skilled in the art of speaking so far as it is possible for a man to be so;" a most marvellous illustration of the power of him who spake as never man spake, who needed not that any should testify of men, for he knew what was in man. He varied the prescription according to the diagnosis. To one man he said, "Sell all thou hast ;" to another, "Ye must be born again; " to a third, "Keep the two commandments of the law: he took the wise in their own craftiness, and upon the vision of the dreamer he opened such glories as had never shone from the artificial heavens of the poets.

We may claim for Christ's "sayings " an originality, a compass, and living energy such as have not been rivalled by any speaker. This would probably be admitted even by the more self-controlled class of sceptics. Assuming this to be so, we are thrown back upon an old inquiry, "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works? Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary, and his brethren James, and Joses, and Simon, and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence, then, hath this man all these things?" That question remains to be answered by those who deny his Godhead. Viewed from the human stand-point, how could Christ's contemporaries be other than confounded by Christ's wisdom? Can any man rise above the normal conditions of his race? Is there a secret way from the nethermost stratum of society up to the eminence of superhuman wisdom? How is it that only one man has ventured on the giddy ascent? His

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sayings" have no charm of style; poetic surprises are never attempted; nearly everything is curt, abrupt, and barely allusive, yet to-day, as in the days of his flesh, all who weigh his words come to the conclusion that " never man spake like this man." Is there no argument in this?

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IT

T is held by many to be a hard thing that any man should be damned for not believing "these sayings of mine." This conclusion must have been reached through a most incomplete apprehension of the term "belief." In the course of this argument, we have had repeated occasion to state that a man's belief is that by which his whole life is governed, the foundation of his character, the very vitality of his manhood. It can hardly be repeated too often, that belief is not a mere mental assent to a proposition, but the resting and consequent risking of the whole life upon the truth of that proposition.

By setting aside, for the moment, the term "belief" on account of the narrow theological associations which have been unjustly gathered around it, the point may to some extent be elucidated by another word which has no such associations attaching to it,— that word is character. Now, as we have found ourselves at liberty, on the authority of Christ himself, to reason from the human towards the divine, let us in a familiar manner try what can be done by an analogical process. Is there anything in the constitution of human society which will throw at least an edge of light around the awful mystery of endless punishment?

It will not be denied, at the onset, that there are many persons whom a virtuous man would not admit to his confidence or hospitality. Ask the reason, and the answer will be, "The persons have lost their good character, they are dissipated, vicious, and altogether unworthy of respect or confidence." Here, then, is a point to begin at. It is conceded by this answer that purity of character is the indispensable qualification for admission into virtuous society, and by so much it is shown that a bad man is “damned," ostracized (or soften it into unrecognized), solely on the ground of vice. But what is vice? Is it not the practical side of belief? The man believes in vice as a principle, or a policy, or an enjoyment, and therefore he pursues it. But by pursuing it he becomes socially a condemned man; he that believeth not (he that is not virtuous) is damned. It may be urged that a man may have many heterodox notions about religion, and yet his social repute may be irreproachable; and on the other hand, that a man's notions about religion may be orthodox, while his life is sinful. This is true, but it merely throws us back upon a definition already laid down, viz., that belief is not intellectual, but moral: "with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; so that religion is not a question of mere notions, but the expression of the entire spiritual life. It would be as logical to contend that a man is going a journey because he can explain the construction of an engine as to contend that a man is going to heaven because he can correctly answer theological questions. Salvation turns upon spiritual vitality, and spiritual vitality is represented by the right use of the term faith. It

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nust never be absent from the mind that religion is not a set of opinions, but life in Jesus Christ. So far, then, we find society doing precisely what God does, viz., drawing a broad line of demarcation between the virtuous and the vicious, in other words, establishing a system of rewards and punishments based cxclusively on morals. Society has found this to be necessary to its own preservation and prosperity, for all history has gone to show that, apart from every theological system, the moral element has always determined the true value of civilization. Virtue has meant safety; vice has meant danger. This is a fact of immense value in an inductive inquiry respecting rewards and punishments.

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It is now proposed to show that, in the matter of endless punishment for sin, society does, in its degree, precisely what Almighty God is declared in the Christian writings to do. If God punishes the finally impenitent forever, man does the same thing, and does it necessarily necessarily because of the demands. of the moral universe without, as well as the exactions of the moral principle within. In other words, the very constitution of the moral universe demands and necessitates the endless punishment of the impenitent. How we may work our way to this conclusion will now appear.

It is objected that there is no proportion between time and eternity, and, consequently, that to punish man eternally for doing wrong in his short lifetime is inequitable. While it is not denied that punishment is merited, it is contended that there should be some proportion between the crime and the penalty.