The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign PolicyOxford University Press, 9 בספט׳ 2004 - 576 עמודים Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated détente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal? In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat. We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir. This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 89
עמוד xviii
... Chinese in the peace process. But Vietnam was not the only example. Kissinger was concerned about the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971 mainly because of its potential impact on the simultaneous opening to China. Kissinger justified his ...
... Chinese in the peace process. But Vietnam was not the only example. Kissinger was concerned about the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971 mainly because of its potential impact on the simultaneous opening to China. Kissinger justified his ...
עמוד 33
... Chinese leadership simultaneously agonized over the possibility of an escalated military conflict with the Soviets and about the incremental, but noticeable, North Vietnamese gravitation toward the USSR and away from China, Beijing gave ...
... Chinese leadership simultaneously agonized over the possibility of an escalated military conflict with the Soviets and about the incremental, but noticeable, North Vietnamese gravitation toward the USSR and away from China, Beijing gave ...
עמוד 40
... China, became the scene of two military clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops. On both occasions the Chinese, despite inferior weaponry, inflicted significant casualties (up to fifty on March 2 and sixty on the 15th) on the Soviets ...
... China, became the scene of two military clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops. On both occasions the Chinese, despite inferior weaponry, inflicted significant casualties (up to fifty on March 2 and sixty on the 15th) on the Soviets ...
עמוד 41
... Chinese were apparently planning to use the occasion “to establish Mao Zedong's anti-Soviet and chauvinist great power course as the general line of Chinese policy.” The Soviet leadership also warned the East Germans about “Beijing's ...
... Chinese were apparently planning to use the occasion “to establish Mao Zedong's anti-Soviet and chauvinist great power course as the general line of Chinese policy.” The Soviet leadership also warned the East Germans about “Beijing's ...
עמוד 48
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
תוכן
1 | |
17 | |
32 | |
4 Progress and Promise | 55 |
5 Negotiating in the Shadow of War | 68 |
6 Crises and Opportunities | 92 |
7 Breakthroughs | 116 |
Triangular Diplomacy and the IndoPakistani War | 154 |
The October War and Shuttle Diplomacy | 302 |
Watergate Kissinger and Foreign Policy | 332 |
16 Renewal? Ford Vladivostok and Kissinger | 359 |
Exit from Vietnam | 382 |
Angola and East Timor | 399 |
Kissinger and the Marathon of 1976 | 427 |
20 The Chairman On Trial | 457 |
The Flawed Architect | 485 |
9 The Week That Changed the World | 185 |
Triangulation Moscow and Vietnam | 201 |
11 Exiting Vietnam | 228 |
12 Highs and Lows | 260 |
13 Secretary of State | 291 |
Notes | 493 |
Selected Bibliography | 535 |
Index | 541 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
agreed agreement Ambassador Angola April argued August Beijing bombing Brezhnev Cambodia ceasefire Chinese countries crisis December Deng détente Détente and Confrontation diplomatic discussions Dobrynin/Kissinger domestic Duc Tho early election February Ford Ford’s Garthoff Gromyko Haig HAKOF Haldeman Diaries Hanoi Henry Kissinger Huang Huang Chen India Indochina Isaacson Israeli issues January July June Kimball Kissinger and Nixon Kissinger to Nixon Kissinger’s later Le Duc Tho leaders major Mao’s March Memcon Middle East military Moscow negotiations Nixon administration Nixon and Kissinger Nixon’s Vietnam North Vietnamese November NPMP nuclear October opening to China Pakistan Paris peace Pham Van Dong political president presidential relations relationship Rogers role Saigon SALT Scowcroft secret trip secretary Senate September Sino-American Sino-Soviet South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-American summit Taiwan talks Thieu tion told triangular diplomacy troops United USSR Viet Vietnam War Washington Watergate White House Winston Lord Zhou Enlai