The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign PolicyOxford University Press, 9 בספט׳ 2004 - 576 עמודים Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated détente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal? In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat. We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir. This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come. |
מתוך הספר
עמוד 29
... Brezhnev Doctrine—had apparently been accepted in Washington. In addition, the Soviets continued to support militarily a number of Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, in their quest for retribution after Israeli victories in the ...
... Brezhnev Doctrine—had apparently been accepted in Washington. In addition, the Soviets continued to support militarily a number of Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, in their quest for retribution after Israeli victories in the ...
עמוד 35
... Brezhnev, and the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko. Yet, this hardly meant that the entire Soviet leadership—many of whom lacked even the basic knowledge of American society and politics—was united. As in the United States, powerful ...
... Brezhnev, and the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko. Yet, this hardly meant that the entire Soviet leadership—many of whom lacked even the basic knowledge of American society and politics—was united. As in the United States, powerful ...
עמוד 37
... Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny were staying in the same sanitarium, however, was convenient and hardly an accident: it undoubtedly allowed for some intense brainstorming and speculation about the future of Soviet-American relations ...
... Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny were staying in the same sanitarium, however, was convenient and hardly an accident: it undoubtedly allowed for some intense brainstorming and speculation about the future of Soviet-American relations ...
עמוד 40
... Brezhnev pressed through a more measured response. The Soviets began to build up their conventional forces on the Chinese border and launched an attack on March 15. After this incident, the Soviets began to search for a diplomatic ...
... Brezhnev pressed through a more measured response. The Soviets began to build up their conventional forces on the Chinese border and launched an attack on March 15. After this incident, the Soviets began to search for a diplomatic ...
עמוד 89
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
תוכן
1 | |
17 | |
32 | |
4 Progress and Promise | 55 |
5 Negotiating in the Shadow of War | 68 |
6 Crises and Opportunities | 92 |
7 Breakthroughs | 116 |
Triangular Diplomacy and the IndoPakistani War | 154 |
The October War and Shuttle Diplomacy | 302 |
Watergate Kissinger and Foreign Policy | 332 |
16 Renewal? Ford Vladivostok and Kissinger | 359 |
Exit from Vietnam | 382 |
Angola and East Timor | 399 |
Kissinger and the Marathon of 1976 | 427 |
20 The Chairman On Trial | 457 |
The Flawed Architect | 485 |
9 The Week That Changed the World | 185 |
Triangulation Moscow and Vietnam | 201 |
11 Exiting Vietnam | 228 |
12 Highs and Lows | 260 |
13 Secretary of State | 291 |
Notes | 493 |
Selected Bibliography | 535 |
Index | 541 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
agreed agreement Ambassador Angola April argued August Beijing bombing Brezhnev Cambodia ceasefire Chinese countries crisis December Deng détente Détente and Confrontation diplomatic discussions Dobrynin/Kissinger domestic Duc Tho early election February Ford Ford’s Garthoff Gromyko Haig HAKOF Haldeman Diaries Hanoi Henry Kissinger Huang Huang Chen India Indochina Isaacson Israeli issues January July June Kimball Kissinger and Nixon Kissinger to Nixon Kissinger’s later Le Duc Tho leaders major Mao’s March Memcon Middle East military Moscow negotiations Nixon administration Nixon and Kissinger Nixon’s Vietnam North Vietnamese November NPMP nuclear October opening to China Pakistan Paris peace Pham Van Dong political president presidential relations relationship Rogers role Saigon SALT Scowcroft secret trip secretary Senate September Sino-American Sino-Soviet South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-American summit Taiwan talks Thieu tion told triangular diplomacy troops United USSR Viet Vietnam War Washington Watergate White House Winston Lord Zhou Enlai