people, or their reprefentatives, who alone can have a right to give.

We hope thefe obfervations will not be thought inexpedient, when it is confidered that the pofition to which they relate, effentially affects the rights of property in Great Britain, as well as the queftion of American taxation, which even our Author would have us examine with caution proportioned to the event of a decifion which must convict one part of robbery, or the other of rebellion.? Our Author's other pofition is, that there must in every fociety be fome power or other from which there is no appeal, which admits no restrictions, which pervades the whole mass of the com munity, regulates and adjufts all fubordination, enacts laws or repeals them, erects or annuls judicatures, extends or contracts privileges, exempt itself from question or control, and bounded only by phyfical neceffity.'

Similar pofitions have been made the foundation of almost every fyftem of arguments against the claims of the colonies, and yet they can be true only of focieties which are governed by divine authority; for wherever a ftate is governed by a power delegated from the people, that power must have been delegated on certain conditions, and for certain ends, from which thofe entrusted with it can have no right to depart. Before a parliament could have been legally conftituted, certain compacts must have been made, certain rights established, and certain conftitutions formed, to fupport and regulate even the existence of parliament itself; and these must in reafon and juftice be confidered as fo many impaffable boundaries to the authority of parliament, which, however abfolute within fuch limits, could not extend to the fubverfion of rights or conftitutions established by the whole fociety collectively, without invalidating the very commiffion by which the authority of parliament was delegated. Lawyers, indeed, from a conftant habit of fubmitting their reafon to the authority of parliament, have commonly adopted extravagant ideas of its authority. Almost all of them however, and particularly Lord Coke, fpeak of certain acts and certain rights as being more especially facred and fundamental.-And the act of fettlement declares, according to the ancient doctrine of the common law, that certain effential privileges are the BIRTH-RIGHT of the people of England," which neceffarily implies, that they cannot justly be taken away by any authority. But moreover, parliament itself has exprefsly fet bounds to its own power, and thereby warranted us to conclude that its power is not unlimited: the ftatute 25th of Edward II. declares that the great charter fhall be always allowed as the common law, and directs fentence of excommunication to be denounced at ftated times against all those who act or counsel any thing against it, and the statute 42d of Edward III. c. 1. enacts, "That the great charter and the charter of the forreft fhall be holden and kept in all points; and if any ftatute fhall be made to the contrary, that shall be holden for none;" all which does most strongly imply, that there are certain fundamental rights, and particularly thofe contained in the charters before mentioned, which no parliament has a right to invade. We have belides the memorable cafe of two of the judges of England (Sir Richard Epsom and

Edmund

Edmund Dudley,) who were HANGED for allowing the force of law to an act of parliament made in the 11th year of Henry VII. by which the right of trial by jury was abridged, contrary to what Lord Coke ftyles a fundamental law" and his Lordship (zd Inft.) obferves, "that the fearful end of these two oppreffors should deter others from committing the like" (that is from enforcing an unconftitutional act of parliament)" and should ADMONISH PARLIAMENTS that inftead of this ordinary and precious trial per Legem Terræ, they bring not in abfolute and partial trials by discretion*

Thefe facts and authorities will doubtless be fufficient to invali

date our Author's pofition, and to prove that the power of parlia ment is not (what no human power ought to be) unlimited: there are indeed many acts which the feelings of every honeft man would determine to be beyond the lawful authority of parliament. e. g. Should an act be ever paffed to annihilate the democratic branch of our legislature, fuch act would not only deferve resistance, but every one promoting it would deferve the punishment of a traitor, guilty of what Lord Somers calls "the firft and highest of treasons,-that which is committed again the conftitution." Nor would it be much less criminal to deprive the freeholders of England of the right of fuffrage for reprefentatives in parliament.-But how far it is juftifiable to impofe laws and taxes upon the freeholders of America, without allowing them a reprefentation, we prefume not to decide, though it is a question which may be worthy of confideration.

We have bestowed thefe obfervations upon our Author's pofition, not only becaufe great part of his conclufions are deduced from it, but because we think it pregnant with danger to the liberties of the people of Great Britain. We do not indeed fufpect that any undue connexion has been yet formed between the legislative and executive powers of government, or that the modern fyftem of governing by parliament refults from the acquifition of any unconflitutional inAuence therein.-It is however poffible, that in fome future reign, the means of corruption belonging to the crown may be fo employed as that the reprefentatives of the people instead of protecting may betray the rights of their conflituents.-And the Prefident Monrefquieu has even predicted, that the conftitution of England will finally perish by this fpecies of perfidy: it is our duty therefore, as friends to the liberties of mankind, and efpecially of our own countrymen, to difcourage this prevailing fashionable doctrine of

These facts operate to prove that the authority of a parliament legally conftituted has fome fundamental bounds which it ought not to tranfgrefs,-but parliamentary authority even within thofe bounds may be vitiated if extended over perfons who having a right to be reprefented, have no reprefentative, therein.. This appears from the act made for admitting reprefentatives for the County Palatine of Chefter; which, after reciting that the inhabitants thereof had been bound by acts of Parliament without having "either knight or burgefs" therein, declares thefe extenfions of parliamentary authority to have been a grievance, and derogatory to their "moft ancient jurifdictions, liberties, and privileges." "For remedy whereof, &c." a reprefentation was granted.

Rev. Mar. 1775.

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parliamentary omnipotence; for the paffive obedience and nonrefiftance which this doctrine comprehends, will not be rendered lefs dangerous, by transferring that unlimited power to a future corrupt parliament which fome wickedly afcribe to the King, during the reigns of the Stuarts.-We mean not to define, much less to abridge the juft limits of parliamentary authority; but we would oppose those who maintain that it has No bounds, and confequently, that the people have No rights but what depend on the arbitrary will of their delegates; a doctrine tending to prepare us for flavery even before we have a corrupt parliament ready to betray us into it.

To apply the preceding obfervations to particular parts of our Author's work, would require more room than we can bestow on any fingle performance, and we must therefore content ourselves with noticing a few of the many other exceptionable passages therein; particularly

, He that denies the English Parliament the right of taxation, denies it likewife the right of making any other laws civil or criminal, yet this power over the Colonies was never yet difputed by themselves. They have always admitted ftatutes for the punishment of offences, and for the redrefs or prevention of inconveniences; and the reception of any law draws after it by a chain which cannot be broken, the unwelcome neceffity of fubmitting to taxation.'

Having before proved that a right to taxation is different from a right of legislation, it must follow that a denial of the former does not neceffarily involve a denial of the latter.-Not that we think the people of America, even if exempted from parliamentary taxation, could be faid to enjoy the privileges of Britons while subject to a legislative power in which they have no participation.-The Colonies have indeed confented to obey fuch acts of Parliament as are bona fide made to regulate their commerce; but it is ungenerous to employ this confent in fupporting oppreffive claims, and every attempt to do it must incline them to retract a conceffion which they find fo much abused.

With regard to our Author's affertion that the legislative authority of Parliament was never yet difputed' by the Colonies, it is fo repugnant to truth, that to acquit him of wilful falfhood, we must convict him of great ignorance refpecting the political hiftory of the Colonies. In our Review for November laft we alleged inftances in which the right of Parliament to make laws binding in America had been denied by King James I. and his minifters, and by the people of the Colonies, who for several years openly disobeyed the acts of trade and navigation; nor were they at all obferved in the Colony of Maffachusetts until after the General Affembly there had paffed an act profeffedly to give them that validity of which as acts of parliament they were held to be deftitute: and we hall recite part of the letter which the affembly on that occafion, viz. in 1679, wrote to their agent in England, as fufficient to fhew what degree of credit is due to our Author's affertion. Writing of the acts of trade, &c. the affembly declare, "We apprehend them to be an invafion of the rights, liberties, and properties, of the fubjects of his Majefty in this Colony, they not being represented in parliament ;

and

and according to the ufual fayings of the learned in the law, the laws of England are bounded within the four feas, and do not reach America.

2dly, Concerning the plea of the Congrefs, that by migrating to America they forfeited none of the rights of English fubjects, our Author writes, That they who form a fettlement by a lawful Charter, having committed no crime, forfeit no privileges, will be readily confeffed; but what they do not forfeit by any judicial fentence, they may lose by natural effects. As man can be but in one place at once, he cannot have the advantages of multiplied refidence. He that will enjoy the brightness of funshine, muft quit the coolness of the fhade. He who goes voluntarily to America, cannot complain of lofing what he leaves in Europe. He perhaps had a right to vote for a knight or burgefs: by croffing the Atlantick he has not nullified his right; for he has made its exertion no longer poffible. By his own choice he has left a country where he had a vote and little property, for another, where he has great property, but no vote. But as this preference was deliberate and unconstrained, he is still concerned in the government of himself; he has reduced him. felf from a voter to one of the innumerable multitude that have no vote. He has truly ceded his right, but he ftill is governed by his own confent; because he has confented to throw his atom of interest into the general mafs of the community. Of the confequences of his own act he has no caufe to complain; he has chofen, or intended to chufe, the greater good; he is reprefented, as himself defired, in the general reprefentation.'

It is here in effect admitted, that a Colonial deprived of a repre fentation is deprived of one of the rights belonging to Englishmen, or at least to English freeholders; but it is also pretended, that by emigration he has voluntarily relinquished that right, contrary to the expectation of the emigrants themselves, and to the strongest affurances given in their feveral charters.-Our Author fhould have remembered that though a Colonift by going to America, might ceafe to be a freeholder of a particular county in England, yet he acquired by this tranfition another freehold in a particular district of America, and if after removing to that continent his perfon and his new freehold were ftill to continue fubject to the laws and taxes of parliament, every circumstance which rendered it expedient of defirable for him to be reprefented while he was an English freeholder, must make it expedient and defirable that he should enjoy a fimilar representation as a freeholder of America; and to deprive him of it, is to firip him of the most important privilege that belongs to the fubjects of a free government. So far, however, were the Colonifts from expecting to fuffer any abridgment of the rights of Englifhmen, that as Governor Hutchinfon has mentioned in his hiftory of the Maffachusetts Bay, The first planters of the Mafachusetts Colony removed to America, expecting there to enjoy civil and religious liberty in a GREATER DEGREE than their fellow-fubjects at that time enjoyed it in England."

3dly, 'The reafon (fays our Author)why we place any confidence in our reprefentatives is, that they muft fhare in the good or evil which their counfels fhall produce. Their hare is indeed commonly confe

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quential and remote; but it is not often poffible that any immediate advantage can be extended to fuch numbers as may prevail against it. We are therefore as fecure against intentional depravations of government as human wisdom can make us, and upon this fecurity the Americans may venture to repofe.'

Of the objection to which this is intended for a reply, we gave an account in our Review for December last, p. 477. and certainly it has not been invalidated by any thing delivered in this performance; it would, therefore, have been more judicious in our Author had he entirely overlooked the objection.

4thly, It is urged (fays our Author,) that when Wales, Durham, and Chester, were divested of their particular privileges or ancient government, and reduced to the fate of English counties, they had reprefentatives affigned them.

To thofe from whom fomething had been taken, fomething in return might properly be given. To the Americans their Charters are left as they were, except that of which their fedition has deprived them. If they were to be reprefented in parliament, fomething would be granted, though nothing is withdrawn.'

Having no room to enter upon the fubject of American Charters, or of the fedition for which one of them is faid to have been taken away (though never legally forfeited), we fhall only obferve, that nothing was given to the people of Wales, Durham, and Chefter, when they were brought to the state of English counties, but the privileges of English fubjects, which were by parliament itself underftood neceffarily to include that of being reprefented.-To the fame privileges of English fubjects the Colonifts were entitled by birth right, and therefore in afking a reprefentation, they do not afk the grant of a new favour.

5thly, It might be hoped (proceeds our Author) that no Englishman could be found, whom the menaces of our own, Colonists, juft refcued from the French, would not move to indignation, like that of the Scythians, who, returning from war, found themfelves excluded from their own houfes by their flaves.'

We have heard of a chimney-fweeper who fancied himfelf affociated in the fovereignty of America, and often asked are not the Americans OUR fubjects" But Doctor fuffers his fancy to

ramble farther than that of the chimney-fweeper; for before he can have the fame caufe of indignation as the Scythians, he muft fancy the Colonists are not only his fubjects but his flaves, and that their claim to the benefit of their own houfes, is a forcible entry and oufter committed in his own.

6thly, Though we were before told by our Author, that the Colonists have never denied the legislative authority of parliament, we afterwards find him afferting that they now question the validity of every act of legiflation. They confider themfelves as emancipated from obedience, and as being no longer the subjects of the British crown. We are willing to overlook the contradiction between this and our Author's former affertion; but to preferve his veracity from an impeachment even by the former imputation of ignorance feems hardly practicable; for negative ignorance will not justify pofitive falsehood; on the contrary, when a writer fteps forth