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blance, vicinity, contrariety, to the arts. As therefore the former or the latter principles of affociation are predominant, a man's genius is adapted to form the philofopher or the artift.

The predominant affociating principle renders the inferior principles fubfervient to it. In the arts, they are all in fubordination to refemblance; in the fciences, to caufation and coexistence. The prevailing principle likewife difpofes the mind to be most easily affected by thofe modifications of the fubordinate, which are moft co-incident with it and fitteft to promote its defign. The philofopher chiefly obferves fuch resemblances as refpect caufe and effect; while the artift employs caufation only with a view to enliven his fubject.

In fcientific investigation, genius is not aided, but obstructed in its progrefs by paffion: in the arts, fenfibility and paffion ought to have a confiderable power over the imagination.

In the two kinds of genius imagination is differently affifted by memory. It must perform its office with the utmost fidehty in feientific refearches; pointing out phenomena already observed, and truths already proved. In the arts, it is of no confequence that the picture fhould be an exact copy of any archetype in the memory; the effect is often greater where this is not the cafe. An exact refemblance of the nearest connection of things is neceffary in philofophy; in the arts the memory is chiefly employed on feparate objects, or flight connections.

Great powers of judgment are of importance in fcience to enable us to make a proper ufe of the conceptions which imagination fuggefts, and to draw new and juft conclufions from facts. In the arts a lefs degree of accuracy in judging of truth may be fufficient. A very nice and accurate judgment often checks the efforts of genius in the arts, and fubftitutes an inipid correctnefs in the room of bold invention.

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But tafte or the judgment of beauty is effential to genius for the arts. It reftrains, regulates, and directs the fancy: its decifions fuggefis new trains of ideas connected with them, Sen fibility of tafte gives a ftrong feeling of every beauty or ble mifh; elegance of tafte points out latent beauties, and adds novelty to grace; correctnefs of tafte prevents the faults of a wild and unchaftifed fancy.

The exertions of genius in the fciences have in their nature a fedatenefs, gravity, and authority: in the arts they have a fprightlinefs, gaiety, and impetuofity; because fentiment and paffion is concerned in the latter and not in the former. Hence the different kinds of genius give a different caft to the whole character.

The power of execution is effential to genius for the arts. Some poffefs this without any powers of invention: on the contrary, there may be degrees of invention, without a capacity

of

of correfpondent execution; but both are necessary to complete the artift. Though this power may be in part acquired by ftudy and habit, it requires a precife and definite perception of any effect before it is produced, and a quick difcernment of the eafiest and best means to be employed in communicating ideas.

From the whole it appears, that there are in human nature feveral diftinct powers of affociation, each capable of various modifications; from whence muft neceffarily arife varieties of genius. The different kind of genius are not however wholly incompatible. Great flexibility, with a moderate fancy will produce a little genius in various departments; joined with a finer imagination it will enable a man to distinguish himself in feveral ways. But, when a perfon unites in himself different kinds of genius, it will be generally found that he excells only in one department, and that in others his genius is of an inferior order.

In the fubject to which his genius is moft adapted, it exerts itfelf with vigour; it follows the affociating principle which is naturally prevalent. In the subject to which it is lefs adapted, it operates more heavily; it follows an affociating principle which is by foreign caufes forced into a temporary predominance. The effects of genius in the former cafe, are like fruits fuitable to the climate, which attain their perfect flavour; in the latter they are like fruits raised by artificial heat in a climate not proper for them, which remain infipid and never reach their full maturity. Under the guidance of the principle of affociation naturally predominant, the other principles operate with such alacrity as fubjects fhew in ferving their rightful king; under the guidance of any other principle, their operation resembles the fpiritless backwardness with which a people obey an ufurper or a conqueror.'

In the preceding abftract we have taken notice of several of our Author's remarks on memory, judgment, &c. which appear to us to have been rather a deviation from his main defign; and which might perhaps have been omitted in the work, without at all diminishing the perfpicuity or conclufiveness of the general investigation.

From this fummary, and ftill more fully from the perufal of the work itself, it will, we doubt not, appear to the judicious reader, that Dr. Gerard has contributed materially to the improvement of that important fcience, the knowledge of human nature, by unfolding the operations of the mind in works of genius; by fhowing in what manner genius is the offspring' of imagination, and is directed and aided by judgment and memory; by tracing the various appearances of genius up to their refpective fources in the different kinds and modifications of affociation, and in the varieties of judgment and memory; and

by applying thefe general principles to explain the causes of the diverfities of genius, as it is employed on the fciences or on the

arts.

But befide the merit which this work has in common with all fuccefsful investigations of the powers and operations of the human mind, that it opens a curious and interesting train of fpeculation to the philofopher; we apprehend it may have the merit of utility beyond moft other publications of this kind, We find from experience, that the principles of affociation are in fome degree under the government of volition; and that it is in a man's power to employ one or other of these at pleasure. Since therefore the varieties of genius chiefly depend on the nature of the affociating principle which is predominant, and the manner in which this, and the other fubordinate powers of affociation are exerted; may it not be poffible for a man, by the judicious direction of the affociating principles, according to the theory established in this work, to produce material variations and improvements in his genius? Though the maxim, Poeta nafcitur, be allowed to be juft, do not thefe fpeculations lead us to question whether it should be added, non fit? At leaft the inquiry feems worth pursuing; and if it appear as important to our judicious Author as it does to us, it will probably be purfued with fuccefs.

In the fecond edition the Doctor will doubtlefs correct the following errata:

Page 104. If a philofopher should [were to] deduce any phenomenon from a known cause, by a procefs oppofite to what we have obferved in fimilar cafes, we would [fhould] fufpect, &c.

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P. 142. Cuftom has bestowed upon them an indiffoluble connection; and the most ignorant fcarce imagine that they have any connection [fcarcely imagine, that they have no connection] except that which custom has bestowed.

P. 170. It tends to-caufe the mind run [to run].

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P. 256. caufing one [to] bring others.

P. 265. a perfon should [would] have no power.

P. 398. Without its being in the use of interpofing [accustomed to interpofe] its judgment.

We will conclude this article with the following beautiful fimiles, which (with many others interfperfed through the work) fhow that our Author has no inconfiderable command over the affociating principle chiefly employed in the arts, refemblance; as the whole performance proves him to be a great matter of that which is principally used in science, the relation of cause and effect.

As acuteness of smell carries a dog along the path of the game for which he fearches, and fecures him against the danger of quitting it for another fcent; fo régularity of imagination

leads

leads the man of genius into thofe tracks where the proper ideas lurk, and not only enables him to difcover them, but by a kind of inftinctive infallibility prevents him from turning afide to wander in improper roads, or to spend his time in the contemplation of unappofite ideas. As the bee extracts from fuch flowers as can fupply them, the juices which are proper to be converted into honey, without lofing its labour in fipping those juices which would be pernicious, or in examining thofe vegetables which are ufelefs; fo true genius difcovers at once the ideas which are conducive to its purpofe, without at all thinking of fuch as are unneceffary, or would obstruct it.'

E.

ART. II. The Administration of the British Colonies. Part the Second. Wherein a Line of Government between the fupreme Jurifdiction of Great Britain and the Rights of the Colonies is drawn, and a Plan of Pacification is fuggefted, &c. By Thomas Pownal, late Governor, &c. of Maffachusetts-Bay and South-Carolina. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Walter. 1774.

O

UR Author in the first part of this work *, confidered the relations between Great Britain and the Colonies; proceeding, as he observes, from thofe principles, by the vigour of which, all free communities are governed within themselves, to the examination and difcuffion of the external relation in which the colonies, as communities of Englishmen in partibus exteris, ftood to the fovereign power of the kingdom of Great Britain.' And pursuing this inquiry by an analyfis of the circumftances under which they emigrated, and the principles on which these communities were in fact fettled,' he found them to be de fallo

de jure counties palatine, established on the precedent of the county palatine of Durham.' And then by an examination of the procedure of the realm of England towards thefe kind of principalities, he found they were bound to perform towards the empire of England all fervices which arife from the duty of subordinate parts of it, to maintain the union, safety, and vitality of the whole: Yet that in the cafe of aids and fubfidies which are of free will, they could not in the ftrict legal acceptation of their rights, be bound by the gifts and grants of the reprefentatives of the realm not reprefenting them,' and he produced cafes wherein, when they excepted to the being thus bound, they were held excufed and free therefrom.' And as government had afterwards admitted these principalities to a reprefentation in parliament, he from this precedent endeavoured to recommend an union of all the parts of the British dominions into a one whole, an organized body, animated by a free will extending to all.' And this he recommended as the only means of preventing an Ame

See Review, vol. xxxix. p. 323.

rican union, diftinct from, and independent of Great Britain."' Our Author prefumes, that the people of America would at one time have been pleafed with a reprefentation in the British parliament, and in fupport of this opinion, he cites a letter, (printed at large) from Dr. Franklin to the late Governor Shirley, written December 22, 1754, in answer to a propofal made to him on that fubject by the Governor. We are likewife favoured with the following opinion of the late Mr. Grenville, on the fame fubject, in a letter from that ftatefman to Governor Pownal, dated Wotton, July 17, 1768.'

"As to the great queftion of our parliament's granting to America a competent number of representatives to fit in our house of commons, you are no ftranger to the declarations I repeatedly made in the house at the time when the repeal of the ftamp-act was agitated; that if fuch an application should be properly made by the colonies to parliament, in the fame manmanner as thofe which were made from Chester and Durham, and probably from Wales, it would, in my opinion, be intitled to the most ferious and favourable confideration. I continue ftill in the fame fentiments; but I am much afraid that neither the people of Great Britain nor those of America are fufficiently apprised of the danger which threatens both, from the prefent ftate of things, to adopt a measure to which both the one and the other feem indifpofed." The fulleft conviction of its neceffity, and the hearty concurrence both of the government and people are indispenfably neceflary to fet fo great a machine in motion, as that of uniting all the out-lying parts of the British dominions into one system."

Our Author fuppofing the people of America to be now as little difpofed to the union in queftion, as thofe of Great Britain, and confequently defpairing of this his otherwife favourite meafure, proceeds in this fecond part of his work, to form a line between the fupremacy of parliament and the rights of the colonies on a different bafis; and this he propofes as a line of pacification. If we are to treat, fays he, there must be some line to which our negociations are to have reference: if we are to fight, there must be fome line which fhall bound and be the end even of our victories.' And as the foundation of this part of his work, he maintains that if ftates permitting or promoting emigrations, fuffer the emigrants to fettle on lands belonging to other states, they fuffer the allegiance of fuch emigrants to be transferred to that ftate.' If they fuffer them to settle in locis vacuis, and to acquire a feparate dominium, they then Juffer them to become a community fui juris,-which was the precife cafe of the Grecian colonies. But if thefe colonists fettle on lands which, in partibus exteris, are (according to the ufage and law of nations) the dominions of that ftate from

whence

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