verse, are now afloat, to which philosophy must adjust herself. This Sir Wm. did not do, owing partially to the fact that they were not agitated to so great an extent in his day. And Mr. Mill also fails as yet in this department. At present, therefore, there is not a philosopher who has elaborated a system exactly suited to the wants of the age. Doubtless this will by and by be forthcoming; but it is not as yet. At present, therefore, there is a two-fold movement observable among scientifico-philosophical minds. On the one hand there is a tendency towards a materialistic terminus that may resolve itself into a nothingism when reached. "On the other hand, unless I am mistaken,' observes our author, "there has been and is now a drift of a large quantity of speculative thought on through pure idealism towards something like Schelling's and Hegel's doctrine of the absolute identity of subject and object." Perhaps in some minds these two tendencies may lead to the doctrine understood to be that of the unintelligible Hegel, viz., that nothing and absolute being are one and the same, and as such is the one sole substance of which all things are simple modes. To the Christian soul this may seem a sad and desponding description of the state of thought in our midst. In one sense it is, but in another sense it is not. We must remember that things, when at the worst, are always at the turning point toward a state of betterness. So it is here. The darkness will give place to a bright and glorious light. Out of chaos the cosmos will arise that for harmony, stretch, and power will exceed any such thing that has gone before. Signs are abroad, not a few, that point to a day when the foundation of all real thought will be discovered, on which a glorious superstructure of loveliness will be raised to the honour of men and to the glory of God. Chapter IV. is occupied with the "Latest Drifts and Groupings," in which there is an attempt to enumerate "the chief currents and eddies of philosophical opinion that are now meeting and traversing each other at all angles within Great Britain." In a cursory manner the author surveys the works and theories of the British Comtists; Mr. Lewes and Miss Martineau; Messrs. Bain and Herbert Spencer; Hamiltonianism and its modifications; Mr. Ferrier and a British Hegelian; Swedenborgianism and Spiritualism; and the last section of this last chapter is devoted to a critique on John S. Mill's review of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy. From what Professor Masson says, it is evident that he is a warm admirer of the late Scotch philosopher, who, according to his thinking, has not been honoured so highly by his opponent as he should be. At the same time he is candid enough to admit that Mr. Mill has written a work that tells with power on some of Hamilton's positions. But into this we cannot enter at present. We have said enough to indicate the nature of the work before us. We forgot to mention that the substance of the volume was originally delivered as a series of lectures; and this, in our estimation, is an advantage to most readers. We commend it cordially to those who have a taste for such discussions, being assured that they will be both assisted and stimulated by its pages. W. A.-P. The Miracles: Helps to Faith, not Hindrances. By William M. Taylor, M.A., Liverpool. Edinburgh: Oliphant. 1865. AN able and useful treatise on a great subject. Mr. Taylor discusses such aspects of the subject as the following:-Definition of a Miracle; -Possibility of Miracles;- Credibility of Miracles;-Evidence in behalf of Miracles;-The Mythical Theory of Strauss ;-The Legendary Theory of Renan ;-The Evidential value of Miracles. All of these topics are handled in a manner that reflects the highest credit on the author. We could have wished a more elaborate discussion of the criteria by which, in the matter of miracles, we are to distinguish the wheat from the chaff, so that we may set aside and shelve the "evidential value" of the "lying wonders of Satan," (2 Thessalonians ii. 9),—the "miracles which the spirits of devils work," (Revelation xvi. 14),—the “false prophet's miracles," (Revelation xix. 20.) We are not quite satisfied, indeed, with the author's Definition of a Miracle. To say, with Dr. W. L. Alexander, that it is "a sensible effect produced by the immediate power of God," (p. 13), may be saying too little on the one hand, and assuming too much on the other. There may, we conceive, be "many sensible effects produced by the immediate power of God" which are not miracles in Mr. Taylor's sense of the term. We are not sure, indeed, about the propriety of excluding the immediate power of God from any of the sensible effects of which we are conscious. And on the other hand, we do not see that Elisha's preservation was in any degree the less miraculous, because, in addition to the presence of God, the mountain on which he stood was girdled round and round with invisible "horses and chariots of fire." Neither would we regard the giving of the law on Sinai, as having its "evidential value" depreciated into something lower than the miraculous, by the fact that it was effected "by the disposition of angels." (Acts vii. 53; Gal. iii. 19; Heb. ii. 2; Ps. lxviii. 17.) Mr. Taylor, while taking Dr. Alexander's cue, likewise takes another, and defines a miracle to be "something which we see and know to be inconsistent with certain laws of nature." (p. 16.) But here, too, we have some objections. We are not sure that it is possible for any thing to be realised that is "inconsistent with certain laws of nature." When a boy lifts up a stone and throws it into the air, he does not do anything that is in the slightest degree inconsistent with the law of gravitation. During the whole process of the boy's acting, the law of gravitation performs its full work, both on him and on the stone, as well as on all around. But another force had come into play; and it too did its work. What then, if it should be the case that a third force, though invisible, should lift the boy himself, either with or without his stone, and carry him to the top of a mountain, or to the highest pinnacle of a temple or a tower, or, let us say, even into the third heavens? What then? We do not see that there would be the slightest evidence of any thing having transpired that could be said to be really "inconsistent" with an law of nature. But we must not enter farther into the discussion of this far-reaching topic. A Lecture on Conversion. By the Rev. John Reid, of Windermere. London: Jackson, Walford, &c. Second edition. 1865. WE have been greatly delighted with this admirable lecture. And we are, therefore, truly glad to notice that it has reached a second edition. THE EVANGELICAL REPOSITORY. THIRD SERIES. No. XV. - MARCH, 1866. THE DECALOGUE AND THE SABBATH. KNOW YE NOT, BRETHREN, FOR I SPEAK TO THEM THAT KNOW THE LAW, HOW THAT THE LAW HATH DOMINION OVER A MAN AS LONG AS HE LIVETH?" ROM. VII. I. "THE LAW HATH DOMINION OVER A MAN AS LONG AS HE LIVETH." So says that great Apostle, who has expounded to us, at once with the greatest simplicity, and with the greatest sublimity, the gospel of God's grace. What does he mean? What does he mean by the Law? What does he mean when he says that this law hath dominion over a man, or, over the man, -over the human being? What does he mean when he adds the qualifying clause-as long as he liveth? Can it be the case that, in affirming that the "law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth," he contradicts what he had previously said in the fourteenth verse of the sixth chapter of the epistle,-"ye are not under the law, but under grace"? Can it be the case that he repeats the contradiction, when he proceeds to say, in a subsequent, but adjacent, verse of this seventh chapter, the 6th,-"we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held"? Is the law, according to this latter statement, dead,-buried,-abrogated,-abolished, so that no man need any more concern himself with its obsolete precepts on the one hand, or with its impotent threatenings on the other? If so, and if the Apostle says that it is so, how comes it to pass, that he nevertheless says, in the expression before us, "know ye not, brethren, how that the law hath dominion over a man, as long as he liveth"? The theory of the Apostle's contradiction and recontradiction of himself, is not, to say the least of it,-a very likely one. And its unlikelihood tapers off almost, if not altogether, to infinitude, when we assume, as we are entitled to do, that he was No. 15.] L [Vol. 4. not only a logical reasoner, but also an inspired expositor of the gospel of salvation. We may surely be pardoned, then, for laying this theory aside, and turning elsewhere for a solution of the difficulty, if difficulty there really be. We assume that the law referred to, is, substantially, that particular element of the Old Testament Revelation, which exhibits not the specific duty of Jews as Jews, but the general duty of man as man. The word law, indeed, has in the writings of the Apostle a somewhat varied range of reference. It sometimes denotes, for instance, the whole of the Old Testament Revelation. And most appropriately is it thus employed; for that Revelation was truly, in its entirety, an authoritative exhibition of the will of God. Sometimes, again, the word denotes that portion of the entire Old Testament Revelation, which is comprised in the Five Books of Moses. That was the first written Revelation of the will of God. But the Old Testament Revelation of God's Will, whether as embodied in the Five Books of Moses, or as comprehending the Psalms and the Prophets in addition, is a multiform or many-sided thing. It may consequently be looked at, now on this side of its unity, and now on that. It exhibits, for instance, in some of its elements, what is the duty of man as man. In other elements, again, it assumes and proclaims that man is sinful; and it exhibits the divine grace that is extended to man as such, and the duty that is devolving on him in consequence of this grace. In other and very numerous constituents of its many-sided unity, it exhibits what were the duties, and what were the privileges, of Jewish men, as Jewish men. The Apostle, in using the word law, uses it as a great and comprehensive-minded thinker might be expected to use it,— realizing the complexity involved in its unity. He hence contemplates the complex object which it represents, at very varied angles of vision. And, as was not unnatural, he frequently shifts his stand-point, moving rapidly round the object of his contemplation, and looking at it in a succession of its manifold aspects. Unless we bear in mind that in speaking of the law, the Apostle was thus dealing with a many-sided unity, we shall be often perplexed when we try to follow in the train of his discussions. It is demonstrable, we conceive, that in the passage before us, and in the greater part of the immediate context, the Apostle is referring to the law-viewed as an authoritative revelation of the will of God in reference to man as man. He is referring to the law, in other words, viewed in that element of its entirety, And that constitutes what is commonly called the moral law. this particular aspect of the sum-total of the law was, to the Apostle, that which was singled out and marked off in the Old Testament phraseology as "the ten words," and which is often called in our current conventional terminology the decalogue. That it was to this decalogue,-which was but the expansion, in a direction mainly prohibitory, of the glorious duologue,— that the Apostle refers in the passage, in which our text occurs, seems to be demonstrated by what he says in the course of his argumentation. Look, for instance, at the 7th verse of the chapter-"What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust,-(concupiscence, inordinate desire,—a kind of covetousness,)-except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." It seems to be evident that the Apostle is referring to the law, in that element of its entirety which exhibits the duty of man as man, and which, therefore, when transgressed, makes known to us our actual sinfulness. He is referring to that element of the law that contains this as one of its commandments,-"Thou shalt not covet." The quotation of this particular commandment, combined with the reasoning in which the quotation is embedded, seems to demonstrate that he is referring to the decalogue. This seems to be as evidently his reference, as in that other passage-chapt. xiii. 8, 9,-where he says;-"Owe no man anything, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law." What law? Why, assuredly, the decalogue, for the Apostle goes on to say,-"For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." We are constrained, then, to understand the apostle as referring to that specific aspect of the sum-total of the divine Authoritative Revelation, that is realized in the Decalogue. The argument in support of this interpretation of his reference might be elaborated into a multitude of minute details, cumulative in their evidence. But what we have said seems sufficient. Assuming, then, that the reference of the word law is to that which is both the decalogue and the duologue, what does the Apostle mean when he speaks of this law "having dominion over a man?" He means, we answer, that it has power over the man referred to,-executive power,-executive power to deal with the man as he deserves. If this be the Apostle's meaning, it is evident that he did not look upon the law as powerless, as de |