Tight upon the precife nature of the relation ufually de noted by a caufe*: he then mentions Ariftotle's attempt to give precifion to the word caufe, by dividing caufes into 1. The material, 2. The formal, 3. The efficient, and 4. The final, obferving, that of thefe caufes, only two-the efficient and the final are worthy of confideration.

*Thefe manifeftiy denote very oppofite relations. The deEgn, purpose, or intention, with which an action is performed, which is the notion included in a final caufe, is evidently fomething very different from the immediate author or performer of that action, which is the notion included in an efficient cause. Defign and intention are things, which can exist only in an intelligent mind; and may frequently be found there without giving birth to any action at all. We cannot, in many cafes, infer them with certainty from the actions which we witness, because we are very liable to be miftaken concerning the real purpose which fuch actions were intended to accomplish. At any rate, we do not for a moment believe, that defign or intention can of themfelves give birth to events, or be the caufes of any effects; to accomplish this, we are aware that fome being pofeffed of what is called power or force is neceffary, by the energy of which the event or effect is made to take place, and to which appropriately belongs the name of efficient cause or agent:" (p. 19.) he after. wards fays, that an efficient caufe, is that which directly and immediately produces a change or event in nature.”

There is an ambiguity in this laft pofition which renders it very unfit for a definition, and indeed leads the author into fomething like a contradiction. He fays truly, (p. 21.) that of thofe changes or natural events which imply the operation of efficient caufes, fome are known by the name of phænomena, by which term I underfland certain changes that take place, not only in material, but also in intellectual beings.' To this explanation of the word phænomena, we have no objection; but we know not how to reconcile either it or the author's definition of an efficient caufe, with what occurs in the very next page, where he fays, that

"Thofe changes or events which are obferved to be produced by the immediate operation of active beings, or of agents endowed

*Dumefnil, however, feems to think (See his Latin Synonyms tranflated by Goffet) that the original meaning of caufe is what produces an effe, and quotes Cicero for his authority. Mr. Parkhurft in like manner, derives alia from a Hebrew word, which fignifies impelling or propelling caufes. See his Greek and English and Hebrew and English Lexicons, Rev.

with powers fimilar to that, which we find in ourselves, we do not call natural phænomena; but allot this name to thofe changes, which are accomplished, as far as appears to us, without any interference of this kind, and are governed by what are called the per.

manent laws of nature."

"

But how is it poffible that any changes can be accomplished without the interference of active beings, if it be indeed true, (as we are convinced it is) that to accomplish an effect, fome being poffeffed of what is called power or force is neceffary, by the energy of which the event or effect is made to take place, and to which appropriately belongs the name of efficient caufe? In vain does the author tell us,

that

"There is an important diftinction established in the class of efficient caufes; fome of thefe are observed to be active, and to exert an immediate volition or effort of what is properly called power, in the production of their effects. Such is the cafe with all the effects or changes, which we ourselves, or any of our fellow men immediately produce. Other efficient caufes have no proper characteristics of activity, but feem governed by fixed and immutable laws in all their operations; fo that the energy of power cannot, in its juft fenfe, be afcribed to them. Such are impulse and gravity confidered as caufes by which bodies are fet in motion; heat confidered as the cause of fufion; electric excitement as the cause of attraction, and fo forth.” P. 22.

But this claffification is obviously improper; for neither impul e nor gravity, nor any thing elfe which is not active, can be an efficient caufe, if, as this author fuppofes, an efficient cause and an agent be fynonymous terms, and if the name of efficient caufe, appropriately belongs, as we think it does, to a being exerting the energy of power. Into these apparent inconfiftencies Mr. Scott feems to have been led, by haftily calling an efficient caufe that which directly and immediately produces a change or event in nature; for changes or events in nature are certainly produced by impulse * and electric excitement without any direct or immediate interpofition of active power known to us. We apprehend,

*We are fully aware of the arguments that have been urged against actual impulse, in any cafe, and we allow to these arguments their utmost force. Apparent impulfe, however, is a very common phænomenon, and it is certainly one phyfical cause of motion. Rev,

however,

however, that to produce even thefe changes, active power muft have been exerted at fome time, and that impulfe and. electric excitement are the mere inftruments of that power; for it feems to us impoffible to conceive a change from one flate to another, but by the energy of fome power analogous to volition in men.

The active power really exerted on fuch occafions, we believe to be that fiat of the Almighty, which conftituted the corporeal world; fo that certain events fhould always be followed, in fimilar circumftances, by other determined events of one kind; but if the preceding events be called effici ent caufes, fuch caufes fhould not be confidered as agents, for the agency is not in them, but in that powerful being which gave them the qualities which they poffefs. If therefore fuch caufes as have no proper characteristics of activity be called efficient caufes, thofe which have fuch character iftics fhould have another name, and be always denominated agents. Or if the name of efficient caufes be confidered as fynonymous with agents, and appropriated to fuch beings. as exert the energy of power in the juft fenfe of the word; the other kind of caufes fhould be denominated phyfical or inftrumental caufes, and never be claffed with agents ftrictly fo called. It is in this fenfe only that we could wish the phrafe efficient caufes to be always employed, and in this fenfe this author feems to confider it as moft properly employed; but if fo, he ought to have defined an efficient caufe to be, not that "which directly and immediately," but that "which mediately or immediately produces a change or event in nature." Both kinds of caufes-efficient and phyficalmay be neceffary to the production of certain events or changes in nature; but they are not both neceffary in the fame fenfe of the word. No change can be conceived which does not imply an exertion of power, in the juft fense of the word, at fome time and in fome place; but though, by the prefent laws of nature, physical caufes appear to be neceffary to the production of the events which always follow them, and which are never feen to take place but in confequence of the application of fuch causes, the cafe might have been otherwife. Had it pleased the author of nature fo to conftitute the universe, fire might uniformly have hardened wax and foftened clay, and that electric excitement which now attracts light fubftances, might have repelled them; but it feems not more impoffible to conceive the whole of any thing to be greater than all its parts, than it is to conceive a change or event in nature,

without

without the exertion of power fomewhere and at some time, to which exertion that change may be ultimately traced.

The fecond chapter of this Inquiry is divided into fix fections; in the first and fecond of which the author gives a luminous, though very concife, view of the ancient modes of philofophizing in general, and of the opinions of the most celebrated schools concerning caufation in particular. The firft fection is employed on the philofophy of the eastern nations, a very barren fubject; and the second, on the most celebrated fchools of ancient Greece, which, with respect to caufation, are not much more fertile. The detail, however, which feems to be extremely candid and accurate, as far as it goes, will be interefting and inftructive to those young men of fcience, who have not leifure or opportunity to ftudy Brucker's hiftory of philofophy; and the refalt of the whole is, that, with respect to caufation, the philofophers of antiquity feem to have been all comprehended under two fects. By one of these fects, every change in nature was attributed to the immediate operation of effentially intelligent and active principles, or minds; by the other, all fuch principles were excluded from the universe, and every change accounted for by the impulfe of atoms, fet in motion by fome inconceivable neceflity of nature.

In the third fection we have a remarkably candid and perfpicuous view of the philofophy of Defcartes and Malebranche. To these two eminent men, Mr. Scott does ample juftice. Far from laughing,-as fome of his countrymen have laughed at them, he ates their theories,-efpecially refpefting caufation,-with the utmoft fairness, even when he differs from them; and acknowledges that Descartes was the first philofopher who marked, with precifion and diftinctness, the boundary between the material and intellectual worlds. For an account of the merits and defects of the general fyftem of that celebrated Frenchman, we must refer to Mr. Scott himself; but we fhall transcribe Defcartes's theory refpecting the origin and continuance of motion, becaufe we think much more favourably of it than this author feems to do; and it is not now, perhaps, generally known, According to Defcartes, the fole caufe and origin of motion which we find in the univerfe, is God.

"The nature of motion," fays he, "having been confidered, it is neceffary to examine into its caufe, which is twofold: first, an univerfal, and primary caufe, whence proceed in general all the motions of the world; next, a particular caufe, by means of which, the various portions of matter acquire motions which they

had

had not at first. As to the general caufe of motion, it appears manifeft to me to be none other than God himself, who in the beginning created matter, and motion, and reft along with it, and now, by his own conftant interference alone, (jamque per folum fuum concurfum ordinarium) preferves the fame quantity of motion and rest in the universe, as he originally affigned to it." P. 102.

The creation of reft feems indeed a very improper expreffion, as we can form no other notion of reft than the abfence of motion. Even "the creation of motion," as diftinguished from matter appears to us a phrafe without meaning; but there is nothing elfe in this account of the origin and continuance of motion, which has not been maintained by fome of the most diftinguished Newtonians with as much earneftnefs as by Descartes or Malebranche. About the primary caufe of motion, there can, among Theifts, be no controverfy; and the late Bishop Horfley, than whom no man was more converfant with the works of Newton, appears, from a letter quoted by Lord Monboddo in his ancient metaphyfics, to have maintained that, all which Defcartes feems to have meant by folum fuum concurfum ordinarium, is neceffary to continue corporeal motion, produced by whatever caufe. It does not appear to us, that by the word concurfum, can be here meant what in English is understood by the word interference. It is not, we think, a well chofen word, to denote any thing applicable to the fubject of difcuflion; but we should be inclined to interpret it concurrence rather than interference; for, that the concur rence of the Deity, or the continuation of that volition by which matter was at first brought into existence, and thofe properties impreffed on it which were and are the immediate fources of motion, is neceffary to preferve, not only the original quantity of motion in the univerfe, but even the univerfe itself in exiftence, is a truth which appears to us felf-evident. Accordingly, to the late Dr. Robinson of Edinburgh, another eminent Newtonian,-there are appearances in the heavens, which make it evident that "the fuftaining hand of God is ftill neceffary, and that the prefent order and harmony, which he has enabled us to understand and admire, is wholly dependent on his will, and its duration one of the unfearchable meafures of his providence *."

See likewife our 31ft vol.

* See our 29th vol. p. 519, &c. p. 511, &c., where, if we mistake not, Mr. Scott's objections to the reafoning of Malebranche on this fubject, are completely obviated. Rev.