Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation DebateOxford University Press, 19 במרץ 1992 - 216 עמודים This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this problem. Their ideas include an argument for the empowerment of private and public interest groups in the regulatory process and a provocative discussion of how the government can support and encourage industry self-regulation. |
תוכן
| 3 | |
2 The Benign Big Gun | 19 |
3 Tripartism | 54 |
4 Enforced SelfRegulation | 101 |
5 PartialIndustry Intervention | 133 |
6 Delegation and Participation in a Responsive Regulatory order | 158 |
Notes | 163 |
| 183 | |
| 197 | |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
actors Administration agency's analysis antitrust argued Australian behavior benefits benign big gun Braithwaite cartel Chapter citizens companies competitive competitors comply consumer contestable cooperation equilibrium corporate Corporate Crime Reporter costs delegation deregulation dominant firm dominant-firm economic economic rationality effective efficient capture empowered enforced self-regulation enforcement pyramid environmental escalation evolution of cooperation example executives firm's forms of capture fringe fringe-firm intervention incentives increase inefficient inspectors institutions joint cooperation joint defection laissez-faire lobbying market failure monopsonist monopsony motivated negotiation nursing home oligopoly OPEC partial-industry regulation participation People's Express players political possible prisoner's dilemma problem production profits protection public interest punitive rational Reagan regulated firms regulatory agencies regulatory culture regulatory strategies republican residents responsive regulation reward payoff rules safety sanctions Scholz second sourcing social responsibility sucker payoff temptation payoff tion tripartism tripartite trust unregulated violations zero-sum capture