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What I say, then, not excluding in any proper case other tests which are more precise and specific, is, that the tendency to the formation of religious character is a test which is both useful and necessary: or, to express my meaning, more particularly, that it is a general one which includes all others; and that there are cases, also, in which no other is adequate to measure accurately the moral quality of actions. I speak of the actions of those who live under the operation of the principle of obedience to the will of God, and who have, practically, little to look for in the science of ethics, but the discovery of the particulars which God's will requires*. To all Christians this is the main use of the science; and it is unnecessary here to advert to the case of those persons to whom the Scriptures have not been made known, or to the advantages which may be derived by Christians themselves from tracing, as far as may be, all analogies between the written and the unwritten law of God. Does then the Christian need any test whatever, besides the precepts which he finds in Scripture? and, if he does, has that test which I have proposed the real value which I suppose to belong to it?

Of the preliminary question; Whether the Christian need any test whatever, besides the precepts which he finds in Scripture? it is said by Paley, that "whoever expects to find in Scripture a specific direction for every moral doubt that arises, looks for more than he will meet with +." This Paley says, and I think that in this you agree with him. Scripture principles apply to all cases. Its specific precepts, in the sense here intended, do not. Some test, therefore, is of necessity requisite in cases of doubt concerning particular actions, of doubt how far they are consistent with Hiw fed

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Christian Remembrancer, p. 166,7 Paley's Moral Philosophy, vol. i, p. 5.

Scripture principles, how far included in its general precepts. And this also you seem to me to admit, where you say, and justly, that "the sense of right and wrong, the probable general consequences, the particular consequences to ourselves, and more especially to our character and habits, and the true estimate which would be made by an impartial person, all these, and many more, are means which have been given us by God for the purpose of enabling us to form correct notions of his will and of our duty." These, in short, you regard as so many tests. And in so regarding them I agree with you fully.

The next question is; Whether the test I contend for be a general one which includes all others? I have not stated, I think, any thing more than this. For it certainly is not the meaning of my treatise, that, of the tests you mention, we should "surrender all but onet." Over and above what is said in a distinct section, which treats formally of the use of practical rules, I state explicitly that prudence, or, as you express it, "the consequences to ourselves §,"

"cannot be averred to be the sole criterion by which the conscience may or ought to be guided; that we ought to be just, we ought to be pious, even on the principle of prudence alone; and that, to these ends, the criterions to which we look must be the criterions of justice or piety "I state also that "in almost all ordinary pursuits, the rule of life is commonly very easy, if the principle of obeying it be but in force¶;" that we have for our guides, not neglecting revelation," the example of others," the law," aad

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« public opinion *naming these tests certainly with no intention to exclude those others of which you speak. All that I say of prudence, as a criterion," is, that it is the paramount criterion of all the rest+; including all, but not excluding any that it is, a general one ;— and that there are cases, also, in which no other is adequate to "measure" accurately the moral quality of actions §. The use of showing it to be a general criterion, is, that it serves to combine the rest into system; and that by referring to it, we may always clearly prove, however we may be driven to extremities by pertinacious arguers on the principles of our conduct, that it is impossible to impugn without folly the established rules of virtue, or of religion. And that this criterion is in reality thus general is evident, if it be wholly impossible that "in calculating our own best way to happiness, we should not, in the last resort, estimate every thing by its effect on ourselves ¶." This calculation, indeed, of our own best way to happiness, is not, as I apprehend, the only case in which this tendency to the formation of religious character is justly applicable as a general test. It is also applicable in all cases of obligation; but as the question of obligation is not properly included in the general argument pursued in my treatise, I shall reserve all further observation concerning it, till I come to the consideration of your objections to what I have advanced, incidentally, and in a few pages of the Appendix, on the obligation which I suppose all men to be under, so to act as may be most for their own benefit **.

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I have now to prove that the tendency here spoken of, is, in some cases, the only adequate measure of the moral quality of actions. This point you apparently must admit, since you plainly admit the test in question to be one which we are sometimes bound to apply. But, as this point is, I believe, the real hinge on which the merits of the whole system turn, I will beg your permission to explain it particularly in the consideration of a few selected

cases.

I may take, as one case, the crime of suicide, and, as another, the virtue of fortitude; and I shall point out the inadequacy, in these two cases, of the other tests which you speak of; namely, "the sense of right and wrong,' "the probable general consequences, and "the true estimate which would be made by an impartial person t." I am far from supposing, that you yourself, in such cases, would think of applying these other tests, or that your observations imply your attributing to them more importance than they may justly possess. My sole purpose is to exemplify the usefulness of taking, in some cases, as the test of actions, the tendency to the formation of religious character; by comparing it, in these particular instances, with those other tests which you mention, and which, perhaps, may be ranked next to it, though in very different degrees of importance.

First then of suicide.-Is it not certain that both the moral sense of the agent, and the vulgar estimate formed of the action, have, in some instances, scarcely reckoned it among crimes? Both these tests are little more than indications that we ought to be wary lest our passions

* Christian Remembrancer, p. 167.gif

† Ibid. ibid. I am not sure that I exactly understand in what sense you here make use of the word true, but I will venture to presume, that it must mean the same with real, or that you would exclude by it not error, "but hypocrisy."

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deceive us, and to look carefully for some better criterion.

And, undoubtedly, a better criterion will be found in the consequences which may accrue to society. But is it easy to say, that there are not many gone cases, in which a man who may be crippled with disease, and overcome by pain, and broken in spirit, may not justly think that society would be even benefited by the surrender of his own station in it to his heir? or is it easy to say, that the love of life is not far too strong a principle to allow suicide ever to become so common, as to produce any serious ill consequences to society? or, though the calculation of these consequences to society be, as I believe it to be, against the practice, yet does it afford sufficient ground for a strong conclusion? Is this ground the best on which to stand? or ought we not rather to take the ground of saying, that every man is called to act or suffer according to the will of the Great Author of his existence; and that though denied, perhaps, the power of exerting himself in any ca. pacity of doing good to society, he may still turn his own sufferings to bis own moral improvement? It may be said, indeed, and justly said, that he may even do good to society by furnishing an example of religious patience and constancy. But is this the first end, is it not merely the second? If the case be not a case of religion, it cannot possibly afford a religious example.

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In the same manner, with regard to the virtue of fortitude. Opinion, no doubt, ranks it high. But opinion usually miscalculates its importance. It is, or may be, eminently useful in society: but can its social uses be the measure of its value to any man who lives in a private station, of whom society may never require the sterner virtues, well contenting itself if he be docile and amiable? Yet still the demand

for moral fortitude may justly be made, in private life, with scarcely a less degree of force than in public; though society be in this case little concerned; though the test of the value, or the importance of this virtue, may here be only the degree in which it is requisite to enable the agent to resist temptation; for ex ample, the temptation of gain or of pleasure; and to sustain the character of his mind.

Even these cases, however, are but inadequate instances of the importance of taking the tendency to the formation of moral character, as the test by which our actions are to be weighed. The test of all duties, as far as they affect society, must, of course, be the consequences to that society: and this test will, to a certain extent, prove suicide to be a crime, will prove fortitude to be a virtue. But to the duties which, according to the old division, men owe to God and to themselves, it is most certain that the test of the consequences to society will not at all apply. Here we must have the tendency to character: for otherwise we have no test at all. Thus in piety: the test of its strength is the degree in which it excites us to act: but the test of its purity is the real tendency of the acts excited. by it, to form that character at which we aim; or else that real formation of the same character which the performance of those acts evinces. If there be no test but that of its strength, we cannot know the true nature of the feeling: it may be a malignant or a savage fa naticism, which colours itself with the name of piety. The actions, or the active habits themselves, cannot be the test, because they are not a complete evidence of the real motive. The tendency, therefore, of the acts, or the habits to the formation of the moral character which I have described; or else, which comes eventually to the same thing,

their real dependency on, or relation to it; is the only test which we have left.

Thus, a man who professes to act from piety, if he be solicitous to discover whether his actions have in reality this character or not, asks himself first: Is the principle which I profess a really active principle? Does it exert itself? If it does, is it in some suitable acts? If so, how do I know that these acts are indicative of that character of true piety, from which I wish to satisfy myself that they flow? Because their effect is to promote the good of man, one great province in which piety has to operate, or because they are expressly commanded by God. But how shall I know that I perform them from this principle, and that there is not some inferior motive, perhaps only a mere worldly motive, at bottom? Because I satisfy myself, on a sincere examination, that these acts do really tend to confirm, or that they are the real and correct expression of, a pure feeling of piety; because I persuade myself that my whole cha racter is so far consistent with that pure feeling, that I have no just cause to distrust my sincerity. If the efforts which I make are successful, I willingly refer the praise to God, and feel that it is not a selfish victory which I gain; or, if I miss the personal ends which might follow from them, I still preserve a truly religious satisfaction. Or, because I endeavour, on a strict analysis of my motives, to give to all the moral claims and qualities their due weight and proportion +: I am not conscious of any favouritism of any one species of virtue, and feel no regret that a benevolent object ought to be prosecuted only by just means t.

Such, undoubtedly, would be the natural method of ascertaining the real motives of conduct, which every

*Human Motives, p. 185, 184. + lbid. p. 18. + Ibid. p. 954. REMEMBRANCER, No. 30.

well-disposed and reflecting mind would take. And, indeed, does not St. Paul himself direct men positively to this very test, namely, the test of their own consciences seriously examining their dispositions or motives, where, in speaking of the institution of the Eucharist, and the manner in which it ought worthily to be received, he says, "But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup*. # " "As if he had said," observes Dean Stanhope, " before every approach to this sacrament, it is fit that a man see into, and be satisfied with, the disposition of his own mind t.”

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This, assuredly, is to take for a test the tendency to the formation of religious character. But every man who reasons thus in his own case, must reason similarly on the abstract question. As, therefore, a religious character is the object to which, in the last resort, we must study to conform, so the tendency to form that character must be the test, by which, whether a vague test, or a precise one, our actions must, in the last resort, be weighed. And I may add, finally, that the mere vagueness of a test cannot, in all cases, be a just objection to it. It may be vague because it is true; because it is not justly liable to the objection that it will apply only partially: for it is of the very nature of general tests to be vague: and specific tests, when brought in comparison with them, will naturally be precise and particular.

I fear I should encroach too much on your next number, were I now to proceed as I had originally intended; to the two remaining positions which I have to prove. I will defer these, therefore, to your number for July. I was far from meaning to have troubled you at so much length; but you must be well aware that almost all sorts of arguments grow

1. Cor. xi. 28.

+ Notes to the Family Bible. Y y

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stances, many Papists were continued in office, whom it would have been dangerous to remove, whilst the opinions of the public were still so unsettled and divided. But these Papists, it is plain, were trusted no further than was absolutely necessary; the greatest jealousy and distrust was felt concerning them, and they were nicely watched by their Protestant coadjutors.

During the insurrections which broke out in this reign, and which were occasioned by the Popish priests, it has been asserted, that Catholic commanders were sent against the rebels, and the name of

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To the Editor of the Remembrancer, Lord Clifford, (or De Clifford) has

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Sir, DURING the late debates in Parliament respecting the Catholic question, some important historical misstatements were made concerning them, which I shall now endeavour to rectify, and place in their real light. And first, Sir, it was attempted to be shown, that, because some Papists remained in high offices during the reigns of Edward VI. and the earlier part of Queen Elizabeth, that it would be prudent to render them eligible to tithe some offices in our times. This is a plain sequitur," even supposing the fact to be correct. But, if it is meant to be asserted that no jealousy was entertained of these Catholics either in the reigns of Edward or Elizabeth, every reader of English history is able to contradict the statement. During the former reign, indeed, the Reformation could not be said to have been more than half finished. With all the difficulties attending the minority of the Sovereign, and after the changes which had recently taken place with regard to religion, it would have been highly impru dent if the councillors of the king had proceeded otherwise than in the most cautious and gradual manner to accomplish what was still remain ing to be done. Nor is it to be wonderedy cify under these circum

been mentioned as amongst the number. After the minutest enquiry, I can find no such nobleman employed on this occasion. The commanders were the Marquis of Northampton, in Yorkshire; Lord Russel, and Sir W. Herbert, in Devon; and the Earl of Warwick, in Norfolk. It would not be easy to shew that any of these individuals were opposed to the principles of the Reformation.

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The same remark will apply to the earlier years of Queen Elizabeth's reign. After the great revulsion which had taken place under Mary, it would have been very rash to have attempted any sudden and wholesale changes. Accordingly whilst she retained several of her sister's Catholic councillors, she added to them such men as Burleigh, Walsingham, and Knowles, &c. the tried friends and advocates of the Reformation. And on which side she placed her confidence there can be no question. But the difficulties of her "situation," compelled her to these pru dent measures, and she might have said with Dido,

artoon moslaren) ant "Res duræ et regni novitas me talia

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cogunt, w domow souvib edi But as she became more firmly seated on the throne, her real sentiments became the more apparent, and these sentiments were fully jastified by the frequent insurrections

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