The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign PolicyOxford University Press, 9 בספט׳ 2004 - 576 עמודים Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated détente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal? In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat. We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir. This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 87
עמוד xvii
... USSR. Having been largely cut off from major foreign policy decisions in past decades, congressional leaders, particularly those with aspirations for higher office, wanted to get their piece of the action. By 1976, moreover, Kissinger's ...
... USSR. Having been largely cut off from major foreign policy decisions in past decades, congressional leaders, particularly those with aspirations for higher office, wanted to get their piece of the action. By 1976, moreover, Kissinger's ...
עמוד xviii
... USSR was commendable. Yet, Kissinger's approach was also limiting and, ultimately, counterproductive. The Flawed Architectillustrates this central flaw in Kissinger's policies by emphasizing the relationship between his overall ...
... USSR was commendable. Yet, Kissinger's approach was also limiting and, ultimately, counterproductive. The Flawed Architectillustrates this central flaw in Kissinger's policies by emphasizing the relationship between his overall ...
עמוד 29
... USSR and its allies to defend socialism in East European countries by force if necessary—often referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine—had apparently been accepted in Washington. In addition, the Soviets continued to support militarily a ...
... USSR and its allies to defend socialism in East European countries by force if necessary—often referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine—had apparently been accepted in Washington. In addition, the Soviets continued to support militarily a ...
עמוד 35
... USSR had only about 1,900), their economic power far exceeded that of any other country (in 1970, for example, the United States' share of gross world product was 23 percent compared to the USSR's 12.4 percent), and Washington's overall ...
... USSR had only about 1,900), their economic power far exceeded that of any other country (in 1970, for example, the United States' share of gross world product was 23 percent compared to the USSR's 12.4 percent), and Washington's overall ...
עמוד 37
... USSR's “current views on the most important international issues.” Rogers used the opportunity to raise the issues of Vietnam and Berlin, emphasizing Washington's hope for a positive Soviet attitude on both. The Soviets were also ready ...
... USSR's “current views on the most important international issues.” Rogers used the opportunity to raise the issues of Vietnam and Berlin, emphasizing Washington's hope for a positive Soviet attitude on both. The Soviets were also ready ...
תוכן
1 | |
17 | |
32 | |
4 Progress and Promise | 55 |
5 Negotiating in the Shadow of War | 68 |
6 Crises and Opportunities | 92 |
7 Breakthroughs | 116 |
Triangular Diplomacy and the IndoPakistani War | 154 |
The October War and Shuttle Diplomacy | 302 |
Watergate Kissinger and Foreign Policy | 332 |
16 Renewal? Ford Vladivostok and Kissinger | 359 |
Exit from Vietnam | 382 |
Angola and East Timor | 399 |
Kissinger and the Marathon of 1976 | 427 |
20 The Chairman On Trial | 457 |
The Flawed Architect | 485 |
9 The Week That Changed the World | 185 |
Triangulation Moscow and Vietnam | 201 |
11 Exiting Vietnam | 228 |
12 Highs and Lows | 260 |
13 Secretary of State | 291 |
Notes | 493 |
Selected Bibliography | 535 |
Index | 541 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
agreed agreement Ambassador Angola April argued August Beijing bombing Brezhnev Cambodia ceasefire Chinese countries crisis December Deng détente Détente and Confrontation diplomatic discussions Dobrynin/Kissinger domestic Duc Tho early election February Ford Ford’s Garthoff Gromyko Haig HAKOF Haldeman Diaries Hanoi Henry Kissinger Huang Huang Chen India Indochina Isaacson Israeli issues January July June Kimball Kissinger and Nixon Kissinger to Nixon Kissinger’s later Le Duc Tho leaders major Mao’s March Memcon Middle East military Moscow negotiations Nixon administration Nixon and Kissinger Nixon’s Vietnam North Vietnamese November NPMP nuclear October opening to China Pakistan Paris peace Pham Van Dong political president presidential relations relationship Rogers role Saigon SALT Scowcroft secret trip secretary Senate September Sino-American Sino-Soviet South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-American summit Taiwan talks Thieu tion told triangular diplomacy troops United USSR Viet Vietnam War Washington Watergate White House Winston Lord Zhou Enlai