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ART. I. An Efay on Genius. By Alexander Gerard, D. D. Profeffor of Divinity in King's College, Aberdeen, 8vo. 5 s. fewed. Cadell. 177420

E the fubject of this treatise, or the reputation of the tempt that

principal object is entertainment, to open the book, they will probably, after turning over a few pages, and loading it with the damnatory epithets of dull, heavy, tedious, dry, and metaphyfical, throw it by, and fend for fomething entertaining from the circulating library. And yet, we will rifk our credit with fuch readers fo far as to affert, what will doubtlefs appear to them ftrangely paradoxical, that this is one of the moft entertaining works we have lately met with. The defign is new; the fubject is curious and interefting; the investigation is pursued with great accuracy and penetration; and the expreffion is perfpicuous and elegant. On thefe grounds, we venture to promise much pleasure from this work to fuch readers as have learned to think.

The best proof, we can give, that this eulogium is not exaggerated, will be to lay before our readers the following abftract or fummary of the train of investigation which the Author has followed in treating on the fubject of Genius.

The work confifts of three parts: the first treats concerning the nature of Genius; the fecond points out the general fources of the varieties of Genius; the third confiders its feveral kinds.

Part I. Genius is not the fame thing with capacity, which is common to all who unite in any tolerable degree judgment, memory, and induftry. Genius is properly the faculty of invention, or the power of making new difcoveries, and producing original works: the degree of this faculty is always judged to be proportioned to the novelty, difficulty, or dignity of the VOL. LII. invention.

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invention. Improvements in fciences or arts difplay genius as much as original discoveries.

Invention being the criterion of Genius, the next inquiry is, what power of the mind it is that qualifies a man for invention ? This can neither be fenfe nor memory. Imagination is the creative power. By tranfpofing, varying, and compounding our perceptions, it produces numberless combinations that are wholly new. Invention is then to be referred folely to this faculty. Senfe and memory fupply materials; judgment obferves relations, infers conclufions, and corrects the fuggeftions of fancy; but imagination alone invents, or produces genius.

The operations of imagination are chiefly performed by the power of affociation. To this power we must therefore refer the origin of genius. Where there is true genius, the exertions of the imagination will be comprehensive, regular, aɛlive; combining ideas and images in endless variety, without following the track of memory; connecting ideas in their proper order and relation to the leading defign; paffing with great rapidity through all poffible views of the ideas which prefent themselves, and with facility making a great variety of arrangements, till that occurs which beft fuits the defign. Invention and genius likewife comprehends a power of taking an extenfive view of ideas already affociated, as they tend to one point, and are connected in one whole. That elevation and warmth of fancy which is ftyled enthufiafm, always accompanies genius. The mind pursues its affociations with eagerness, views its ideas as a rich treasure with delight and confcious pride, and triumphs in the profpect of forming it knows not what excelling things. This ardour improves the operations of genius, by giving vigour to the affociating power, and keeping the attention closely fixed on the fubject.

Genius cannot attain perfection, unless it be united with a found and piercing judgment. It was this which enabled the reat geniufes of antiquity to produce works without the aid of rules, which have been the foundation of fyftems, and rules of criticism in all fucceeding ages. The utmolt exertion of judg ment is neceflary, in forming the plan of any work, and difpofing its feveral parts; it must be employed through the whole. execution, and must at last review, correct, and finish the piece. The determinations of judgment will often be of use, to put the imagination into a new track, and enable it to extend its views. The use of topics and common places in invention is founded on this principle.

The greatest works of genius fpring at firft from fingle per-, ception, perhaps accidentally raifed in the mind. Imagination is always fet on work by fenfe or memory; and even when

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genius creates conceptions of its own, they are all combinations of ideas which thefe had previously fuggefted.

Part II. Of the general fources of the varieties of Genius.

The origin of the varieties of genius is chiefly to be fought for in the feveral modes of affociation which the imagination. employs in its operations.

The qualities or relations of ideas which fit them to be affociated, are fimple or compound. The fimple are principally three, refemblance, contrariety, vicinity. The compound are chiefly, co-exiflence, the relation of cause and effect, and order.

Affociation is aided by habit and by paffion. The ideas which habit has rendered familiar are more eafily introduced by any prefent perception, than others equally related to that per ception, but which we are little accustomed to think upon. Habit renders us more apt to be affected by one of the affociating qualities than by others: it makes the fame affociating quality more ready to operate on the imagination after one particular manner than after another; and it produces a union be tween perceptions not otherwife related. Paffion has a powerful effect on affociation. Some ideas are intimately connected with a paffion as its object or caufe, or what fupports and gratifies it; and these ideas force themselves upon the mind while it is under the influence of the paffion. Different ideas, in different refpects connected with the fame paffion, are by turns fuggefted; but fuch as are altogether foreign from it are rejected, and fuch only dwelt upon as have a real or fancied connexion with it. Paffion therefore chiefly employs thofe affociating qualities which will lead it but to a small diftance from its object, fuch as refemblance, vicinity, co-existence, and the relation of caufe and effect.

Affociation is not produced fo effectually by recollection as by fenfation: the train of thought therefore produced by the latter, will be different from that produced by the former. Affociation is also susceptible of variety from the combination of the affociating principles. Habit and paffion, resemblance and contiguity may be united; and hereby the force of affociation ftrengthened.

Each principle of affociation is in itfelf capable of receiving different forms or modifications. Vicinity admits of degrees. Refemblance differs in degree, and in kind. Contrariety in fome cafes, implies only great difference, in others, that one thing is the negation of another, and in others, that objects produce oppofite effects. Co-existence takes place, when qualities or parts are united in one whole; or are common to feveral individuals; or where there is, or has been, a temporary union between the qualities and their fubject. Cause and effect affumes an infinite variety of forms; fome nearer, others more

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remote;

remote; fome more, others lefs, obvious.

Order respects place, time, nature, and uniformity of figure. All these dif tinct forms of the affociating principles, produce correspondent peculiarities in the exertions of genius, which are regulated by them.

In almost every man, fome one of the associating principles is predominant. This must be ultimately refolved into the original conftitution of different minds. Which foever of the affociating principles is predominant, it will give a peculiar caft to the genius. The fame is true with refpect to the different combinations and modifications of thefe principles. The great divifions of genius commonly arife from the prevalence of one principle of affociation over another; and the more minute varieties from the prevalence of different modifications. Yet these modifications are fometimes fo diffimilar, that the predominance of one over another produces a difference of genius, as great as could be produced by the predominance of principles totally diftinct. The natural hiftorian and the poet both employ refemblance as their medium of affociation, but in different ways. The peculiar form of genius alfo depends upon the degree of force with which the other principles of affociation co-operate with that which predominates.

Diverfity of genius farther arifes from different degrees of flexibility or pliableness in the imagination. This confifts in a capacity of being equally impreffed with diffimilar defigns, and employing different affociating principles with equal vigour; making each in its turn predominant, as the nature of the fubject requires. Hence the fame perfon will write in a different manner on the fame subject at different times, and acquit himfelf equally well on different fubjects.

Farther, to account for the diverfities of genius, we must observe the varieties which take place in the other faculties from which it receives affiftance. Memory in retaining fimple perceptions is fubject to variations, from length of time, the nature of the object, and the degree of attention. Memory employs the fame aflociating powers with imagination; and their operations are almoft always intermingled. The chief perfections of memory are, that it be eafily fufceptible of impreffions; tenacious of what it has received; diftinct, to exhibit ideas in their proper order; and ready, in calling them forth. The different degrees in which these excellencies prevail, will have an effect on the productions of genius. The peculiar turn of memory will affect genius, by determining in many inftances the idea from which it fhall fet out in invention, and the nature and connexion of the ideas afterwards fuggefted.

Judgment is employed on truth and beauty. Men differ in the degree in which they exercife the fame fpecies of judgment,

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or in the fpecies which they most readily exercise. Judgment differs in its operations according to the degree of vigour with which attention is employed, the diftinctnefs and readiness with which memory supplies materials, and the acuteness with which the reasoning faculty deduces conclufions. Judgment employed on beauty is called tafte; and confifts in the united exercise of the reasoning faculty, and the internal fenfes. A correct tafte, regulating the productions of genius, will carry them towards perfection.

Part III. Of the feveral kinds of genius.

The kinds of genius are most conveniently diltinguished according to the nature of the object about which it is employed, or the end to which it is adapted. These may be reduced to two, the difcovery of truth, and the production of beauty. Genius is then the power of invention either in fcience er in the arts, either of truth or beauty.

Some difference between genius for fcience and the arts arises neceffarily from the diverfity of their ends. Scientific genius employs the powers of affociation in fearch of appearances and relations to establish truth. Genius for the arts exhibits fuch objects and relations as are adapted to please the taste. The philofopher obferves and defcribes minutely all the appearances of his objects, which can forward his inveftigation: the artist catches only fuch general appearances as are most striking. A genius for fcience therefore is formed by penetration, a genius for the arts by brightness: these are their general characters.

Both these imply a great extent and compass of imagination, but of different kinds. Penetration requires an imagination that can dwell long and fteadily on one object, or on those closely connected with it, and obferve accurately those qualities which are the leaft obvious. Brightnefs of imagination makes every prefent object fuggeft a multitude of ideas, and hurries the mind quickly from one thing to another not very closely connected with it, and thus enables a man to exhibit a great variety and quick fucceffion of objects adapted to please.

The peculiar predominancy of fome of the affociating principles contributes to form penetration, and of others, brightnefs of imagination. Some relations of things lead the mind more quickly, and to a greater diftance, from these things, than others: the former favours brightnefs, the latter penetration. Some qualities lay a foundation for relations between one object and many others, and thereby produce a rapid fucceffion : other qualities do not form obvious connexions with different objects, but confine the attention, and lead the mind to examine one object in a variety of lights. From hence it will appear, that the relations of caufation and co-existence are the fources of affociation beft fuited to fcience, those of refemblance,

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