EDWARD.

There are a great number of religions, differing widely from each other, both as to their doctrines and as to the influence which they respectively possess. The classification of them would be a very perplexing affair: and then they are subdivided into an infinite number of sects and parties; so that it would be very difficult to ascertain even the mere matter-of-fact as to what was believed, and by whom it was believed.

MR. B.

Nevertheless, make the attempt. All nations either believe in the existence of one God or of more Gods than one.

EDWARD.

By this means I am enabled to put them under the heads of Theists and Polytheists, and may discard the latter from further consideration, from the evident absurdity of their tenets.

MR. B

The Theists you may also range under four heads of Jews, Mohammedans, Christians, and Deists. In what do they agree, and in what do they differ?

EDWARD.

They all acknowledge one God; and the three first allege that he has made a revelation of his will to mankind: but these again differ as to the

extent of the revelation, and the persons to whom it was communicated; all three agreeing as to the divine legation of Moses, the two last also adding that of Christ, and the last that of Mahomet.

MR. B.

So much for the fact of belief; now consider that of numbers.

EDWARD.

Here nearly all is left to the Christians and Mohammedans, the numbers of the other two being very small in comparison.

MR. B.

Lastly, take into account character and influence.

EDWARD.

Here nearly all is left to the Christians.

MR. B.

Then has not Christianity the first claims on your attention? Again, if Christianity be founded in falsehood, Mohammedism at once falls to the ground with it, and, in the opinion of all except the Jews, Judaism also: so that the question ultimately reduces itself to Christianity, or no revealed religion; as Paley has stated it in the beginning of his work on the Evidences. Further, Mohammedism cannot be from God, inasmuch as it professes to be of universal obligation, and yet commands observances which in the nature of

things cannot be universally observed. The religion said to have been promulgated by Moses and the other prophets previously to the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the nation, was designed for that nation only, and we cannot therefore immediately argue as to its truth or falsity. The Jews of modern time and the rest of the world differ, however, as to the true interpretation of the religious books of the former; and if the anti-Judaical interpretation be correct, modern Judaism is untenable, which is rendered almost a matter of certainty, by the fact that hitherto all their calculations and expectations have proved fallacious. Lastly, Christianity professes to be of universal obligation, and contains within it nothing repugnant to the possibility of the assertion. It has also stood the test of time, and has never yet been positively demonstrated to be false. It is held by the most enlightened nations in the world, and hence arises at least some degree of probability for its truth. Now, under all these circumstances, which are mere matters of fact acknowledged by foes as well as friends, the advocate for Christianity maintains its pre-eminent claims to a full investigation. Admitting, for argument's sake, the possibility that the Deistical creed is correct, according to their own sentiments as to the importance of truth, they must, out of their own mouths, be condemned of God for not inquiring into the

truth of a religion which at first appeared likely to be from Him.

BEATRICE.

This is to me perfectly convincing. I am only surprised at your arguing so long upon a point which I was not aware was disputed, as to the claims of Christianity to examination: and yet you have not brought forward the consequences in a future state, should the Christian statement prove true.

MR. B.

a Christian may

I have not, and for this reason, tell an unbeliever that his happiness or misery in a future state depends upon his conduct now, in reference to this religion: but the sceptic will be little moved by the mere assertion, unless other circumstances give it weight. He would probably reply," All other religions, in substance, say the same. I cannot enter into an examination of the merits of each-it is impossible; and why should I prefer inquiring into one rather than another. Your arguments can only amount to probability, and other creeds may be supported by equal or stronger probabilities.

BEATRICE.

To this, then, your argument answers, that there is in the first instance not only far greater probability of its being true than any other, but also strong probability considered merely in itself;

and that as no alleged revelation of which there is only a possibility of its being from God, can be safely rejected without examination, so no excuse can remain for a neglect of inquiry into this.

MR. B.

And now I scruple not to add what I before omitted, that the awful consequences of rejection ought to have the greatest weight with every reflecting mind. If there were little chance of Christianity's being true, I grant that the fear of those consequences should have little weight; for it is easy to raise any thing into importance by attaching to it the possibility of awful consequences: but when any real probability exists of any events taking place, as in this case, we know that the real importance of such an event to us is measured jointly by its probability and its consequences: now the consequences are infinite, in case Christianity be true; and therefore he is inexcusable who rejects Christianity without examination, or neglects its claims.