מה אומרים אנשים - כתיבת ביקורת
לא מצאנו ביקורות במקומות הרגילים
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
according actual admit appear applicable assertion attributes becomes called causality cause character combination common conceive concept concerning conclusion connection consciousness consequence constitution contain definition dependent determine distinct distinguished effect equal example existence experience expressed fact faculties formal former furnish given hand Hence human idea identical imagination immediate implies impossible individual instance intuition judgment Kant kind knowledge language laws of thought less limited Logic logician manner material matter means mental merely Metaphysics mind moral nature necessarily necessary necessity negative never notion object observed operations origin particular perceived perception phenomena philosophy physical portion positive possible premise present principle proposition psychological pure question reasoning reference regarded relation remarks representative requires respect result sense sensible separate side similar space substance sufficient supposed syllogism takes term theory thing thinking true truth understanding universal whole
עמוד 341 - In a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end to their own life. This is the general law; and the special question as to who shall commit the crime depends of course upon special laws; which, however, in their total action, must obey the large social law to which they are subordinate.
עמוד 32 - I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal.
עמוד 40 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...
עמוד 315 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view ; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
עמוד 78 - finite.' Therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call 'infinite.' No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say...
עמוד 166 - Spirit, in its primary signification, is breath; angel, a messenger ; and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find in all languages the names which stand for things that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested...
עמוד 31 - Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell ; for myself I find I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse.
עמוד 354 - Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
עמוד 132 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance.