fhare Hence, the ftillnefs of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the at tention: Horror ubique animos, fimul ipfa filentia terrent. Zara. Silence and folitude are ev'ry where! Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors That hither lead, nor human face nor voice Is feen or heard. A dreadful din was wont To grate the fenfe, when enter'd here, from groans And howls of flaves condemn'd, from clink of chains, And crash of rufty bars and creaking hinges; And ever and anon the fight was dafh'd With frightful faces and the meagre looks Of grim and ghaftly executioners. Yet more this ftillness terrifies my foul Than did that scene of complicated horrors. Mourning Bride, at 5. ft. 8. And hence it is, that an object feen at the termi nation of a confined view, is more agreeable than when seen in a group with the furrounding ob jects: The crow doth fing as fweetly as the lark Merchant of Venice. 34. In matters of flight importance, attention is moftly directed by will; and for that reafon, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impreffion. Had we power equally to with-hold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep impreffion. But our power fails us here: an interefting object feizes and fixes the attention beyond the poffibility of control; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may folicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a fmall misfortune is fcarce felt in prefence of a greater : Lear, Thou think'ft 'tis much, that this contentious ftorm Invades us to the fkin; fo 'tis to thee; But where the greater malady is fix'd, The leffer is fcarce felt, Thou'dft fhun a bear; But if thy flight lay tow'rd the roaring sea, Thou'dft meet the bear i'th' mouth. When the mind's free, The body's delicate: the tempeft in my mind Doth from my fenfes take all feeling elfe, King Lear, at 3. Sc. 5. 35. Genus, fpecies, modification, are terms invented to diftinguish beings from each other. Individuals are diftinguished by their qualities: a number of individuals confidered with refpect to qualities that diftinguish them from others, is termed a fpecies: a plurality of fpecies confidered with refpect to their distinguishing qualities, is termed termed a genus. That quality which distinguisheth one genus, one fpecies, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modification: thus the fame particular that is termed a property or quality when confidered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a modification when confidered as diftinguishing the individual or the clafs from another: a black skin and foft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the fame circumstances confidered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different fpecies, are denominated modifications. 36. Objects of fight, being complex, are diftinguishable into the several particulars that enter into the compofition: these objects are all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thickness. When I behold a fpreading oak, I distinguish in this object, fize, figure, colour, and fometimes motion: viewing a flowing river, I diftinguish colour, figure, and constant motion: a dye has colour, black spots, fix plain furfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extenfion fome of them are felt rough, fome smooth: fome of them are hard, fome foft. With refpect to the other fenfes, fome of their objects are fimple, fome complex: a found, a taste, a smell, may be fo fimple as not to be diftinguishable into parts: others are perceived to be compounded of different founds, different tastes, and different fmells. 37. The eye at one look can take in a number of of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: as these objects are distinct from each other, each having a separate and independent existence, they are distinguishable in the mind as well as in reality; and there is nothing more eafy, than to abstract from fome and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its fpreading branches, fixes our attention upon itfelf, and abstracts us from the fhrubs that furround it. In the fame manner, with refpect to compound founds, taftes, or fiells, we can fixour thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abstracting our attention from the rest. But the power of abstraction is not confined to objects that are separable in reality as well as mentally; it also takes place where there can be no real feparation: the fize, the figure, the colour, of a tree, are infeparably connected, and cannot exist independent of each other; the fame of length, breadth, and thickness: and yet we can mentally confine our observations to one of these, neglecting or abstracting from the reft. Here abstraction takes place where there cannot be a real feparation. 38. This power of abstraction is of great utility. A carpenter confiders a log of wood, with regard to hardnefs, firmnefs, colour, and tex ture: a philofopher, neglecting these properties, makes the log undergo a chymical analysis; and examines its taste, its fmell, and its component principles the geometrician confines his reafon ing to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness. In general, every artist, abstracting from all other properties, confines his obfervations to those which have a more immediate connection with his profeffion. 39. Hence clearly appears the meaning of an abstract term, and abftract idea. If in viewing an object, we can abstract from fome of its parts or properties, and attach ourselves to others, there must be the fame facility when we recall this object to the mind in idea. This leads directly to the definition of an abstract idea, viz. “A "partial idea of a complex object, limited to one "or more of the component parts or properties, "laying afide or abftracting from the reft." A word that denotes an abstract idea, is called an abstract term. 40. The power of abstraction is bestowed upon man, for the purposes folely of reafoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearness of any process of reasoning, that, withdrawing from every other circumftance, we can confine our at tention to the single property we desire to investi gate. 41. Abstract ideas, may, I think, be diftinguished into three different kinds, all equally fubfervient to the reasoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not poffefs the faculty of distributing them into claffes, the mind would be loft in an endless variety, and no progrefs be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty |