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it is supported, the valuable works that might easily be made available for its communication, or the facility with which it might be introduced into the existing course of study, in all it possesses unquestionable advantages, as the basis of logical instruction. But, on the other hand, its compass is small, and its contents, though clear and definite, are, taken by themselves, too meagre to be an adequate substitute for the miscellaneous reading which is so often misnamed Logical. To supply this defect, two courses are open.
The study of Formal Logic may be combined either with its objective or with its subjective applications. We may treat, that is to say, a system of Logic, either in connection with some of the various objects of thought to which it may in practice be applied, or in relation to the thinking mind and to that mental philosophy of which it forms a portion. The former method has been abundantly tried, and has abundantly failed in the trial. A system of Logic treated in its objective application has no alternative between an impossible universality or an arbitrary exclusiveness. By whatever right one iota of the matter of thought can claim admission into the system, by the same right the whole universe of human knowledge is entitled to follow. Such a method can only be employed as a bad means of collecting desultory information on unconnected subjects. As a system, it postulates its own failure.
It is in connection, not in confusion, with cognate sciences, as a branch of mental philosophy, that Logic may and ought to be studied. One of the objects of the present work is to shew that Logic as a science cannot be rightly understood and appreciated, except in relation to Psychology. The neglect of this relation has been acknowledged as the weak side of the Kantian Philosophyb: its recognition has been imperatively demanded by the ablest modern writers on the subject. “Selon moi,” says M. Duval-Jouve, “ l'objet de la logique n'est pas seulement la direction de l'intelligence, mais encore l'étude de l'intelligence; la direction après l'étude; et un traité de logique doit comprendre la description du fait intellectuel, la théorie de ses lois, l'exposé des règles qu'il doit reconnaître, soit dans son état psychologique et de pure pensée, soit dans sa manifestation par la paroleo.” The propriety of including these psychological matters in a Treatise on Logic may be questioned; but to the necessity of including them in a philosophical course, of which Logic should form a portion, the whole history of the science bears witness. The alliance established of old between Logic and Metaphysics was dissolved by the Critical Philosophy of Kant, and cannot be restored, except by identifying the two, with Hegel. To those who reject this alternative, a blank is
+ See Fries, System der Logik, p. 22.
made in philosophical study, which can only be adequately supplied by a well-connected course of Mental Science, embracing, as its constituent portions, the three cognate subjects of Logic, Ethics, and Psychology.
To Ethics, as well as to Logic, Psychology is an indispensable supplement. The science of man as he ought to be must be based on that of man as he is. In Moral Philosophy, as in Logic, questions of a psychological character meet us at every stage of our course; and the value of every ethical system must ultimately be tested on psychological grounds. Perhaps it is not too much to say, that half the ethical systems which have been at different times in vogue, have started from a psychological assumption, which, consistently carried out, would make Ethical Philosophy impossible.
May it be allowed to suggest a still higher application of the same criterion ? conception of Revealed Religion, as a communication from an Infinite to a finite Intelligence, is implied the existence of certain ideas of a purely negative character, the purpose of which is not speculative but regulative truth; which are designed, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice. These, from their very nature, are beyond the criticism of reason. But in order to discriminate accurately between the provinces of reason and faith, to determine what we may and what we may not seek to comprehend as a speculative
In the very
truth, an examination of the limits of man's mental powers is indispensable. The ground of many a controversy might be considerably narrowed, were we to inquire at the outset what are the mental powers that can be brought to the solution of the question, and how are they related to the data on which they must operate. Fichte made his earliest attempt, as a disciple of the Kantian philosophy, by an Essay towards a Critique of every Revelation. The positive portion of his principles of criticism (for many of them have a negative character only) might be better applied to a Critique of every Critique of Revelation :-an inquiry, that is to say, what portion of the contents of Revelation, as addressed to human minds, can be wrought by human interpretation into the form of speculative dogmas.
“ La psychologie,” says M. Cousin, “n'est assurément pas toute la philosophie, mais elle en est le fondement.” If there be any truth in this saying of one of the highest philosophical authorities of our own or of any age, it will follow of necessity that a course of instruction in this fundamental branch must be an integral and indispensable portion of any system of philosophical teaching.
The psychological criticisms of the present work are mainly limited to logical questions, and are designed to throw some light on matters which, almost from the commencement of my logical studies, have appeared to me to stand in especial need of elucidation. Much of what has been acquired from foreign sources, with much labour and little guidance in the search, might have been learned in an easier and more direct manner, had the course which I have ventured to recommend been adopted in relation to my own early studies. The numerous obligations which the work is under to previous writers are most of them acknowledged as they occur. One or two, however, demand an express mention here. The reader who is familiar with Kant's writings will probably discern obligations to the Critical Philosophy in almost every page; even where the language of Kant has been departed from, and the difference in detail is such as would not justify a direct reference to his works. The method and material for thinking derived from the study of the Kantian philosophy is in many respects far more valuable than the direct information communicated. This is especially the case with a student who views that philosophy from the psychological rather than the metaphysical side, in its relation to Hume and Locke rather than to Wolf and Leibnitz, and who endeavours to combine the materials thence obtained with the most valuable results of the Scottish philosophy, which owes its rise, like the Kantian, to the scepticism of Hume.