of a noble Spirit. For that Love of Praise can never be criminal, that excites and enables a Man to do a great deal more Good than he could do without it. And perhaps there never was a fine Genius or a noble Spirit, that rofe above the common Level, and diftinguished itself by high Attainments in what is truly excellent, but was fecretly, and perhaps infenfibly, prompted by the Impulse of this Paffion.

But, on the contrary, if a Man's Views centre only in the Applause of others, whether it be deserved or not; if he pants after Popularity and Fame, not regarding how he comes by it; if his Paffion for Praise urge him to stretch himself beyond the Line of his Capacity, and to attempt. Things to which he is unequal; to condescend to mean Arts and low Diffimulation for the Sake of a Name; and in a finifter, indirect Way, fue hard for a little Incense, not caring from whom he receives it; his Ambition then becomes Vanity. And if it excite a Man to wicked Attempts, make him willing to facrifice theEfteem of all wife and good Men to the Acclamations of a Mob; to overleap the Bounds of Decency and Truth, and break thro' the Obligations of Honour and Virtue, it is then not only Vanity, but Vice; a Vice the most destructive to the Peace and Happiness of Human Society, and which of all others hath made the greateft Havock and Devastation among Men.

What an Inftance have we here of the wide Difference between common Opinion and Truth? That a Vice fo big with Mischief and Mifery fhould be mistaken for a Virtue! And that they who have been moft infamous for it should be crowned with Laurels, even by those who have been ruined by it; and have those Laurels perpetuated by the common Confent of Men through after Ages! Seneca's Judgment of Alexander is certainly more agreeable to Truth than the common. Opinion; who called him " a publick Cut-throat, " rather than a Hero; and who, in seeking only "to be a Terror to Mankind, arose to no greater "an Excellence, than what belonged to the most ❝hurtful and hateful Animals on Earth (p)."

Certain

(p) Quid enim fimile habebat vefanus Adolefcens, cui pro virtute erat felix Temeritas ?.. Hic a pueritiâ latro, gentiumque Vaftator, tam hoftium pernicies quam amicorum. Qui fummum bonum duceret terrori effe cunétis mortalibus: oblitus non ferociffima tantùm, fed ignaviffima quoque animalia, timeri ob virus malum. Sen. de Benef. cap. 13.

How different from this is the Judgment of Plutarch in this Matter? who, in his Oration concerning the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander, exalts him into a true Hero; and juftifies all the Wafte he made of Mankind under (the fame Colour with which the Spaniards excufed their inhuman Barbarities towards the poor Indians, viz.) a Pretence of civilizing them. And in attributing all his Succefs to his Virtue, he talks more like a Soldier serving under him in his Wars, than an Hiftorian who lived many Years afterwards, whofe Bufinefs it was to tranfmit his Character impartially to future Ages. And in whatever other refpects Mr. Dryden may give the Preference to Plutarch before Seneca, (which he does with much Zeal in his Preface to Plutarch's Lives) yet it must be allowed that, in this Inftance at leaft, the latter shows more of the Philefopher. See Plut, Mor, Vol, i, ad fin.

Certain it is, that thefe falfe Heroes who feek their Glory from the Deftruction of their own Species, are of all Men moft ignorant of themfelves; and by this wicked Ambition entail Infamy and Curfes upon their Name, instead of that immortal Glory they pursued. According to the Prophets Words, Woe to him who coveteth an evil Covetousness to his House, that he may fet his Neft on high; that he may be delivered from the Power of Evil. Thou haft confulted Shame to thine Houses by cutting off many People; and haft finned against thy Soul (q).

Now no Man can truly know himself till he be acquainted with this, which is so often the fecret and unperceived Spring of his Actions, and obferves how far it governs him in his Conversation and Conduct; Virtue and real Excellence will rife to View, tho' they be not mounted on the Wings of Ambition, which by foaring too high procures. but a more fatal Fall.

And to correct the Irregularity and Extravagance of this Paffion, let us but reflect how airy. and unfubftantial a Pleasure the highest Gratifications of it afford; how many cruel Mortifica. tions

(q) Hab. ii. 9, 10. yn yr yn: that gaineth a wicked Gain.

Oh Sons of Earth! Attempt ye still to rife,
By Mountains pil'd on Mountains, to the Skies ?
Heav'n still with Laughter the vain Toil surveys,
And buries Madmen in the Heaps they raise.
Who wickedly is wife, or madly brave,
Is but the more a Fool, or more a Knave.

Pope's Effay on Man

tions it exposes us to, by awakening the Envy of others; to what Meanness it often makes us fubmit; how frequently it lofeth its End by purfuing it with too much Ardor; and how much more folid Pleasure the Approbation of Confcience will yield, than the Acclamations of ignorant and mistaken Men, who, judging by Externals only, cannot know our true Character; and whose Commendations a wife Man would rather despise than court. ‹ Examine but the Size of People's Senfe, and the Condition of their Underftanding, and you will never be fond of Popularity, nor afraid of Cenfure; nor folicitous what Judgment they may form of you 'who know not how to judge rightly of them• felves (r).

(γ) Διελθε.εσω εις τα ηγεμονικα αυτων, και οψει τινας κρίλας φοβή οιες και περί αυτών οντας κριτας, Mark Anton, lib. ix. 18.

CHAP.

CHA P. XIII.

What kind of Knowledge we are already furnifhed with, and what Degree of Esteem we set upon it.

XII. MAN can never rightly know him

Afeif, unles be examines into his Know

ledge of other Things.

We must confider then the Knowledge we have; and whether we do not fet too high a Price upon it, and too great a Value upon ourselves on the Account of it; of what real Use it is to us, and what Effect it hath upon us; whether it does not make us too ftiff, unfociable, and affuming; tefty and fupercilious, and ready to despise others for their fuppofed Ignorance. If fo, our Knowledge, be it what it will, does us more Harm than Good. We were better without it; Ignorance itself would not render us fo ridiculous. Such a Temper, with all our Knowledge, fhows that we know not ourselves.

A Man is certainly proud of that Knowledge he defpifes others for the Want of."

How common is it for fome Men to be fond of appearing to know more than they do, and of feeming to be thought Men of Knowledge? To which End they exhauft their Fund almoft in all Companies, to outfhine the reft. So that in two or three Conversations they are drawn dry,

and