particular exceptions. The former, therefore, is not only at liberty, but is bound to avail himself of every means of judging, which he possesses or can acquire; and to surrender all means but one, and confine himself solely to that, is evidently improper. The sense of right and wrong, the probable general consequences, the particular consequences to ourselves, and more especially to our character and habits, and the true estimate which would be made by an im. partial person, all these, and many more, are means which have been given us by God for the purpose of enabling us to form correct notions of his will and our duty. And though many distinguished moral writers have chosen to confine their attention to one single topic, we cannot admit that their example is worthy of imitation, or that there is any peculiar merit in the test selected by Mr. Penrose, which exempts it from the condemnation which all such tests deserve. He has taken a part (an important part we admit) for the whole: and he has substituted what is dark and difficult for the perspicuity of true philosophy. If we are told that we are to judge of the propriety of actions by their tendency to improve the disposition and character, mistakes of the most grievous nature will unavoidably occur. The calm, the considerate, and the virtuous, may handle this keen weapon with out hurting themselves; but in the bustle and hurry of the world, continual accidents must happen; and even well meaning men will be often led astray. Indiscreet and irregular zeal appears to all who are under its influence to be calculated to make them better men. Power, if not procured by wickedness, promises every one who courts it, that it will strengthen and enlarge bis good dispositions, and confirm all his virtuous affections by extending their scope. And every other species of self-deception to which our race is exposed can make common cause with the principle under consideration, and succeed by its assistance in beguiling and destroying us. Religion and morals have produced their due effect when they have made us as good as we can be; but it does not therefore follow that every thing is secure when our feelings are as good as possible. At least many men will always think that their feelings and motives are as good as possible, when they are far enough from an habitual discharge of their whole duty; and it may be doubted whether a continual attention to the state and progress of our motives and affections, will not distract the attention from more important objects, will not monopolize our assiduity and mislead our judgment. We are to be determined through life by considering, not merely what is most likely to improve our mind and our character, but generally by considering what is right and what is wrong. The latter may be more easily and more unerringly discovered than the former; and it will lead to all the good consequences which the other promises to furnish, and to many more besides. Having considered the leading argument of the volume at so much length, we are compelled to pass over the details much more rapidly than we could have wished; for it is in the details that we consider Mr. Penrose's strength principally to consist, and we should have had great pleasure in making our readers acquainted with the substance of many of his chapters, which establish his claim to a high rank among Christian moralists. The remarks on the moral influence of the principles of Christianity, and the answer to the objections which have been made to the doctrine of the Atonement, from its supposed interference with the formation of virtuous habits, are a proof that he has come out of the study of ethics with a full conviction of the superi ority of revelation to natural religion, and with an intimate knowledge of the manner in which revelation proposes to improve us. And the digressions upon friendship and sympathy, though we think them a little misplaced in a work of which the fundamental principles required more developement, and of which the connection is not as visible as amplification might have made it, are agreeable specimens of Mr. Penrose's talents as an essayist, and exhibit a delicate sense of moral discrimination. The following extract from the chapter upon the love of God as a motive, has an immediate reference to the general theory, and also may be taken as a specimen of the particular mode of treating each subdivision of the subject. “The superior efficacy of the generous motives, when compared with that of the more selfish, or the greater power which they possess over the mind, is not, I believe, in nature less prominent or decisive than the greater extent of the field which they occupy And since this is true preeminently of the love of God, the observations which this position may call for may here be in a sufficiently proper place; though they will be found applicable to the whole theory of motives, since the nature of no motive can be thoroughly known, nor yet its value as an ingredient of character, if we take not into account its force or its weakness. "I admit freely that all the generous motives, particularly the motive of the love of God and the benevolent and sympathetic affections, require a mind prepared in some degree to expand beneath their kindly influence. There may be monsters, beings sunk in ignorance, or sunk in savage hard-heartedness, who while in that state are incapable of being moved by them. I go farther, and allow, if it be desired, in any degree which may be thought supposable, that fear of punishment is with some men the sole, and with others the chief motive to virtue; and that when this fear is lulled or forgotten, hope usually is the motive which springs next. This admission, however, is far from being inconsistent with what I have stated of the generous motives. For hope * Chap. iii, sect. iii. and fear are only different expressions of the universal desire of happiness, and are pre-supposed as an essential part of our nature in every inquiry into the particular motives. And in depraved men, especially, I suppose fear to be the true principle which, in all cases, or nearly in all, is best fitted to rouse the attention. "But suppose it roused, and that it dictates to the depraved man the necessity of reformation from vice, as the same principle in its more amiable form of hope urges the virtuous to perseverance in virtue. Were the whole man merely a calculating animal, this principle might be enough to determine him, that is, if the rule be but sufficiently evident by which certainly is much more than this. The his actions ought to be guided. But man specific motives which are natural to his frame rush in and destroy the balance, each having its peculiar object in view, sometimes of a good, sometimes of an evil, sometimes of an indifferent, character. Appetite points to some pleasure of sense, the desire of honour to some worldly distinction, benevolence to some object of charity, piety to some object of religion. All these feelings come in and operate on beings, in whom the hope of happiness and the fear of misery, and some appre hension of the way to attain or avoid them, are, as has already been said, pre-supposed, though in very various circumstances and degrees.I believe then, that in all ordinary cases, the motive of piety, if the great things which God has done even for sinners be but judiciously urged; and the motive of benevolence, when proper methods are taken to excite the kindly principles of our common nature, are by far the most powerful motives which can be brought to act on the mind; that they are calculated to have a more considerable effect, not only than any arguments for the beauty, and dignity, and reasonableness of virtue, which are rather factitious than natural principles, but even than reputation, or profit, or power, though some of these, and reputation in particular, are perhaps most appealed to in the great proportion of cases. "In the instance of men of habitual piety and benevolence this assertion will readily be allowed, but I mean also to affirm it in general. I do not say that in all cases the desire of reputation, or even less powerful motives, fail to effect a reformation from vice. Indeed, I am well assured of the contrary. But what I say is, that in all natural cases, for I am not contending that none are anomalous, wherever these motives do effect it, the moral motives, supposing them to be urged others will not." P. 64. The only remaining topics upon which we have room for any remarks are those which are discussed in the Appendix. Mr. Penrose, as we have already seen, is an advocate for the prudential system, and maintains that the desire of happiness is the only motive which obliges us to practise virtue. For our own parts, we confess that the words obligation and prudence appear to us so distinct, that we cannot perceive how a man is obliged to pursue a thing merely for his own benefit; and therefore we consider the obligation of prudence to be a contradiction in terms. If our only motive for an action be our own advantage, we must think that we are at liberty to sacrifice that advantage, if we please, and consequently, that we are not obliged, however strongly we may be urged, to perform the action. Mr. Penrose, on this subject, disagrees with Mr. Dugald Stewart, on whom he often relies too much; but we are not satisfied that the disagreement is consistent with other principles which they maintain in common with each other. The latter rejects both the religious and the prudential explanation of the meaning of the word obliged, and says that we are not bound to practise morality from a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and Governor of the Universe; because in this case we reason in a circle, resolving our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation. And the other system is also rejected as unsatisfactory, because it leads us to conclude that the disbelief of a future state absolves from all real moral obligation, and that a being pericolly and independently happy can have no moral attributes or perREMEMBRANCER, No. 27, ceptions. And the explanation which this writer ultimately adopts, and for which he refers to the high authority of Bishop Butler, is, that Every being who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe." Now Mr. Penrose appears to adopt both this principle of which Mr. Stewart approves, and the preceding one, which, in our apprehension, he satisfactorily refutes; and the first which is dismissed with very little ceremony, but is not refuted, and is fairly worth the other two, is totally lost sight of. How does it appear that the first principle is made out by reasoning in a circle? It is self evident, from the relation of the creature to the Creator, that the former ought to conform to the will of the latter; and Mr. Stewart says it is likewise self evident that a man ought to follow the natural dictates of his conscience. If, therefore, in the former instance, he says that we argue in a circle from religion to morality, and from morality to religion, we may reply, that he is guilty of the very same offence, and argues from conscience to morality, and from morality to conscience. The truth is, that both propositions are plain and indisputable; but our's is of far more value, and of far more extent than his. Butler unquestionably has rested obligation upon conscience; but with all our deference for his authority, we shall venture to contend that he would have adopted this principle with important qualifications, if he had not been arguing against Hobbes, and the atheists, to whom it would have been useless to mention the will and authority of God. And, indeed, this appears pretty plainly in his preface, in which he observes, that the circumstance of "man being by nature a law unto himself is of the utmost importance, because from it it will follow, that though men should, through stupidity or speculative scepticism, be ignorant of, or disbelieve any authority in the universe to punish the violation of this law, yet if there should be such authority, they would be as really liable to punishment, as though they had been beforehand convinced that such punishment would follow." This observation shows the real drift of Butler's argument: it is directed against those who refused to believe in a God; and we cannot doubt that he would have admitted the definition of Jeremy Taylor, that "conscience is the mind of man governed by a rule," and that this rule is the will of his Maker. Locke's cele brated assertion is equally in our favour. "The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration." Making some small grains of allowance for the last clause in this sentence, it is worthy of the wise and pious mind by which it was dictated; and is one of the many passages, which place Locke at such an immeasurable height above the crowd of sceptical followers, by whom he is misunderstood and dishonoured. And let it be observed, that the principle for which we contend has this remarkable recommendation: it leads us naturally to desire and expect a revelation. Mr. Stewart's theory tends, as might be supposed, the other way. It teaches, that God has given man enough in giving him his faculties; and that a due use of those faculties will gradually unfold the whole science of morals, in the same manner, and to the same extent, that it does the science of astronomy. Whereas, the sounder and safer doctrines of Taylor and of Locke, tells men that they should seek in all directions for the disco very of their Maker's will, and of such sanctions of his will, as may induce them to observe it. And since nature does not furnish one fourth part of what they desire, they are bound to investigate the truth of every thing that lays claim to revelation, and to rejoice with great joy if the claim can be established. These differences are important, and should never be overlooked. But to return to Mr. Penrose: as he agrees with Butler and Mr. Stewart on the subject of conscience, we know not how he can consistently maintain, that a desire of happiness is the sole motive which obliges us to practise virtue. The former maintain explicitly, that conscience alone constitutes obligation; and either obligation is a rational motive, or else the word motive, or the word obligation, must be used in an unusual and unauthorized signification. If, as we suspect, Mr. Penrose means that this sense of obligation arising from conscience, is a speculative and philosophical prin. ciple, and will therefore be no motive to the generality of men; then we shall request him to observe, that this is an additional reason for preferring our view of moral obligation to his: and that he even runs some risk of losing the principle altogether, since his own peculiar view of it has been demolished by i Mr. Stewart, and that which he holds in common with Butler is not found practically useful. We shall conclude our remarks by an extract from the second appendix; in the doctrine which it contains we most heartily concur, and we only lament that we should have been compelled to disagree materially with a writer who exhibits so much solid good sense; and to controvert the principles from which such useful consequences appear to be deduced. "It is our duty, no doubt, to obey conscience in all things; and no substitution of a rule, designedly bent to suit any the least imperfection of will, can possibly be accounted obedience. In the same manner, it is the precept of Christianity "to be perfect;"" to crucify the world, the flesh, and the devil," "to bring every thing under the obedience of Christ." But, in both cases, what is given to direct us is principle-a principle, it may properly be said, of law, but not any positive enactment; at least, all the positive enactments relate to matters so clear and so obvious, that all consciences must feel their propriety. If, however, the law of morals had gone to say, "give every thing that thou hast to the poor," or if our Saviour had imposed on every man the command to forsake all in order to preach the Gospel, the utter irreconcileableness of these demands with the ordinary weakness and common feelings of mankind, would, undoubtedly, have caused a general rejection, in the one case, of the moral, and, in the other case, of the Christian law. But now the power given to every man of making his conscience the interpreter of the law, so far as his own practice is concerned, and thus making his convictions the measure of his duty, may be seen to answer two purposes at once. In the first place, it detracts nothing from the perfection of the principle of obedience or action. In the second place, it fixes men's positive duties, the particulars to which they are in all cases bound, so far within their grasp or ability, that the link of the obligation is clearly discernible. A vicious man, whose conscience is not seared, might probably feel doubtful of his ability, and, if doubtful of his ability, could not feel any full obligation to devote himself to any high moral career. It is, perhaps, happy therefore that his convictions are commonly ch, that he cannot question his power of following them into a practice moulded ac. cordingly, even though those convictions ay extend no farther than to the necessity of forsaking gross vice, or some other very inadequate conception of virtue. Better men have, of course, better concep tions: the rule refines as it is carried farther and farther; but even for the best men, it is wisely provided, that the sense of obligation should not relax, chiefly, I suppose, because, in every approach to the belief that we have satisfied all obligations, we must necessarily recede from humility, a virtue, which, in every created understanding, must be indispensable to its actual worth, and which probably is most felt by the worthiest." P. 377. ** This expression will, I hope, not be misunderstood. It is, of course, intended only in a popular sense, and with the same reserve which I have claimed for the word merit in a note in p. 146.” Plain Thoughts on the Abstract of Mr. Brougham's Education Bill, humbly submitted to the Consideration of the British Legislature. By a Plain Englishman. 8vo. pp. 32. Rivingtons. 1821. Observations on Mr. Brougham's Bill"For belter providing the Means of Education for his Majesty's Subjects," shewing its Inadequacy to the End Proposed, and the Danger which will arise from it to the Cause of Religious Liberty. 8vo. pp. 32. Baldwin, & Co. 1821. HAVING entered in our last Number at great length into the consideration of the proposed plan for the establishment of Parochial Schools, it was not our intention to revert to the subject, until the public should be acquainted with the alterations to which Mr. Brougham and his coadjutors had assented; and the question that the bill do pass should be brought fairly before the country. But Mr. Brougham has stated that he shall not introduce the bill until after his return from the Circuit; and it seems daily more improbable, let him introduce it when he may, that it will obtain the approbation of Parliament, and under these circumstances we cannot refrain from saying a few words upon the opposition that the proposed measure has experienced from various quarters. The first of the pamphlets before us is evidently the production of a zealous and intelligent friend of the National Society; and the writer points out many of the omissions and inconsistencies with which Mr. Brougham's bill notoriously abounds. But he proceeds to condemn the principle of establishing parochial schools, and on this point we decidedly differ from him. "Most reasonable men are now persnaded, that Education will do good or harm on a large scale, according to the principles on which it is conducted, and |