ter of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external conftruction: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, not less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one *. This conviction of a common nature in every species, paves the way finely for diftributing things into genera and fpecies; to which we are extremely prone, not only with regard to animals, and perhaps vegetables, where nature has led the way, but also with regard to many other things where there is no ground for fuch diftribution, but fancy merely.

With respect to the common nature of man, in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not less than univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived; becaufe, giving allowance for the difference of culture, and gradual refinement of manners, the fact correfponds to our conviction.

We are fo conftituted as to conceive that this common nature, is not only invariable, but also perfect or right; and confequently that individuals ought to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation from the standard, makes accordingly an impreffion upon us of imperfec

See clays on morality and natural religion, part 1. essay 2. ch. 1.

tion, irregularity, or disorder: it is disagreeable, and raifes in us a painful emotion: monftrous births, exciting the curiofity of a philofopher, fail not at the fame time to excite averfion in a high degree.

This conviction of a common nature or standard, and of its perfection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right and a wrong fenfe or tafte in morals. It accounts not lefs clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong fenfe or taste in the fine arts. A man who rejects objects generally agreeable, and delights in objects generally disagreeable, is condemned as a monfter: we difapprove his taste as bad or wrong, because we have a clear conception that he deviates from the common standard. If man were fo framed as not to have any notion of a common ftandard, the proverb mentioned in the beginning would hold univerfally, not only in the fine arts, but in morals: upon that fuppofition, the taste of every man, with refpect to both, would to himself be an ultimate ftandard. But the conviction of a common ftandard being made a part of our nature, we intuitively conceive a tafte to be right or good if conformable to the common standard, and wrong or bad if difconformable.

No particular concerning human nature is more univerfal, than the uneafinefs a man feels when in matters of importance his opinions are rejected by others: why fhould difference in opinion create uneafinefs,

uneafinefs, more than difference in ftature, in countenance, or in drefs? The conviction of a co.nmon ftandard explains this mystery: every man, generally speaking, taking it for granted that his opinions agree with the common fenfe of mankind, is therefore difgulted with thofe of a contrary opinion, not as differing from him, but as differing from the common ftandard : hence in all difputes, we find the parties, each of them equally, appealing conftantly to the common fenfe of mankind as the ultimate rule or ftandard. Were it not for this ftandard, of which the conviction is univerfal, I cannot difcover the flighteft foundation for rancor or animofity when perfons difier in effentiak points more than in points purely indifferent: with refpećt to the latter, which are not fuppofed to be regulated by any standard, individuals are permitted to think for themfelves with impunity: the fame liberty is not indulged with refpect to the former; for what reason, other than that the ftandard by which these are regulated, ought, as we judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all men? In a word, to this conviction of a common ftandard must be wholly attributed the pleafure we take in those who efpoufe the fame principles and opinions with ourfelves, as well as the averfion we have at those who differ from us. In matters left indifferent by the ftandard, we find nothing of the fame pleasure or pain: a bookish man, unlefs fway'd by convenience, relifheth not the contemplative

H h 4

templative more than the active part of mankind; his friends and companions are chofen indifferently out of either class: a painter conforts with a poet or musician, as readily as with thofe of his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as I do, nor the less agreeable for preferring mutton.

I have ventured to fay, that my difguft is raifed, not by differing from me, but by differing from what 1 judge to be the common standard. This point, being of importance, ought to be firmly established. Men, it is true, are prone to flatter themselves, by taking it for granted, that their opinions and their tafte are in all refpects conformable to the common standard; but there may be exceptions, and experience fhows there are fome: there are inftances without number, of perfons who cling to the groffer amufements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any relish for more elegant pleasures, fuch, for example, as are afforded by the fine arts; yet these very perfons, talking the fame language with the reft of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleasures; and they invariably approve those who have a more refined tafte, being afhamed of their own as low and fenfual. It is in vain to think of giving a reason for this fingular impartiality, other than the authority of the common ftandard with respect to the dignity of human nature *: and from the instances now

* See chap. 11.

given we difcover, that the authority of this standard, even upon the most groveling fouls, is fo vigorous, as to prevail over felf partiality, and to make them despise their own taste compared with the more elevated tafte of others.

The uniformity of tafte and fentiment refulting from our conviction of a common standard, leads to two important final causes; the one refpecting our duty, the other our paftime. Barely to mention the first shall be fufficient, because it does not properly belong to the present undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not this uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions fhould uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest bleffing in fociety; and in order to uniformity of action, uniformity of opinion and fentiment is indifpenfable.

With refpect to paftime, the fine arts in particular, the final caufe of uniformity is illuftrious. Uniformity of tafte gives opportunity for fumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extenfive embellishments, which please univerfally and the reafon is, that without uniformity of taste, there could not be any fuitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in fuch works, and to advance them toward perfection. The fame uniformity of taste is equally neceffary to perfect the arts of mufic, fculpture, and painting; and to fupport the expence they require after they are

brought