good from its effects and consequences, and, of course, all distinction between good and evil is lost! Thus we see to what confusion error would lead us.

There is no alternative, we must suppose, that in what God has said he was sincere : and, if so, what he commanded he intended should be done. To suppose, then, that he did not intend the thing that was every way the best, is a base reflection upon his character. Had mankind continued obedient to the first covenant, sin had never been known, and, of course, according to Mr, H. the greatest possible good had never been promoted! This error is too glaring to be mistaken-every person must see it.

Again-our author supposes it may readily be believed, "that some important purposes might be accomplished in a kingdom as extensive as that of Jehovah, by having it known to what conduct a spirit of rebellion would lead." p. 73.— We think however, that many important purposes might be accomplished in a kingdom as extensive as that of Jehovah, by having it known to what conduct a spirit of sinless obedience would lead ; and this is our condemnation, that we have forsaken the good and the right way, and gone in a way that is not good. The whole argument of Mr. H. seems to proceed upon the supposition, that, because the kingdom of Jehovah is extensive, moral evil is necessary for the promotion of important purposes. But how the extent of the kingdom can render sin necessary, is difficult to see. No very good results have ever yet arisen, from a spirit of rebellion in the kingdom of God. The first of which we have any account, hurled legions to the bottomless pit. And it is to be feared that the second will do equal damage to the human race. Can we believe this, and at the same time suppose that purposes sufficiently important can be promoted thereby, to compensate for the loss of so many immortal

beings? No, sin is an intruder in the kingdom of God.~ It brought death and all our wo- -it forms no part of the kingdom of Jehovah, for that is a kingdom of "righteous. ness, peace, and joy, in the Holy Ghost." Our author,

must have mistaken the kingdom to which sin belongs; for it is an important ingredient of the kingdom of the devil.Without it he would be at a loss how to accomplish the destruction of one soul. By it he "reigns in the hearts of the children of disobedience."

He next undertakes to "show how the Deity may overrule the wicked conduct of men, consistently with the purity and holiness of his character." p. 74. It is to be hoped that Mr. H. will find few, if any opposers to the doctrine of God's overruling providence, so far as that doctrine is con sidered aside from the doctrine of absolute predestination.— We shall, therefore, have no controversy with him, in whatever he may have advanced which adheres strictly to that sentiment. But his confounding them together, so often, renders it necessary to make some remarks on his following arguments. His first is as follows:-" The sinner is free in the strictest sense of the word; and that the great Jeho vah, by so disposing of motives in his providence, should lead him to different acts of sin, than he would otherwise have committed but which while they are no more guilty; may be better overruled for the accomplishment of benevolent designs, can it be said that any injustice is done to the sinner, or that God has done any thing unworthy of his character ? " In order for this argument to have weight, in clearing the divine character from the imputations of the Calvinistic system, Mr. H. should have proved two things; 1. That the great Jehovah does, by the disposition of motives, before the sinner, lead him to different acts of sin, than he would otherwise have committed. 2. That these acts of sin

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are no more guilty, than the sins he would otherwise have committed. We have his assertion for it, but it, wants proof Again-Mr. H.'s account of the condition of the sinner in the above, is utterly contradictory. First he represents the sinner as being "free, in the strictest sense of the word."Now his own account of this freedom, on the preceding page is, that the choice is made "without the least influence from any other being." Let us now compare with this, his second account. In this, he says that the "great Jehovah, by so disposing of motives in his providence, leads the sinner to different acts of sin than he would otherwise have committed." Leaving our opponents to reconcile these contradictions, let us consider the second argument. "If the di

vine influence be so exerted as to restrain the sinner, and thus render his criminality less than it would otherwise have been, it cannot be said that his agency is injured, or that he has been treated unjustly. If men cannot be restrained without having their agency impaired, what shall we say of the influence of the precepts, penalties, and threatenings of the Bible?"

We shall all agree with Mr. H. that the divine influence is often so exerted as to restrain the sinner, and thus render his crime less than it would otherwise have been. But how we ask, does this prove, that, on supposition that God, by the disposition of thirty pieces of silver, before the mind of Judas, led him to betray his Master; the divine "character remains unimpeached"? The argument has no bearing on the subject. We grant that there is no injustice done to the sinner, by the restraining grace of God, but, on the contrary a great mercy. But the very reasons which render it highly proper for God to restrain the sinner, and thus render his criminality less, render it utterly improper for him, by motives of inducement, to lead him to commit sin, As to the

difficulties, therefore, arising from the peculiarities of his system, Mr. H. as we conceive, has not touched them with this argument. Again, he says, " when the mercies of God are abused by men, he is the occasion of their sin, though by means which ought to have the contrary effect."

Did not God, according to Mr. H. eternally design to be the occasion of their sin ? and, if so, ought those mercies to have an effect contrary to the eternal will of God? But if they ought to have a contrary effect, surely they might, and if they might, then it was never decreed that they should not. Now if there is one sin which God did not decree the existence of, in justice to the divine character we are bound to believe, that he did not decree the existence of any sin.

Again-is the Almighty sincere in the gift of his mercies, or is he not? If he is, he is not, properly, the occasion of their sin. To suppose that he bestows them for the express design to insnare men, aud lead them to sin, is both impious and absurd. Let God speak for himself" O, Israel! thou hast destroyed thyself." In the doing of a wicked act, who is the guilty person, he who is the occasion of it with design or he who is the instrument, acting under the influence of irresistible" motives"? If it be decided that he who is the occasion of it, with design, is the guilty person, then, on the principles of our opponents, God is the occasion of sin with design to be so. Now who does not see that such a notion, instead of clearing the divine character involves it in the deepest shade? The argument drawn from sagacious Lu. ther's management, with ambitious Henry VIII., bears evident marks of imperfection. 1. It is not certain, (such is the depravity of the human heart,) that the motives of Luther were perfectly upright and pure; whereas, with the great Jehovah, it is certain that his motives are always so.2 If the motives of Luther were upright, yet it was not the

overruling providence of an infinitely wise and good Being. I am aware that Mr. H. sees this objection to his argument, and labours to obviate it, but has not, in our opinion, done it. Moreover, if the argument were sound, it would only prove that God overrules the conduct of men, in a way consistent with their freedom; whereas, we have already seen that the doctrine of our opponents utterly destroys that freedom, and makes men mere machines. We conclude, therefore, that it is not an "impression so readily received by men," that if God overrule their conduct consistently with their agency, they are no longer free." But we know that it is an impres sion generally received by men, that if God has "fore-ordained whatever comes to pass," and in order to "produce every such event," "places motives before the sinner," so as to lead him to the commission of sin, they are not free agents. And who can blame them for receiving such an impression, when the plainest dictates of common sense teach that it is so?

It will admit of a serious doubt, whether the man can be found who would "allege the doctrine of God's overruling providence, in a way consistent with his agency, "as the reason why he rejects the Bible." But there are not a few infidels in our land, who do allege it is a sufficient reason for rejecting the Bible, that they are taught by men that, that teaches that God has first decreed that man should transgress his law, and then determined to damn him for so doing! It is not a matter of very great astonishment that men should allege such a sentiment, as an "apology for sin," and feel able to "silence every believer in such a doctrine." Again, our author is of opinion that there is no sentiment which "inherits a greater share of the blind and unreasonable virulence of the natural heart than this-that God controls and overrules the conduct of wicked men." p. 76.