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Confidering that an epic and a dramatic poem are the fame in fubftance, and have the fame aim or end, one would readily imagine, that subjects proper for the one must be equally proper for the other. But confidering their difference as to form, there will be found reason to correct that conjecture, at least in fome degree. Many fubjects may indeed be treated with equal advantage in either form; but the subjects are still more numerous for which they are not equally qualified; and there are fubjects proper for the one and not at all for the other. To give fome flight notion of the difference, as there is no room here for enlarging upon every article, I obferve, that dialogue is the best qualified for expreffing fentimėnts, and narrative for difplaying facts. Heroifm, magnanimity, undaunted courage, and the whole tribe of the elevated virtues, figure best in action: tender paffions, and the whole tribe of fympathetic affections, figure beft in fentiment: what we feel is the most remarkable in the latter; what we perform is the most remarkable in the former. It clearly follows, that tender paffions are more peculiarly the province of tragedy, grand and heroic actions of epic poetry*

*In Racine, tender fentiments prevail; in Corneille, grand and heroic manners. Hence clearly the preference of the former before the latter, as dramatic poets. Corneille would figure better

in an heroic poem.

I have no occafion to fay more upon the epic, confidered as peculiarly adapted to certain fubjects. But as dramatic fubjects are more complex, I must take a narrower view of them; which I do the more willingly, in order to clear a point thrown into great obfcurity by critics.

In the chapter of emotions and paffions *, it is occafionally fhown, that the fubject beft fitted for tragedy is a story where a man has himself been the caufe of his misfortune. But this man. muft neither be deeply guilty, nor altogether innocent: the misfortune must be occafioned by a fault incident to human nature, and therefore venial. Misfortunes of this kind, call forth the focial affections, and warmly interest the spectator. An accidental misfortune, if not extremely fingular, doth not greatly move our pity: the perfon who fuffers, being innocent, is freed from the greatest of all torments, that anguish of mind which is occafioned by remorse :

Poco é funefta

Laltrui fortuna,

Quando non resta
Ragione alcuna

Ne di pentirfi, né darroffit:

Metaftafios

An atrocious criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himself, excites little pity, for a diferent reafon: his remorfe, it is:

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true, aggravates his diftrefs, and fwells the first emotions of pity; but then our hatred of him as a criminal blending with pity, blunts its edge confiderably. Misfortunes that are not innocent, nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme: they are attended with remorfe to embitter the diftrefs, which raises our pity to a great height; and the flight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not sensibly from our pity. For this reafon, the happiest of all fubjects for raising pity, is where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an action that is innocent, but which by fome fingular means he conceives to be criminal: his remorfe aggravates his diftrefs; and our compaffion, unreftrained by indignation, rifes to its highest pitch. Pity comes thus to be the ruling paffion of a pathetic tragedy; and by proper representation, may be raised to a height fcarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy 'takes in a larger field; for, befide exercifing our pity, it raises another paffion, selfish indeed, but which deferves to be cherished equally with the focial affections. The paffion I have in view is fear or terror; for when a misfortune is the natural confequence of fome wrong bias in the temper, every fpectator who is confcious of fuch a wrong bias in his own temper, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling into the fame misfortune: and it is by this emotion of fear or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies,

that

that the spectators are put upon their guard against the disorders of paffion.

The commentators upon Aristotle, and other critics, have been much graveled about the account given of tragedy by this author: "That "by means of pity and terror, it refines or puri"fies in us all forts of paffion." But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Aristotle's meaning: our pity is engaged for the perfons represented; and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to stand for all the fympathetic emotions, because of these it is the capital. There can be no doubt, that our fympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exercife; and in what manner our other paffions are refined by terror, I have just now faid. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can justly be given to the foregoing doctrine than that now mentioned; and that it was really Aristotle's meaning, appears from his 13th chapter, where he delivers feveral propofitions conformable to the doctrine as here explained. These, at the fame time, I the rather chufe to mention; because, so far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reasoning about fubjects proper for tragedy. His firft propofition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent perfon falling into adverfity ought never to be the fubject. This propofition is a neceffary confequence of his doc

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trine as explained: a fubject of this nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but the former in an inferior degree, and the latter in no degree for moral instruction. The fecond propofition is, That we must not reprefent a wicked perfon emerging from mifery to good fortune: this excites neither terror nor compaffion, nor is agreeable in any respect. The third is, That the miffortunes of a wicked perfon ought not to be reprefented: fuch representation may be agreeable in fome measure upon a principle of juftice; but it will not move our pity, nor any degree of terror, except in those of the fame vicious difpofition with the perfon reprefented. His laft propofition is, That the only character fit for representation lies in the middle, neither eminently good nor eminently bad; where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of fome involuntary fault, as our author expreffes it *. The only objection I find to Aristotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refusing admittance to the påthetic kind: for if terror be effential to tragedy, no representation deferves that name but the moral kind, where the misfortunes exhibited are caused by a wrong balance of mind, or fome dif

If one can be amused with a grave difcourfe which promifeth much and performs nothing, he may fee this fubject treated by Brumoy in his Theatre Grec. Preliminary difcourfe on the origin af tragedy.

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