fmooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taste we perceive the qualities fweet, four, bitter, &c.: by smell we perceive the qualities fragrant, fetid, &c. Qualities, from our very conception of them, are not capable of an independent existence; but muft belong to fome being of which they are properties. A being with respect to its qualities is termed a fubject, or fubftratum; because it fupports its qualities, which are spread, as it were, upon it. Every fubftratum of visible qualities, is termed fubftance, and of tangible qualities, body.

5. Subftance and found are perceived existing at a distance from the organ; often at a confiderable distance. But fmell, touch, and tafte, are perceived at the organ of sense.

6. All the objects of internal fenfe are attributes: witness deliberation, reasoning, refolution, willing, confenting, which are internal actions; as alfo paffions and emotions, which are internal agitations. With regard to the former, I am confcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am confcious of being paffive.

7. Again, we are confcious of internal action as in the head; of paffions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced, of which we are not confcious when we inveftigate the ultimate cause of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is

the

the most probable opinion that they proceed from fome internal power; and if fo, we are, in this particular, unconfcious of the operations of that power. But confcioufnefs being imply'd in the very meaning of deliberating, reafoning, refolving, willing, confenting, fuch operations cannot be without our knowledge. The fame is the cafe of paffions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a paffion or emotion, but what we are confcious of.

9. The mind is not always the fame: by turns it is chearful, melancholy, calm, peevish, &c. Thefe differences may not improperly be denominated tones. An object, by making an impreffion, produceth an emotion or paffion, which again gives the mind a certain tone fuited to it.

10. Perception and fenfation are commonly reckoned synonymous terms, fignifying that internal act by which we are made confcious of objects. But they ought to be diftinguished. Perceiving is a general term for hearing, feeing, tasting, touching, fmelling; and therefore perception fignifies every act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are faid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, found, tafte, fmell, &c. Senfation properly fignifies that internal act by which we are made confcious of pleasure or pain felt at the organ of sense: thus we have a fenfation of the pleafure that warmth, a fragrant fimell, a fweet tafte, gives us; and of the pain that a wound,

a fetid fimell, a difagreeable tafte, gives us. In perception, my attention is fixed upon the external object: in fenfation, it is fixed upon myfelf, and upon the pleasure or pain I feel.

The terms perception and fenfation are fometimes employ'd to fignify the objects of perception and fenfation. Perception in that fenfe is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and fenfation a general term for every pleafure and pain felt at the organ of fenfe.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object the former does not; for I can conceive the most extravagant ftories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs alfo from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony fhip with fails and ropes of filk. When I defcribe a picture of this kind to another, the idea he forms of it is term·ed a conception.

12. Feeling, befide denoting one of the external fenfes, is a general term, fignifying that internal act by which we are made confcious of our pleafures and our pains; for it is not limited, as fenfation is, to any one fort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which fenfation is a fpecics, their meaning is the fame when apply'd to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense; and accordingly we fay indifferently, "I feel pleafure from heat, and pain from cold," or, "I

"have a fenfation of pleasure from heat, and of "pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is faid, is much more extensive: it is proper to fay, I feel pleasure in a fumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in lofing a child, in revenge, in envy: fenfation is not properly apply'd to any of these.

The term feeling is frequently used in a lefs proper fenfe to fignify what we feel or are confcious of; and in this fenfe it is a general term for all our paffions and emotions, which are either pleasant or painful, and for all our other pleasures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impreffion be made upon our body, is probable from reafon, and is afcertained by experience. But it is not neceffary, that we be made fenfible of the impreffion: in touching, it is true, in tafting, and in fmelling, we are senfible of this impreffion; but not in seeing and hearing. We know indeed by experience, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is fpread upon the retina tunica; and that before we perceive a found, an impreffion is made upon the drum of the ear: and yet here, we are not confcious either of the organic image or of the organic impreffion; nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can fay, is, that we fee that river, or hear that trumpet *.

14. Objects

Yet a fingular opinion, that impreffions are the only objects

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recall an object of fight in that manner, it appears to me precifely the fame as in the original survey, only more faint and obfcure. For example, I faw yesterday a fpreading oak growing on the brink of a river. I endeavour to recall these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or reprefentative image? Not fo. I tranfport myself ideally to the place where I faw the tree and river yefterday; upon which I have a perception of these objects, fimilar in all respects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only more obfcure. And in this recollection, I am not confcious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original furvey: the perception is of the tree and river themfelves, as at firft. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively furveying a fine ftatue, I clofe my eyes. What follows? The fame object continues, without any differ

of perception, has been espoused by some philofophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the fenfes of feeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being confcious of an organic impreffion, or of any impreffion. See the Treatife upon human nature: where we find the following paffage, book 1. p. 4. feat. 2. "Properly fpeaking, it is not our body "we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; fo that "the afcribing a real and corporeal existence to these impreffions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to ex"plain," &c.

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