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remote ; some more, others less, obvious. Order respects place, time, nature, and uniformity of figure. All these dis. tinct forms of the associating principles, produce correspondent peculiarities in the exertions of genius, which are regulated by them.

In almost every man, some one of the associating principles is predominant. This must be ultimately resolved into the original conftitution of different minds. Which soever of the associ. ating principles is predominant, it will give a peculiar cast to the genius. The same is true with respect to the different combinations and modifications of these principles. The great divisions of genius commonly arise from the prevalence of one principle of association over another; and the more minute varieties from the prevalence of different modifications. Yet these modifications are sometimes so diffimilar, that the predominance of one over another produces a difference of genius, as great as could be produced by the predominance of principles totally distinct. The natural historian and the poet both employ resemblance as their medium of association, but in different ways. The peculiar form of genius also depends upon the degree of force with which the other principles of association co-operate with that which predominates.

Diversity of genius farther arises from different degrees of flexibility or pliableness in the imagination. This consists in a capacity of being equally impressed with diffimilar designs, and employing different associating principles with equal vigour ; making each in its turn predominant, as the nature of the subject requires. Hence the same person will write in a different manner on the same subject at different times, and acquit bim{elf equally well on different subjects.

Farther, to account for the diversities of genius, we must observe the varieties which take place in the other faculties from which it receives allistance. Memory in retaining simple perceptions is subject to variations, from length of time, the nature of the object, and the degree of attention. Memory employs the same asiocialing powers with imagination; and their operations are almost always intermingled. The chief perfe&tions of memory are, that it be easily susceptible of impressions ; tenacious of what it has received; diftinct, to exhibit ideas in their proper order; and ready, in calling them forth. The different degrees in which these excellencies prevail, will have an effect on the produ&ions of genius. The peculiar turn of memory will affect genius, by determining in many instances the idea from which it fall set out in invention, and the nature and connexion of the ideas afterwards suggefted.

Judgment is employed on truth and beauty. Men differ in the degree in which they exercise the same species of judgment, or in the species which they most readily exercise. Judgment differs in its operations according to the degree of vigour with which attention is employed, the distinctness and readiness with which memory supplies materials, and the acuteness with which the reasoning faculty deduces conclusions. Judgment employed on beauty is called taste; and consists in the united exercise of the reasoning faculty, and the internal senses. A correct tafte, regulating the productions of genius, will carry them towards perfection. · Part III. of the several kinds of genius.

The kinds of genius are most conveniently distinguished according to the nature of the object about which it is employed, or the end to which it is adapted. There may be reduced to two, the discovery of truth, and the production of beauty. Genius is then the power of invention either in science er in the arts, either of truth or beauty.

Some difference between genius for science and the arts arises necessarily from the diversity of their ends. Scientific genius employs the powers of association in search of appearances and relations to establish truth. Genius for the arts exhibits such obje&s and relations as are adapted to please the taste. The philosopher observes and describes minutely all the appearances of his objects, which can forward his investigation: the artist catches only such general appearances as are most striking A genius for science therefore is formed by penetration, a genius for the arts by brightness : these are their general characters.

Both these imply a great extent and compass of imagination, but of different kinds. Penetration requires an imagination that can dwell long and steadily on one object, or on those closely connected with it, and observe accurately those qualities which are the least obvious. Brightness of imagination makes every present object fuggest a multitude of ideas, and hurries the mind quickly from one thing to another not very closely connected with it, and thus enables a man to exhibit a great variety and quick succession of objects adapted to please.

The peculiar predominancy of some of the associating principles contributes to form penetration, and of others, brightness of imagination. Some relations of things lead the mind more quickly, and to a greater distance, from these things, than others: the former favours brightness, the latter penetration. Some qualities lay a foundation for relations between one object and many others, and thereby produce a rapid succession : other qualities do not form obvious connexions with different objects, but confine the attention, and lead the mind to examine one object in a variety of lights. From hence it will appear, that the relations of causation and co-existence are the sources of association best suited to science, those of resem.

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blance, blance, vicinity, contrariety, to the arts. As therefore the former or the latter principles of association are predominant, a man's genius is adapted to form the philosopher or the artist.

The predominant associating principle renders the inferior principles subservient to it. In the arts, they are all in suboraination to resemblance; in the sciences, to causation and co. existence. The prevailing principle likewise disposes the mind to be moft easily affected by those modifications of the subordinate, which are most co-incident with it and fittest to promote its design. The philosopher chiefly observes such resemblances as respect cause and effect; while the artist employs causation only with a view to enliven his subject.

In scientific investigation, genius is not aided, but obstructed in its progress by passion : in the arts, sensibility and passion ought to have a considerable power over the imagination.

In the two kinds of genius imagination is differently aslisted by memory. It must perform its office with the utmost fidehty in scientific researches ; pointing out phenomena already obierved, and truths already proved. In the arts, it is of no consequence that the picture should be an exact copy of any archetype in the memory ; the effect is often greater where this is not ihe case. An exact resemblance of the nearest connection of things is neceffary in philosophy, in the arts the memory is chiefly employed on separate objects, or light connections.

Great powers of judgment are of importance in science to enable us to make a proper use of the conceptions which imagination suggests, and to draw new and just conclusions from facts. In the arts a less degree of accuracy in judging of truth may be sufficient. A very nice and accurate judgment often checks the efforts of genius in the arts, and substitutes an intipid correctness in the room of bold invention. - But taste or the judgment of beauty is essential to genius for the arts. It restrains, regulates, and directs the fancy: its decisions suggelis new trains of ideas connected with them, Sen, fibility of tafte gives a strong feeling of every beauty or ble. mish; elegance of tafte points out latent beauties, and adds novelty to grace ; correctness of tafte prevents the faults of a wild and unchastised fancy.

The exertions of genius in the sciences have in their nature a sedateness, gravity, and authority: in the arts they have a sprightliness, gaiety, and impetuosity ; because sentiment and paflion is concerned in the latter and not in the former. Hence the different kinds of genius give a different catt to the whole character.

The power of execution is essential to genius for the arts. Some possess this without any powers of invention : on the contrary, there may be degrees of invention, without a capacity

' of of correspondent execution ; but both are necessary to complete the artist. Though this power may be in part acquired by ftudy and habit, ic requires a precise and definite perception of any efect before it is produced, and a quick discernment of the easiest and best means to be employed in communicating ideas.

From the whole it appears, that there are in human nature several diftinct powers of association, each capable of various modifications; from whence must necessarily arise varieties of genius. The different kind of genius are not however wholly incompatible. Great Aexibility, with a moderate fancy will produce a little genius in various departments; joined with a finer imagination it will enable a man to diftinguilh himself in several ways. But, when a person unites in himself different kinds of genius, it will be generally found that he excells only in one department, and that in others his genius is of an inferior order.

• In the subject to which his genius is most adapted, it exerts itself with vigour; it follows the associating principle which is naturally prevalent. In the subject to which it is less adapted, is operates more heavily; it follows an associating principle which is by foreign causes forced into a temporary predominance. The effects of genius in the former case, are like fruits suitable to the climate, which attain their perfect flavour ; in the latter they are like fruits raised by artificial heat in a climate not proper for them, which remain insipid and never reach their full maturity. Under the guidance of the principle of association naturally predominant, the other principles operate with such alacrity as subjects fhew in serving their rightful king; under the guidance of any other principle, their operation resembles the Ipiritless backwardness with which a people obey an usurper or a conqueror.'

In the preceding abstract we have taken notice of several of our Author's remarks on memory, judgment, &c. which appear to us to have been rather a deviation from his main design; and which might perhaps have been omitted in the work, without at all diminishing the perspicuity or conclusiveness of the general investigation.

From this summary, and still more fully from the perusal of the work itself, it will, we doubt not, appear to the judicious reader, that Dr. Gerard has contributed materially to the improvement of that important science, the knowledge of human nature, by unfolding the operations of the mind in works of genius; by showing in what manner genius is the offspring of imagination, and is directed and aided by judgment and memory; by tracing the various appearances of genius up to their respective sources in the different kinds and modifications of association, and in the varieties of judgment and memory; and

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by by applying these general principles to explain the causes of the diversities of genius, as it is employed on the sciences or on the arts.

But beside the merit which this work has in common with all successful investigations of the powers and operations of the human mind, that it opens a curious and interesting train of speculation to the philosopher; we apprehend it may have the merit of utility beyond most other publications of this kind, We find from experience, that the principles of association are in some degree under the government of volition ; and that it is in a man's power to employ one or other of these at pleasure. Since therefore the varieties of genius chiefly depend on the nature of the associating principle which is predominant, and the manner in which this, and the other subordinate powers of association are exerted; may it not be possible for a man, by the judicious direction of the associating principles, according to the theory established in this work, to produce material variations and improvements in his genius? Though the maxim,

Pocta nafcitur, be allowed to be just, do not these speculations * lead us to question whether it should be added, non fit? At · least the inquiry seems worth pursuing ; and if it appear as important to our judicious Author as it does to us, it will probably be pursued with success.

In the second edition the Doctor will doubtless correct the following errata: .

Page 104. “If a philosopher should ( were to] deduce any phe. nomenon from a known cause, by a process opposite to what we have observed in similar cases, we would [should) suspect, &c.

P. 142. Custom has bestowed upon them an indissoluble connection; and the most ignorant scarce imagine that they have any connection [/carcely imagine, that they have no connection) except that which custom has bestowed.

P. 170. ' It tends to-cause the mind run [to run).
P. 256. ' causing one sto] bring others.
P. 265. 'a person should (would) have no power.

P. 398. · Without its being in the use of interpefing [accustomed to interpose] its judgment.

We will conclude this article with the following beautiful fimiles, which (with many others interspersed through the work) show that our Author has no inconsiderable command over the associating principle chiefly employed in the arts, resemblance; as the whole performance proves him to be a great matter of that which is principally used in science, the relation of cause and effect.

• As acuteness of smell carries a dog along the path of the game for which he searches, and secures him against the danger of quitting it for another scent; lo regularity of imagination

leads

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