The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign PolicyOxford University Press, 9 בספט׳ 2004 - 576 עמודים Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated détente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal? In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat. We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir. This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 92
עמוד 2
... later allowed him to claim a place in the history books that, given his personal background, was as improbable as almost any other “from rags to riches” story in American history? To answer these questions even partially one needs to ...
... later allowed him to claim a place in the history books that, given his personal background, was as improbable as almost any other “from rags to riches” story in American history? To answer these questions even partially one needs to ...
עמוד 4
... later become a strategist at the Pentagon, was struck by “this little Jewish refugee.” Over the next three years, Kraemer secured Kissinger an appointment as a translator for General Bolling, helped him to become an administrator in ...
... later become a strategist at the Pentagon, was struck by “this little Jewish refugee.” Over the next three years, Kraemer secured Kissinger an appointment as a translator for General Bolling, helped him to become an administrator in ...
עמוד 5
... later comment.4 But it seems that as he returned to the United States from Germany, Kissinger no longer felt like an outsider. Henry Kissinger had become Americanized. Yet, he had no master plan. The prewar path of becoming an ...
... later comment.4 But it seems that as he returned to the United States from Germany, Kissinger no longer felt like an outsider. Henry Kissinger had become Americanized. Yet, he had no master plan. The prewar path of becoming an ...
עמוד 6
... later become a trademark of his writing. Kissinger's undergraduate thesis and overall performance during his first three years at Harvard had earned him summa cum laude (placing him at the top one percent of the class of 1950) and a ...
... later become a trademark of his writing. Kissinger's undergraduate thesis and overall performance during his first three years at Harvard had earned him summa cum laude (placing him at the top one percent of the class of 1950) and a ...
עמוד 8
... later on), but rather provided examples of the extent to which accident and circumstance could undermine the work of even the most eminent and skillful leaders. Or, as the historian John Lewis Gaddis puts it, Kissinger's guide to the ...
... later on), but rather provided examples of the extent to which accident and circumstance could undermine the work of even the most eminent and skillful leaders. Or, as the historian John Lewis Gaddis puts it, Kissinger's guide to the ...
תוכן
1 | |
17 | |
32 | |
4 Progress and Promise | 55 |
5 Negotiating in the Shadow of War | 68 |
6 Crises and Opportunities | 92 |
7 Breakthroughs | 116 |
Triangular Diplomacy and the IndoPakistani War | 154 |
The October War and Shuttle Diplomacy | 302 |
Watergate Kissinger and Foreign Policy | 332 |
16 Renewal? Ford Vladivostok and Kissinger | 359 |
Exit from Vietnam | 382 |
Angola and East Timor | 399 |
Kissinger and the Marathon of 1976 | 427 |
20 The Chairman On Trial | 457 |
The Flawed Architect | 485 |
9 The Week That Changed the World | 185 |
Triangulation Moscow and Vietnam | 201 |
11 Exiting Vietnam | 228 |
12 Highs and Lows | 260 |
13 Secretary of State | 291 |
Notes | 493 |
Selected Bibliography | 535 |
Index | 541 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
agreed agreement Ambassador Angola April argued August Beijing bombing Brezhnev Cambodia ceasefire Chinese countries crisis December Deng détente Détente and Confrontation diplomatic discussions Dobrynin/Kissinger domestic Duc Tho early election February Ford Ford’s Garthoff Gromyko Haig HAKOF Haldeman Diaries Hanoi Henry Kissinger Huang Huang Chen India Indochina Isaacson Israeli issues January July June Kimball Kissinger and Nixon Kissinger to Nixon Kissinger’s later Le Duc Tho leaders major Mao’s March Memcon Middle East military Moscow negotiations Nixon administration Nixon and Kissinger Nixon’s Vietnam North Vietnamese November NPMP nuclear October opening to China Pakistan Paris peace Pham Van Dong political president presidential relations relationship Rogers role Saigon SALT Scowcroft secret trip secretary Senate September Sino-American Sino-Soviet South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-American summit Taiwan talks Thieu tion told triangular diplomacy troops United USSR Viet Vietnam War Washington Watergate White House Winston Lord Zhou Enlai