tection. The Chriftian is perfuaded, that Man has fallen from the State of Innocence in which he was created; that, being a Sinner, he has no Claim upon God by his Obedience, but ftands in Need of Pardon and that, being now weak through Sin, he ftands in Need of Grace and Affiftance to enable him to perform the Conditions on which the Pardon of God is offered: And he believes that God has indeed pardoned Mankind, and granted them Reconciliation, being thereunto moved by the Obedience and Sufferings of his Son Christ Jesus; and that he hath promised, and will furely give his Grace and Affiftance to all true Believers in Chrift, to enable them to perform the Conditions of his Pardon.

What the Chriftian thus believes, the Gospel plainly teaches: And these are the great Points to be made good; and they are briefly comprehended in the Words of the Text, That Jefus Chrift came into the World to fave Sinners.

To illuftrate and confirm this Propofition, it will be proper to fhew,

First, What Reafon we have to believe that Men were Sinners, and ftood in Need of Pardon and Salvation.

Secondly,

Secondly, By what Means Chrift perfected their Redemption and Salvation.

The first Question is, What Reason have we to believe that Men were Sinners, and ftood in Need of Pardon?

It is a Saying of St. Auftin's, Si non periisset Homo, non veniffet Chriftus; If Man had not fallen, Chrift bad not come: And our Lord fpeaks to the fame Senfe, when he tells us, The Son of Man is come to feek and to fave that which was loft: And his Answer to those who reproached him with converfing with Publicans and Sinners ftands upon the fame Ground; They that are whole need not a Phyfician, but they that are fick. Had Man continued in Innocence, the Religion of Nature would have answered all the Ends of his Creation: He wanted no Redeemer in his natural State; for it would be abfurd to fuppofe that Chrift came to redeem Man from the State and Condition in which God made him. After the Works of the Creation were finifhed, God liked them all, and faw every thing that he had made; and behold it was very good: In this State therefore nothing was wanting to the Perfection of the Creature: God was pleased with all his Works, and with Man especially, to whom

he gave Dominion over the rest of the World. In this State therefore there was no Want of a Reconciler between God and Man; nor would there ever have been any such Want, had this happy State continued.

That Innocence and Virtue fhall be rewarded, Guilt and Iniquity punished, is no more than what natural Senfe and Reafon have always taught the confidering Part of Mankind: For the Voice of Reason and of the Law are in this Respect the fame, This do, and thou shalt live. And though Man is altered and changed, yet the Nature of Things is ftill the fame; and he is no ill Reafoner, who, from the abftracted Confideration of Virtue and Vice, concludes, that Virtue has a juft Title to Reward, and Vice deferves Punishment: And it is no Wonder that they who argue upon these general Views only, fhould imagine, that moral Virtue may ftill exalt a Man to all the Degrees of Happiness that his Nature is capable of.

In the celebrated Question concerning the Merit of good Works, there has arose much Confufion, for Want of distinguishing between good Works, fimply and in their own

Nature

Nature confidered, and confidered as done or performed by the Sons of Men. The firft is a fingle Question; Whether Virtue in its own Nature has a Title to Reward? And who will deny it: For as fure as God is juft, as fure as there is a Difference between Good and Evil, he will, he must reward the one, and punish the other. But when you afk, Whether the good Works of Men deferve and merit Reward? you frangely alter the State of the Question; for here not only the Nature of good Works, but the Nature and Condition of Man must be confidered too. If he has already concluded himself, if Sentence is gone out against him, and his Cafe be irretrievable, your Question must be impertinent; because you ask, Whether he, who is already under Condemnation for his evil Works, may be rewarded for his good Works?

Put the Cafe, that a Man ten Years ago committed a fecret and barbarous Murder; that fince he has lived in an unblameable Submiffion and Obedience to the Government: Ask then the Queftion, Whether Submiffion and Obedience to the Government have a Right and Title to Protection and Defence in Life and Fortune? Every

Man

But ask again,

Man will anfwer, Yes. Whether this Man's Obedience and Submiffion have the fame Right and Title? Every Man will anfwer, No: Because the Villainy committed long fince puts him out of Protection of the Government, and Justice is ftill indebted to him for the horrid Fact; and whenever it meets him will execute upon him Wrath and Vengeance.

I intend not to prefs this Inftance to a Parallel with our Cafe: But thus much, at leaft, it fhews, That Virtue and Morality may, in their own Nature, and in themfelves confidered, deferve Reward from a juft and righteous Being; and yet the Virtue and Morality of Man may not deserve it. And this is the parting Point between the Patrons of Natural and Revealed Religion; the not confidering which has made fome imagine, that, whilft we defend the Authority of Revelation, we give up the Principles of Reafon and Nature. Is there not, say they, an effential Difference between Virtue and Vice? True, there is. Is not Justice the Attribute of God; and muft not a just God reward Virtue, and punish Vice? True ftill. Is not this then, fay they, a sufficient Foundation for Religion, without recurring

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