least, if not in method, nearer to the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, than to that of Kant. It is natural, therefore, that his view of the limits of human thought, and consequently of the province of Logic and of its relation to Psychology, should contain much which cannot be directly transferred to the pages of a work which advocates a strictly formal view of Logic, and which would rather contract than enlarge the limits assigned by Kant to the Understanding and the Reason. But the writings of M. Cousin are indispensable to all who would gain a true estimate of the importance of Psychology and its position in a philosophical course; and the benefits which I am conscious of having derived from their study are far more than can be adequately expressed by a direct acknowledgment of passages borrowed from them. From the author's view of the office of Logic I have departed widely; which makes it the more necessary to confess the numberless advantages derived from his writings, in relation to almost every point treated of in the following pages. In many points in which I have departed from the doctrines of the great Eclectic, I am much indebted to the writings of his illustrious critic, Sir William Hamilton. The same acknowledgment may indeed be made in relation to nearly the whole contents of the present volume, partly by way of direct obligation, and still more by way of hints and suggestions of questions to be solved and the method of their solution. I cannot indeed claim the sanction of this eminent authority for any statement which is here advanced, except where direct reference is made to his writings; yet probably, even where I have differed from him in opinion, there is much that would never have been written at all, but for the valuable aid furnished by him. To say that I have occasionally ventured to dissent from the positions of each and all of the philosophers to whom I am so much indebted, is only to say that I have endeavoured to study their works in the spirit in which they themselves would wish to be studied; with the respect and gratitude of a disciple, but, it is hoped, without the servility of a copyist. For the phraseology which I have occasionally been compelled to employ in the course of the following remarks, no apology will be required by those acquainted with the history of mental science. In no branch of study is it so necessary to observe the Aristotelian precept, ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν. Nine tenths of the confusion and controversy that have existed in this department are owing to that unwillingness to innovate in matters of language, which leads to the employment of the same term in various shades of meaning and with reference to various phenomena of consciousness. In this respect, philosophy is under deep obligations to the purism of German writers, which has enabled subsequent thinkers to examine the most important problems of Psychology apart from the old associations of language. A new phraseology may occasion some little difficulty at the outset of a work; but to adhere to an inadequate vocabulary, merely because its expressions are established, is to involve the whole of the subject in hopeless confusion and obscurity. In this respect, however, I trust I shall not be found to have departed from authorized language in a greater degree than is absolutely necessary for the purpose of communicating to English readers some of the most valuable results of German thought, and of carrying into effect the main design of the present Essay,-that of testing the received processes of Logic, by reference to the facts of human consciousness. |