Proper provinss of Rhetoric. THE finding of suitable ARGUMENTs to prove a given point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone.* The business of Logic is, as Cicero complains, to judge of arguments, not to invent them: ("in inveniendis argumentis muta nimium est; in judicandis, nimium loquax." †) The knowledge, again, in each case, of the subject in hand, is essential; but it is evidently borrowed from the science or system conversant about that subject-matter, whether Politics, Theology, Law, Ethics, or any other. The art of addressing the feelings, again, does not belong exclusively to Rhetoric; since Poetry has at least as much to do with that branch. Nor are the considerations relative to Style and Elocution confined to argumentative and persuasive compositions. The art of inventing and arranging Arguments is, as has been said, the Aristotle's division of Persuasives into "artificial" and "inartificial," (evteroi and Texvoi) including under the latter head, "Witnesses, Laws, Contracts," &c. is strangely unphilosophical. The one class, he says, the Orator is to make use of, the other, to devise. But it is evident that, in all cases alike, the data we argue from must be something already existing, and which we are not to make, but to use; and that the arguments derived from these data are the work of Art. Whether these data are general maxims or particular testimo ny Laws of Nature, or Laws of the Land -- makes, in this respect, no difference. + Cic. de Orat. only province that Rhetoric can claim entirely and exclu sively. Various divisions of Argu ents. Arguments are divided according to several different principles; i. e. logically speaking, there are several divisions of them. And these cross divisions have proved a source of endless perplexity to the Logical and Rhetorical student, because there is perhaps no writer on either subject that has been aware of their character. Hardly any thing perhaps has contributed so much to lessen the interest and the utility of systems of Rhetoric, as the indistinctness hence resulting. When in any subject the members of a division are not op posed, [contradistinguished,] but are in fact members of dif ferent divisions, crossing each other, it is manifestly impossible to obtain any clear notion of the Species treated of; nor will any labor or ingenuity bestowed on the subject be of the least avail, till the original source of perplexity is removed, till, in short, the cross-division is detected and explained. Arguments then may be divided, First, into Irregular, and Regular, i. e. Syllogisms; these last into Categorical and Hypothetical; and the Categor ical, into Syllogisms in the first Figure, and in the other Fig. ures, &c. &c. Secondly, They are frequently divided into "Probable," [or "Moral,"] and "Demonstrative," [or "Necessary."] Thirdly, into the "Direct," and the "Indirect; " lor reductio ad absurdum,] - the Deictic, and the Elenctic, of Aristotle. Fourthly, into Arguments from " Example," from "Testi mony," from "Cause to Effect," from "Analogy," &c. &c. It will be perceived, on attentive examination, that sev eral of the different species just mentioned will occasionally Division of Forms of Argu contain each other; e. g. a Probable Argument may be at the same time a Categorical Argument, a Direct Argument, and an Argument from Testimony, &c.; this being the consequence of Arguments having been divided on several different principles; a circumstance so obvious the moment it is distinctly stated, that I apprehend such of my readers as have not been conversant in these studies will hardly be disposed to believe that it could have been (as is the fact) generally overlooked, and that eminent writers should in consequence have been involved in inextricable confusion. I need only remind them however of the anecdote of Columbus break. ing the egg. That which is perfectly obvious to any man of common sense, as soon as it is mentioned, may nevertheless fail to occur, even to men of considerable ingenuity. It will also be readily perceived, on examining the principles of these several divisions, hat the last of them alone is properly and strictly a division of Arguments as such. The First is evidently a division of the Forms of stating them; for every one would allow that the same Argument may be either stated as an enthymeme, or brought into the strict syllogistic form; and that, either categorically or hypothetically, &c.; e.g. “Whatever has a beginning has a cause; the earth had a beginning, therefore it had a cause; or, If the earth had a beginning, it had a cause: it had a beginning," &c. every one would call the same Argument, differently stated. This, sherefore, evidently is not a division of Arguments as such. The Second is plainly a division of Arguments according to their subject-matter, whether Necessary or Probable, [certain or uncertain.] In Mathematics, e. g. every proposition that can be stated is either an immutable truth, or an absurdity and self ments Subject matter of Arguments. contradiction; while in human affairs the propositions which we assume are only true for the most part, and as general rules; and in Physics, though they must be true as long as the laws of nature remain undisturbed, the contradiction of them does not imply an absurdity; and the conclusions, of course, in each case, have the same degree and kind of cer tainty with the premises. This therefore is properly a divis ion, not of Arguments as such, but of the Propositions of which they consist. Arguments. The Third is a division of Arguments ac. Purposes of cording to the purpose for which they are employed; according to the intention of the reasoner ; whether that be to establish" directly" [or "osten. sively"] the conclusion drawn, or [" indirectly "] by means of an absurd conclusion to disprove one of the premises; (i. e. to prove its contradictory :) since the alternative proposed in every valid Argument is, either to admit the Conclusion, or to deny one of the Premises. Now it may so happen that in some cases, one person will choose the former, and another the latter, of these alternatives. It is probable, e. g. that many have been induced to admit the doctrine of Transubstantiation, from its clear connection with the infallibility of the Romish Church; and many others, by the very same Ar. gument, have surrendered their belief in that infallibility. Again, Berkeley and Reid seem to have alike admitted that the non-existence of matter was a necessary consequence of Locke's Theory of Ideas: but the former was hence led, bona fide, to admit and advocate that non-existence; while he latter was led by the very same Argument to reject the Ideal Theory. Thus, we see it is possible for the very. same Argument to be Direct to one person, and Indirect te another; leading them to different results, according as they judge the original conclusion, or the contradictory of a premise, to be the more probable. This, therefore, is not properly a division of Arguments as such, but a division of the purposes for which they are on each occasion employed. Division of Ar• guments as such. The Fourth, which alone is properly a division of Arguments as such, and accordingly will be principally treated of, is a division according to the "relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." I say, " of the subject-matter," because the logical connection between the premises and conclusion is independent of the meaning of the terms employed, and may be exhibited with letters of the alphabet substituted for the terms; but the relation I am now speaking of between the premises and conclusion, (and the varieties of which form the several species of Arguments,) is in respect of their subject-matter: as e. g. an "Argument from Cause to Effect" is so called and considered, in reference to the rela tion existing between the premise, which is the Cause, and the conclusion, which is the Effect; and an "Argument from Example," in like manner from the relation between a known and an unknown instance, both belonging to the same class. And it is plain that the present division, though it has a reference to the subject-matter of the premises, is yet not a division of propositions considered by themselves, (as in the case with the division into "probable" and "demonstrative,”) but of Arguments considered as such; for when we say, e. g. that the premise is a Cause, and the conclusion the Effect, these expressions are evidently relative, and have no meaning, except in reference to each other; and so also when we say the premise and the conclusion are too parallel cases, tha very expression denotes their relation to each other · that |