edly be regular. Regularity is predicated of a figure confidered as a whole composed of uniform parts: uniformity is predicated of these parts as related to each other by resemblance: we say, a fquare is a regular, not an uniform, figure; but with refpect to the constituent parts of a square, we fay not, that they are regular, but that they are uniform.

26. In things destined for the fame ufe, as legs, arms, eyes, windows, fpoons, we expect uniformity. Proportion ought to govern parts intended for different uses: we require a certain proportion between a leg and an arm; in the base, the shaft, the capital of a pillar; and in the length, the breadth, the height of a room: fome proportion is alfo required in different things intimately connected, as between a dwelling-house, the garden, and the ftables: but we require no proportion among things flightly connected, as between the table a man writes on and the dog that follows him. Proportion and uniformity never coincide: things equal are uniform; but proportion is never applied to them: the four fides and angles of a fquare are equal and perfectly uniform; but we fay not that they are proportional. Thus, proportion always implies inequality or difference; but then it implies it to a certain degree only: the most agreeable proportion resembles a maximum in mathematics; a greater or lefs inequality or difference is lefs agreeable.

27. Order regards various particulars. First, in tracing or furveying objects, we are directed by a fenfe of order: we conceive it to be more orderly, that we should pass from a principal to its acceffories, and from a whole to its parts, than in the contrary direction. Next, with refpect to the pofition of things, a fenfe of order directs us to place together things intimately connected. Thirdly, in placing things that have no natural connection, that order appears the most perfect, where the particulars are made to bear the strongeft relation to each other that position can give them. Thus parallelifm is the strongest relation that position can bestow upon ftraight lines: if they be fo placed as by production to interfect each other, the relation is lefs perfect. A large body in the middle, and two equal bodies of less fize, one on each fide, is an order that produces the strongest relation the bodies are fufceptible of by position: the relation between the two equal bodies would be stronger by juxtapofition; but they would not both have the fame relation to the third.

28. The beauty or agreeableness of a vifible object, is perceived as one of its qualities; which holds, not only in the original perception, but alfo in the fecondary perception or idea: and hence the pleasure that arifes from the idea of a beautiful object. An idea of imagination is alfo pleasant, though in a lower degree than an idea of memory, where the objects are of the fame

kind; for an evident reafon, that the former is more distinct and lively than the latter. But this inferiority in the ideas of imagination, is more than compenfated by their greatnefs and variety, which are boundless; for the imagination acting without controul, can fabricate ideas of finer visible objects, of more noble and heroic actions, of greater wickedness, of more furprifing events, than ever in fact exifted: and in communicating fuch ideas by words, painting, fculpture, &c. the influence of the imagination is not lefs extenfive than great.

29. In the nature of every man, there is fomewhat original, that ferves to distinguish him from others, that tends to form a character, and to make him meek or fiery, candid or deceitful, refolute or timorous, chearful or morofe. This original bent, termed difpofition, must be diftinguished from a principle: the latter, fignifying a law of human nature, makes part of the common nature of man; the former makes part of the nature of this or that man. Propenfity is a name common to both; for it fignifies a principle as well as a difpofition.

30. Affection, fignifying a fettled bent of mind toward a particular being or thing, occupies a middle place between difpofition on the one hand, and paffion on the other. It is clearly diftinguishable from difpofition, which being a branch of our nature originally, must exift before there can be an opportunity to exert it upon any particular

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particular object; whereas affection can never be original, because having a fpecial relation to a particular object, it cannot exift till the object have once at least been prefented. It is not lefs clearly diftinguishable from paffion, which de-. pending on the real or ideal prefence of its object, vanishes with its object; whereas affection, once fettled on a person, is a lasting connection; and, like other connections, fubfifts even when we do not think of the perfon. A familiar example will clear the whole. There may be in my mind a difpofition to gratitude, which through want of an object, happens never to be exerted; and which therefore is never difcovered even by myself. Another who has the fame difpofition meets with a kindly office that makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is formed between them, termed affection; which, like other connections, has a permanent exiftence, though not always in view. The affection, for the most part, lies dormant, till an opportunity offer of exerting it in this circumftance, it is converted into the paffion of gratitude; and the opportunity is greedily feized for testifying gratitude in the warmest manner.

31. Averfion, I think, must be opposed to affection, and not to defire, as it commonly is. We have an affection to one perfon; we have an aversion to another; the former difpofes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.

33. What is a fentiment? It is not a percep

tion; for a perception fignifies the act by which: we become confcious of external objects. It is: not consciousness of an internal action, such as thinking, fufpending thought, inclining, refolving, willing, &c. Neither is it the conception of a relation amongst objects; a conception of this kind being termed opinion. The term Sentiment is appropriated to fuch thoughts as are prompted by paffion.

33. Attention is that state of mind which prepares one to receive impreffions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a stronger or weaker impreffion *. Attention is requifité even to the fimple act of feeing. The eye can. take in a confiderable field at one look; but no object in the field is seen distinctly, but that fingly which fixes the attention. In a profound reverie that totally occupies the attention, we fcarce fee what is directly before us. In a train of perceptions, no particular object makes fuch a figure as it would do fingle and apart for when the attention is divided among many ob- · jects, no particular object is intitled to a large

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Bacon, in his natural hiftory, makes the following obfervations. Sounds are meliorated by the intenfion of the fenfe, where the common fenfe is collected moft to the particular sense of hearing, and the fight fufpended. Therefore founds are fweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I fuppofe they are sweeter to blind men than to others: and it is manifeft, that between sleeping and waking, when all the fenfes are bound and fufpended, mufic is far fweeter than when one is fully waking.