of nature and disposition to the object beloved, and an endeavour after more. And this is a maxim that will in no case hold more infalible than in moral subjects. It is impossible that we can love purity, if ourselves are impure; nay, it is even impossible that we can understand it. Though an unholy person may have a very penetrating genius and capacity, may think acutely, and perhaps reason justly upon many, or most of the natural attributes of God, he can neither perceive nor admire his moral excellence. Instead of perceiving the glory of God as infinitely holy, he hates, and sets himself to oppose this part of his character, or to substitute something quite different in its room.* Or if we can suppose him able, or from any particular reason inclined, to tell the truth, as to what God is, he can never discern or feel his glory or beauty in being such. For why! he himself is unholy; that is to say, in other words, he supremely loves, and hath his affections habitually fixed, upon something that is not God, something that is contrary to God's nature, and a breach of his law.

Let us continue to reflect a few moments upon this subject, which is of great importance, varying a little the light in which it is viewed. Let us consider what is meant by a supreme and super lative love to

God's

*This is the true reason why many so warmly oppose vindictive justice, and that in the face of many awful examples of it, even in the present partial and imperfect dispensa tion. That there are many marks of God's displeasure against sin, even in that part of his government which is at present subjected to our view, and also distinct warnings of a stricter reckoning to come, I should think, might be to an impartial person past all doubt; and yet this is derided, and denied by many, merely because they can never think, that a perfection in the divine nature, for which they have no love or esteem in their own hearts. All who love God, then, must be like him; and even those who will not be what he really is, are always strongly inclined, at least to suppose him what they themselves

are.

God. These words must have a meaning. It is not a supreme love of a certain nature, or person, called God, whom no man hath seen, and of whom we know no more but the name. In this case the old maxim would hold, Ignoti nulla cupido; there can be no affection, of either love or hatred, towards an object wholly unknown. A supreme love of God therefore, where it really hath place in any heart, must mean the love of a character in some measure understood, though not fully comprehended. In short, according to the Scriptures, it is a supreme love of the source and pattern of moral excellence, of a being of infinite holiness and purity, with whom "evil cannot dwell." Is not this, in truth and reality, the love of holiness itself, the supreme love of it? Can we love holiness then, and not aspire after it? can we love it, and not endeavour to practise it? nay, can we love it, and not possess it? can we love holiness supremely, and live in sin habitually? It is the grossest contradiction, the most absolute impossibility. There is then a diametrical opposition between the iove of God and the service of sin. To suppose them consistent, would be supposing, that the tendency of the heart and affections might be opposite to the course of the life, or supremely fixed upon two things mutually destructive to each other: on the contrary, our Saviour justly affirms, that "no man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon."

Once more, Is not the love of God, I mean the supreme love of God, precisely what is meant by holiness? It is not only an evidence of it, not only a source of it, not only an important branch, but the sum and perfection of it. For what is sin in the heart, of which all evil actions are but the fruits and expressions, and from which they derive their malignity and contrariety to the divine will? Is it not the love and

pursuit of inferior objects on their own account, and giving them that place in our affections which is due only to God? All sins of whatever kind, may be easily reduced to this, and shown to be nothing else, but the alienation and estrangement of our heart and affections from God, to whom alone they are due: which, so far as it prevails, necessarily occasions a misapplication of every faculty of our minds, and of every member of our bodies, and thus a rebellion of the whole man. But whoever loves God above all, and places his chief happiness and delight in him, is truly holy; not only will be so as the effect, but really is so, by the possession of this disposition. In proportion as this love is increased and strengthened, his sanctification is carried on; and when it is complete and triumphant, entirely free from the mixture of any baser passion, he is perfect in holiness.

It may probably occur to some readers, that this reasoning will not accord with the accounts given by many moderns of the nature and foundation of virtue. Some found it upon the present prevailing tendency of our own dispositions, and make it point directly and immediately at our own happiness: others found it upon our connexions with our fellow-creatures in this state, and make it consist in benevolence of heart, and beneficence of action; others again, who approach nearer the truth, but without precision, style it an acting towards every object, according to reason and the nature of things. Upon any of these schemes, the connexion, or rather coincidence, above alleged, between the love of God and virtue or moral excellence, does not so clearly appear. This indeed seems to me the great defect of these accounts of the nature and foundation of virtue, that they keep our relation and obligations to God at a distance at least, and much out of view. But as this is the first commandment of the law which God hath revealed to man for his obedience, "Thou shalt love the

Lord with all thy heart, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind;" so, upon a fair and just examination, the supreme love of God will be found the most consistent and rational account of the nature of virtue, and the true source from which all other virtues that are not spurious, must take their rise, and from which they derive their force and obligation. It is founded, not only upon the relation of creatures to their Creator, but on the inherent excellence of the divine nature. For supposing (what will scarcely be denied) that God may be at all the object of our esteem and love, it is plain that we ought to have the highest esteem for the highest excellence, a supreme love for what is infinitely aimiable; and if our affections do in any measure prefer what is less to what is more worthy, they must be, in that proportion, wrong and misplaced.

As to some of the phrases (for they are no more) which come into repute together, or in succession one after another, to express the rise and foundation of virtue, such as a sense of beauty, of harmony, of order and proportion, this is no explication of the matter at all; it is only transferring the language used with respect to sensible objects, to ethics or morality, in which it must be understood figuratively. That there is some analogy between those subjects and morality, may be easily confessed; but there are few different subjects in nature, between which as strong or stronger analogy may not be traced. For example, how easy would it be to reduce all notions of morality, nay, indeed all notions of beauty in painting, or harmony in music, to truth and reality, in opposition to falsehood! Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated is an example of this, in which he resolves the morality or immorality of every action, into the truth or falsehood of a proposition. And whoever reads the book will, I dare say, be sensible, that it is just as natural and proper as a certain noble author's rhapsodies upon

beauty and harmony. In short, it were easy to show that none of the accounts given of the nature of virtue have any meaning, truth, or force in them, but so far as they are founded upon, or coincident with that which I have above given from the word of God.*

*There is one late writer, David Hume, Esq. who, it must be confessed, hath excelled all that went before him in an extraordinary account of the nature of virtue. I have taken no notice above of his principles, if they may be called so, because I think both him and them worthy of the highest contempt; and would have disdained to have made mention of his name, but that it affords me an opportunity of expressing my sense of the wrong measures taken by many worthy and able men, who, in sermons and other discourses, give grave and serious answers to his writings. As to himself, that man must be beyond the reach of conviction by reasoning, who is capable of such an insult upon reason itself and human nature as to rank all natural advantages, mental and corporeal, among the virtues, and their contraries among the vices. Thus he hath expressly named wit, genius, health, cleanliness, taper legs, and broad shoulders among his virtues; diseases he also makes vices; and, consistently enough, indeed, takes notice of the infectious nature of some diseases, which, I suppose, he reckons an aggravation of the crime. And, as to mankind in general, if they were at that pass as to need a refutation of such nonsense, as well as impiety, it would be in vain to reason with them at all. If I were to contrive an answer to this writer, it would be a visible, instead of a legible answer: it would be to employ a painter to make a portrait of him from the life; to encompass him with a few hieroglyphics, which it would not be difficult to devise; to inscribe upon his breast these words, HEALTH, CLEANLINESS, and BROAD SHOULDERS; and put the following sentence in his mouth, which he hath adopted from a French author, "FEMALE INFIDELITY when it is known, is a small matter, and when it is not known is nothing." This would be very proper when applied to his writings, who, as well as his friend and coadjutor without a name, makes "our most important reasoning upon many subjects, to rest ultimately upon sense and feeling." It is probable some over-delicate persons will think this is not treating him with sufficient decency; but till there be a plan agreed upon, of the measures of decency due from infidels to