For a Fable spun out to

only allowed but required in them. a great length becomes an Allegory, which generally satiates and disgusts; on the other hand, a fictitious Tale, having a more direct, and therefore less striking resemblance to reality requires that an interest in the events and persons should be created by a longer detail, without which it would be insipid. The Fable of the Old Man and the Bundle of Sticks, compared with the Iliad, may serve to exemplify what has been said the moral conveyed by each being the same, viz. the strength acquired by union, and the weakness resulting from division; the latter fiction would be perfectly insipid if conveyed in a few lines; the former, in twenty-four books, insupportable.

Of the various uses, and of the real or apparent refutation, of Examples, (as well as of other Arguments,) I shall treat hereafter; but it may be worth while here to observe, that I have been speaking of Example as a kind of Argument, and with a view therefore to that purpose alone; though it often happens, that a resemblance, either direct or analogical, is introduced for other purposes; viz. not to prove any thing, but either to illustrate and explain one's meaning, (which is the strict etymological use of the word Illustration,) or to amuse the fancy by ornament of language: in which case it is usually called a Simile: as, for instance, when a person whose fortitude, forbearance, and other such virtues, are called forth by persecutions and afflictions, is compared to those herbs which give out their fragrance on being bruised. It is of course most important to distinguish, both in our own compositions and those of others, between these different purposes. I shall accordingly advert to this subject in the course of the following chapter,

CHAP. III.

Of the various use and order of the several kinds of Propositions and of Arguments in different

cases.

$ 1.

Arguments of Confutation and of Satisfaction.

THE first rule to be observed is, that it should be considered, whether the principal object of the discourse be, to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it, or to compel the assent, of silence the objections, of an opponent. For, cases may occur, in which the arguments to be employed with most effect will be different, according as it is the one or the other of these objects that we are aiming at. It will often happen that of the two great classes into which Arguments were divided, the "A priori" [or Argument from cause to effect] will be principally employed when the chief object is to instruct the Learner; and the other class, when our aim is to refute the Opponent. And to whatever class the Arguments we resort to may belong, the general tenor of the reasoning will, in many respects, be affected by the present consider. ation. The distinction in question is nevertheless in general little attended to It is usual to call an Argument, simply, strong or weak, without reference to the purpose for which it is designed; whereas the Arguments which afford the most satisfaction to a candid mind, are often such as would have less weight in controversy than many others, which again would be less suitable for the former purpose. E. G. There are some of the internal evidences of Christianity which, in general, are the most satisfactory to a believer's mind, but are not the most striking in the refutation of unbelievers: the

Arguments from Analogy, on the other hand, which are (in refuting objections) the most unanswerable, are not sɔ pleas ing and consolatory.

My meaning cannot be better illustrated than by an instance referred to in that incomparable specimen of reasoning, Dr. Paley's Hora Paulina. "When we take into our hands

the letters," (viz. Paul's Epistles,) "which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be; if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances; I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way, than by sending him to the books

themselves."*

There is also a passage in Dr. A. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, which illustrates very happily one of the applications of the principle in question. "Sometimes we have occasion to defend the propriety of observing the general rules of justice, by the consideration of their necessity to the support of society. We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more fre quently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are

* P. 403.

eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be con clusive. Yet, why should it not; if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it, this manner of acting does not ap pear to be so for its own sake the natural and proper object of those sentiments. We must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for other arguments; and the consideration which first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail, therefore, to insist this topic.

upon

Foundations of our judgments of individuals.

It may serve to illustrate what has been just said, to remark that our judgment of the character of any individual is often not originally derived from such circumstances as we should assign, or could adequately set forth in language, in justification of our opinion. When we undertake to give our reasons for thinking that some individual, with whom we are personally acquainted, is, or is not, a gentleman,—a man of taste, humane,-public-spirited, &c., we of course appea. to his conduct, or his distinct avowal of his own sentiments;

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Part II. sec. i. pp. 151, 152, vol. i. ed. 1812.

and if these furnish sufficient proof of our assertions, we are admitted to have given good reasons for our opinion: but it may be still doubted whether these were, in the first instance at least, our reasons, which led us to form that opinion. If we carefully and candidly examine our own mind, we shall generally find that our judgment was, originally, (if not absolutely decided,) at least strongly influenced, by the person's looks tones of voice- gestures — choice of expressions, and the like; which, if stated as reasons for forming a conclusion, would in general appear frivolous, merely because no language is competent adequately to describe them; but which are not necessarily insufficient grounds for beginning at least to form an opinion; since it is notorious that there are many acute persons who are seldom deceived in such indications of character.

In all subjects indeed, persons unaccustomed to writing or discussion, but possessing natural sagacity, and experience in particular departments, have been observed to be generally unable to give a satisfactory reason for their judgments, even on points on which they are actually very good judges.* This is a defect which it is the business of education (especially the present branch of it) to surmount or diminish. After all, however, in some subjects, no language can adequately convey (to the inexperienced at least) all the indications which influence the judgment of an acute and practised observer. And hence it has been justly and happily remarked, that "he must be an indifferent physician, who never takes any step for which he cannot assign a satisfactory reason."

See Aristotle's Ethics, B. VI.