were revoked, and granted to her sister on the ground that she had not been married, because the minister who married them was a mere layman. Burn continues: "This sentence upon an appeal was confirmed by the Court of Delegates. For it was held, that as Haydon demanded a right to himself as husband by the ecclesiastical law, he ought to prove himself a husband by that law and so the court ruled. And a case was cited out of Swinburn, where such a marriage had been ruled to be void as to the privileges attending legal marriages. And it is observed in that case that an act of parliament was thought necessary after the grand rebellion, to entitle people who had been married by justices of the peace to such legal advantages of dower, thirds, and the like, as attended marriages duly solemnized, according to the rites of the Church of England, and the act of the 7th and 8th William, c. 35, seems to put this matter out of all doubt, which lays a penalty on Clergymen in orders if they celebrate marriages in a clandestine manner, for if the same privileges and advantages attended marriages solemnized by the Dissenters as those celebrated according to the Church of England, how easily would that act be evaded or rather rendered of no effect. There would then be no occasion for licence or banns, for making oath or giving security, that there no legal impediments, but every one might do what was right in his own eyes, who should get himself admitted of a dissenting congregation." So far then from the Dissenters' marriages being valid, since the Toleration Act, as is alleged in the petition, and from there being no doubt of there validity before the Marriage Act, according to the Edinburgh Review they were liable to civil penalties, and to be set aside by the operations of the ecclesiastical law. It is of high importance that this was the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, with whom the Marriage Act originated, and whose measure either introduced new restrictions on the liberties of the Dissenters, which is foreign to his character, or only continued the disqualifications which had previously existed. It is true that the measure which he projected was materially altered in the House of Commons, and that he reluctantly concurred in the amendments. But these amendments afforded the longer opportunity to the Dissenters to prepare their petitions; and it would be an advantage of which the present petitioners would not fail to avail themselvs, if they could shew that the Marriage Act had always been unacceptable to the dissenting body, or had at any time been considered an infringement of their religious liberties. The acquiescence of the Dissenters at the time may be assumed, until evidence of their opposition shall be exhibited; and from their acquiescence it is obvious to infer the true state of the previous law. At present they have the benefits of registration, and an easy authentication of their marriages: and they have no difficulties, no scruples, no objections to the law, which requires them to solemnize their marriages in the Church. The view which the Edinburgh Review has taken of the case is quite his own, and the reader might without reference recognize his peculiar style and manner: "The Marriage Act was never intended as an abridgment of religious freedom; the only two sects who asked for the exemption had it; and if other Dissenters had been as watchful of their civil rights as they are now, they probably would have been included in the exception; but the carelessness of Dissenters in the time of George II. cannot affect the rights or weaken the reasons of their descendants. When men are asleep they say nothing; as soon as they are awake and talk about their civil rights, they should be heard: it is nothing to the purpose, why they did not wake sooner." The Marriage Act was not intend ed, and it was not considered an abridgment of religious freedom: and if the sects at the time did not exhibit any watchfulness of their civil rights, it is a proof that they were not conscious of their being invaded. But if the Dissenters were careless in the reign of George II. and under the superintendance of Watts and Doddridge, the call of Priestley and Belsham has awakened them: and if when they were asleep they said nothing, they began as soon as they were awake to talk in no subdued tone of their civil rights, and especially of the law which requires them to solemnize their marriages in the Church. They object, that while they have been exempted by a recent law from the penalties formerly imposed on the denial of the doctrine of the Trinity, they are still obliged by a peremptory enactment to be married by a ritual, in which they are required to assent to that doctrine. Their case is thus stated in the Edinburgh Review: "In the marriage service the doctrine of the Trinity is very frequently introduced. The man and woman are declared to be husband and wife in the name of the Trinity. The Clergyman gives them his blessing in the name of the Trinity. The man is compelled to say after the Cler gyman, that he weds, endows, and worships his wife in the name of the Trinity: and allusions to that doctrine (as is of course to be expected in the ritual of the Church of England) pervade the whole of the marriage service. There are a certain class of Dissenters, the Unitarians, who do uot believe this doctrine to be taught by the Scriptures, and who say that they cannot religiously and conscientionsly be present at a service where such doctrines are inculcated as a part of the Christian religion, much less express their assent to them, which in the marriage service they are by the repetitions after the Clergyman compelled to do." In the marriage service there are no allusions to the doctrine of the Trinity, beside the clear and distinct recognitions of that doctrine which have been described: have those recognitions been cor nor rectly described, neither does "the name of the Trinity" occur once in the office of Matrimony. The man and the woman are not declared to be husband and wife in the name of the Trinity, but in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. The Clergyman does not give his blessing in the name of the Trinity, but by imploring God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost to bless them: the man is not compelled to say after the Clergyman that he weds his wife in the name of the Trinity, but in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. It may be a familiar description, but it is not a correct statement of the fact: and although in the sense of the Clergyman, the words have a definitive and appropriate meaning, and he has no doubt concerning the doctrine which they imply, still the words which the Unitarian is required to use are scriptural words, to which he cannot object, without objecting to the truth and authenIf he was ticity of the Scriptures. required to wed his wife in the name of the Trinity, he might object to the term, as he has objected in language both frivolous and irreverent : but however he may disapprove the application to the office of Matrimony, the words themselves are free from exception. The petition of the Unitarians is more temperate than might have been expected; and is an important document in the discussion of the question. "That your petitioners are Protestant Church with regard to the doctrine of the Dissenters, differing from the Established Trinity, (and resident at or near or (usually assembling at purpose of religious worship.) , for the "That the marriage service required by the existing law is inconsistent in seve ral points with the religious belief which your petitioners conscientiously entertain. "That by the municipal laws of many Christian states, as well as of this kingdom prior to the Act of 26 Geo. II. c. 33. conimonly called the Marriage Act, the ma trimonial contract has been considered as essentially of a civil nature, although usually consecrated by some religious cere mony. "That, accordingly the marriages of dissenters, celebrated in the face of their own congregations after the date of the Toleration Act, were considered valid by our courts of law, although some attempts made to disturb such marriages in the Ecclesiastical Courts served to dispose the majority of Dissenters (between whom and the Established Church there was then no essential difference in points of doctrine) to conform in that particular to the ritual of the Church. "That whilst your petitioners are far from wishing to impugn the policy of the Marriage Act, considered as a measure of civil regulation, they beg leave to suggest, that in its operation in connection with the present Church Service, it imposes a burthen on conscience, which they humbly conceive was not intended by the legisla ture, as may be fairly inferred from the exemption in the Act of the two classes of persons, against whose religious feelings and discipline it seemed particularly to militate. stating his dissent from the doctrines of the Church, his desire to be excused from assisting at the marriage service, and his intention to appear at the altar on the hour appointed by the Clergyman, with the documents and sureties required by the Act, in order to the registration of his marriage; which petition shall be read in Church, and alluded to in the register as the cause of the omission of the marriage service;→ and Dissenters' marriages so performed shall be good in law." If the Dissenters, i. e. the Unitarians, should obtain the relief which they desire, it is obvious to ask, why the intervention of a Clergyman should be required at all, or why the marriages of the Unitarians should not be celebrated in the same manner as those of the Quaker and the Jew. It is a singular expedient, which his zeal for the propagation of Unitarianism has led the Edinburgh Reviewer to suggest, that the Dissenter's petition, stating his dissent from the doctrines of the Church ..... shall be read in Church!!!" It is not proposed to limit or restrict the licence of stating the grounds and reasons of this dissent, and the Clergyman in being required to read this petition in the Church, will be virtually obliged to preach the doctrines of Unitarianism, and to convey them to hearers, whom they would otherwise never reach. And it is in opposing such wanton propositions as these, that there is raised a clamour of " needless hostility," of a want of “good nature, liberality, and condescension," of a contention for trifles to the prejudice of essentials. If it is wrong, and we admit that it is wrong to "undervalue the conscientious scruples of Dissenters, and suppose The principal errors and inaccu- that they proceed from querulous racies of this petition have been faction, or hostility to the Church," already pointed out: the Edinburgh it must be equally wrong to underReviewers refer to it as " this Bill," value the conscientious scruples of and sincerely hoping that it may Churchmen, to impute them to hospass, they pronounce that the protility to the Dissenters; to talk of "That the just and liberal disposition of the legislature, manifested towards your petitioners by the Act passed in the 53d year of the reign of his present Majesty, c. 160. has encouraged them to hope that their religious opinions present no sufficient abjection to the extension in their favour of the recognized principles of toleration; but they humbly submit, that such tolera tion is in their case necessarily incomplete, while they are obliged by the marriage law to join in a service repugnant in many parts to their religious feelings and priu ciples. "Your petitioners therefore humbly pray, that your (right) honourable House will take their case into your serious consideration, aud afford them such relief in the premises, as in your wisdom shall seem meet, "And your petitiouers shall ever pray, &c." visions of the Bill should be to this effect: "The Dissenter should lodge his petition with the Clergyman of the parish, REMEMBRANCER, No. 35, "greediness and insolence wrapt. up in a surplice," and to insinuate, that if the Bishops do not concede the petition of the Dissenters, and 4 T do not " expunge from the Statute From these anticipations of relief from grievances alleged, the Edinburgh Reviewer proceeds to exhibit the mode in which some Unitarians act in respect of the office of Matrimony. They recite the statement of Mr. Dillon, an. Unitarian Minis ter, and if that statement fails in proof of "needless hostility," it supplies too pregnant evidence of criminal and unauthorized concession. "The following is the account which Mr. Dillon, an Unitarian Minister, gives of his own marriage, "Not to appear to take any undue advantage, I previously waited on the parson who was to perform the ceremony: you will see that this was a matter of give. I then stated, that in former cases, This pretended solicitation for advice exhibits far less of "respect for the man or his office," than of a studied intention to draw him into a dilemma, which a man of ordinary address will avoid, and reply, "Let me ask, with what view I am consulted upon this occasion: as far as I am concerned, I can give but one answer to your questions, because I myself have but one rule to follow. If you desire to be married according to the provisions of the English law, you must be married by the ri tual of the English Church, and if you pretend that you cannot conscientiously conform with that ri tual, I have solemnly pledged my self to observe it, and I have no power to dispense with its forms. I am prepared to enter upon the defence of that office and of the doctrines which it contains, and if that is the object of your application to me, I am now ready to attempt the removal of your scruples and prejudices. I might advise you to go into any foreign country where the ritual is not imposed, but in Eng ( land neither I nor any other clergyman can marry you, nor can you contract a legal marriage, but by the prescribed formulary, and if you complain of my advising you to submit to the law, I also have my com plaint, that you are soliciting me to infringe the law. It is certainly not in my power, nor is it in my inclination to compel you to go through the ceremony, but I cannot marry you without the ceremony. In re spect of the protest, which you propose to deliver, you will use your own discretion. I cannot conceive that it will serve you, it will certainly not offend me.” Mr. Dillon proceeds to describe the conduct which he pursued at the time of his marriage. "At the time appointed, a protest such as you have seen, having been drawn out and signed by my intended wife and myself, just before what is called the service began; I put it into his hands, saying, We deliver this as our protest against the religious part of the marriage cere mony, or to that effect. He took it, and requesting that no further interruption might be made, went on; but little difficulty arose till I was bid to repeat the words, In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' Here of course I paused, and after a moment told him that as conscientiously disbelieving the doctrine of the Trinity, I could not repeat these last words. He expostu lated, said he was only the servant of the law, and that we must say these words, or the marriage world be incomplete. I appealed to him as one professing religion, and standing in what he thought a sacred place, whether he ought to call upon us to join in what to us was falsehood or blaspheny. The same answer as before. At length, finding resistance here vain (though the point had been conceded to one of my friends by another person) I spoke to this effect: In the name of the Father and (but protesting against it) of the Son, and (but protesting against it) of the Holy Ghost. When the priest afterwards repeated the same words ( In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost',) the whole party turned away from the altar. The minister, in this instance, did not press us to kneel, and waived most of the prayers which follow. Indeed we contend, that after he has pronounced the parties to be man and wife,' the marriage must be to all intents and purposes complete, and every thing which follows may and shall be omitted." It is obvious, that the protest to the religious part of the ceremony must be irrelevant and unavailing, until some alteration shall be effected in the law in favour of the Unitarians, but the objection of Mr. Dillon might have taught the Edinburgh Reviewer, that the proposed law should supersede the intervention of the clergyman, and the necessity of " approaching his idola trous altar at all," however the party may profess his readiness to present himself to the priest, as to a civil officer, and a willingness to be registered by him. The objec tion to the doctrine of the Trinity has been already noticed; but there lon's manner of expressing his obis a singular temerity in Mr. Diljection: conscientiously disbelieving the doctrine of the Trinity, I could not repeat these last words," namely, "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. I appealed to him.. ... whether he ought to call upon us to join in what to us was falsehood or blasphemy." In his first position Mr. Dillon disbelieves the doctrine of the Trinity; and therefore refuses to recite the words of Scripture: in the second position he calls these words of Scripture falsehood or blasphemy, for he is not required to deliver an opinion on the doctrine of the Trinity, or on the expedience of solemnizing marriage in the name of the Trinity, but to recite certain words of Scripture, the recital of which he pro nounces to be falsehood or blasphemy, words which he cannot repeat. These objections would probably not have been insisted on, if the act 53 Geo. III. c. 160, for the repeal of the act against blasphemy had not passed, or they would have been expressed with more caution and moderation. To impute falsehood and blasphemy to a scriptural |