THE EVER-VICTORIOUS FORCE AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REBELLION.

At this juncture the imperialists began to look toward foreigners for aid in restoring their prestige and power by employing skill and weapons not to be found among themselves. An American adventurer, Frederick G. Ward, of Salem, Mass., proposed to the Intendant Wu to recapture Sungkiang from the Tai-pings; he was repulsed in his first attempt at the head of about a hundred foreigners, but succeeded in the second, and the imperialists straightway occupied the city. This success, added to the high pay, stimulated many others to join him, and General Ward ere long was able to organise a larger body of soldiers, to which the name of Chang-shing kiun, or "Ever-victorious force," was given by the Chinese; it ultimately proved to be well applied. Its composition was heterogeneous, but the energy, tact, and discipline of the leader, under the impulse of an actual struggle with a powerful foe, soon moulded it into something like a manageable corps, able to serve as a nucleus for training a native army. Foreigners generally looked down upon the undertaking, and many of the allied naval and military officers regarded it with doubt and dislike. It had to prove its character by works, but the successive defeats of the insurgents during the year 1862 in Kiangsu and Chehkiang clearly demonstrated the might of its trained men over ten times their number of undisciplined braves.

In September the Tai-pings were driven out of the valley of the Yung river, but the death of General Ward at Tsz'kí deprived the imperialists of an able leader. The career of this man had been a strange one, but his success in training his men was endorsed by honorable dealing with the mandarins, who had reported well of him at Peking. He was buried at Sungkiang, where a shrine was erected to his memory, and incense is burned before him to this day.

It was difficult to find a successor, but the command rather devolved on his second, an American named Burgevine, who was confirmed by the Chinese, but proved to be incapable. He was superseded by Holland and Cooke, Englishmen, and in April, 1863, the entire command was placed under Colonel Peter Gordon, of the British army. During the interval between May, 1860, when Ward took Sungkiang, and April 6, 1863, when Gordon took Fushan, the best manner of combining native and foreign troops was gradually developed as they became more and more acquainted

with each other and learned to respect discipline as an earnest of success. Such a motley force has seldom if ever been seen, and the enormous preponderance of Chinese troops would have perhaps been an element of danger had they been left idle for a long time.

There were five or six infantry regiments of about five hundred men each, and a battery of artillery; at times it numbered five thousand men. The commissioned officers were all foreigners, and their national rivalries were sometimes a source of trouble; the non-commissioned officers were Chinese, many of them repentant rebels or seafaring men from Canton and Fuhkien, promoted for good conduct. The uniform was a mixture of native and foreign dress, which at first led to the men being ridiculed as "Imitation Foreign Devils"; after victory, however, had elevated their esprit du corps, they became quite proud of the costume. In respect to camp equipage, arms, commissariat and ordnance departments, and means of transport, the natives soon made themselves familiar with all details; while necessity helped their foreign officers rapidly to pick up their language. It is recorded, to the credit of this motley force, that "there was very little crime and consequently very little punishment; . . . as drunkenness was unknown, the services of the provost-marshal rarely came into use, except after a capture, when the desire for loot was a temptation to absence from the ranks."1

In addition, the force had a flotilla of four small steamers, aided by a variety of native boats to the number of fifty to seventyfive. The plain is so intersected by canals that the troops could be easier moved by water than land, and these boats enabled it to carry out surprises which disconcerted the rebels. Wilson well remarks concerning Gordon's force: "Its success was owing to its compactness, its completeness, the quickness of its movements, its possession of steamers and good artillery, the bravery of its officers, the confidence of its men, the inability of the rebels to move large bodies of troops with rapidity, the nature of the country, the almost intuitive perception of the leader in adapting his operations to the nature of the country, and his untiring energy in carrying them out.”2

After Fushan, Chanzu, Taitsang fu, and Kiunshan had been occupied, Colonel Gordon found his position beset with so many unexpected annoyances, both from his rather turbulent and incongruous troops and from the Chinese authorities, that he went

1 A. Wilson, The "Ever-Victorious Army," p. 132.

2 Ibid., p. 138.

to Shanghai on August 8th for the purpose of resigning the command. Arriving here, however, he ascertained that Burgevine had just gone over to the Tai-pings with about three hundred foreigners, and was then in Suchau. The power of moral principle, which guided the career of the one, was then seen in luminous contrast to its lack as shown in the other of these soldiers of fortune. To his lasting credit Colonel Gordon decided to return at once to Kiunshan, and, in face of the ingratitude of the Chinese and jealousy of his officers, to stand by the imperialist cause. gradually restored his influence over officers and men, ascertained that Burgevine's position in the Tai-ping army did not allow him freedom enough to render his presence dangerous to their foes, and began to act aggressively against Suchau by taking Patachiau on its southern side in September.

He

Emissaries from the foreigners in the city now reported considerable dissatisfaction with their position, and Colonel Gordon was able to arrange in a short time their withdrawal without much danger to themselves. It is said that Burgevine even then proposed to him to join their forces, seize Suchau, and as soon as possible march on Peking with a large army, and do to the Manchus what the Manchus had done, two hundred and twenty years before, to the Mings. Colonel Gordon's own loyalty was somewhat suspected by the imperialist leaders, but his integrity carried him safely through all these temptations to swerve from his duty.

As soon as these mercenaries among the rebels were out of the way, operations against Suchau were prosecuted with vigor, so that by November 19th the entire city was invested and carefully cut off from communication with the north. The city being now hard pushed, the besieging force prepared for a night attack upon a breach previously made in the stockade near the north-east gate. It was well planned, but the Muh Wang, facile princeps among the Tai-ping chiefs in courage and devotion, having been informed of it, opened such a destructive fire that the Ever-victorious force was defeated with a loss of about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. On the next morning, however (November 28th), it was reported that the cowardly leaders in the city were plotting against the Muh Wang-the only loyal one among their number-and were talking of capitulating, using the British chief as their intermediary.

1 The following cuts show the astronomical instruments of the old Peking observatory as they were before their removal to Germany. Says S. Wells Williams: "They are beautiful pieces of bronze, though now antiquated and useless for practical purposes."