning of any particular man, which may be very different from the reasoning of another particular man: and both, it may be, very different from right reafon; because both may be influenced not fo much by the reason and nature of things, as by partial prepoffeffions and the influence of the paffions. But by right reafon I mean thofe common principles, which are readily allowed by all who are capable of understanding them, and not notoriously perverted by the force of prejudice and which are confirmed by the common confent of all the fober and thinking part of mankind; and may be easily learned by the light of nature. Therefore, if any doctrine, fuppofed to be countenanced by revelation, be nevertheless apparently repugnant to thofe dictates of right reason, or evidently contradict our natural notions of the Divine Attributes, or weaken our obligations to univerfal virtue, that we may

be