language should not be measured off as by a precisely scientific foot-rule, and hence pronounced to be a "hyperbolical" way of denoting "in many respects," (hyperbolisch, in vielfacher Rücksicht,-Reiche). Neither has the expression, as Day, followed by Haldane, supposes,-"no other efficacy than to make a strong asseveration or affirmation, as if he should say, very much." Neither does it mean "certainly very much," or, "without doubt much;"—though such is the interpretation of Luther (zwar fast viel), and Tyndale (surely very moche), and Calvin (omnino multa); of Castellio too (multa omnino); of Koppe also (multum omnino), and Zinzendorf (gewiss in vielen dingen), and Flatt (allerdings haben sie viele Vorzüge), and indeed many others,―more especially of the older critics. The expression employed by the Apostle, though idiomatically susceptible, in certain cases, of this translation, is yet far more commonly used in its simple and obvious sense. (See Wetstein and Raphel.) It is just the opposite of "in no respect," (κar' ovdivα τρóπоv, 2 Macc. xi. 31; Polyb. Hist. iv. 84. 8). And there is no reason for departing, in the case before us, from the natural interpretation. The surplus of privileges enjoyed by the Jews, in relation to things moral, spiritual, and eternal, over and above the privileges enjoyed by the Gentiles, was assuredly, and without any exaggeration, “much in every respect," "much," that is to say, "in every view of the case that can be rationally taken." If, for example, we consider the Jews as susceptible of blissful influence, in a hereditary manner, from the sires of their race, we see that they were highly exalted in privilege; for "theirs were the patriarchal fathers,"-Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. (Rom. ix. 5.) If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence from ordinances of religion, eminently significant and sublimely typical, we see again that they were peculiarly exalted in privilege, for their ritual of religious "service" (their Aaroɛía) was was incomparably superior to that of all surrounding peoples. (Rom. ix. 4.) If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence from a legislative code of preeminent moral purity, we see again that they were peculiarly privileged, for the

core of their whole legislative system was a singularly pure and complete edition of the moral law. (Rom. ix. 4.) If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence from the zealous ministrations of faithful, uncorrupted, and incorruptible instructors and reformers, we see again that they were singularly privileged in having had among them a succession of holy and devoted prophets, "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence from a very special divine providence guiding them, restraining them, constraining them, hedging them round and round. in the way of shutting them off from evil, and in the way of shutting them up to good, surely we must see again that their surplus of privilege was very great. And if we consider it a means of peculiarly blissful influence to have a high ideal presented to the mind, and a lofty aspiration stirred within the heart; then in the exhibition of the Messiah to come, as the "Seed" par excellence, that was germinally enclosed in their distinctively Abrahamic “seed," -in this exhibition, as forming indeed the very central element of the Jewish peculiarities, we see that the Jews enjoyed a privilege that was altogether unrivalled and inestimable. In short, view the subject as we may, "the surplus of privilege belonging to the Jews" is,-both intensively and extensively, as logicians speak,-“ much in every respect." They possessed, as Grotius remarks, far greater facilities, than the Gentiles, for attaining that inward piety, without which neither Gentile nor Jew can be fit to be an heir of unending glory. (Eadem in utroque pietas apud Deum valet; sed ut ad eam perveniat, Israelita sive circumcisus aliquis faciliores habet aditus.)

§ 2. For, first, they were intrusted with the oracles of God, (Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ). There is considerable difficulty in determining whether the ratiocinative particle for (yág),-strangely called an illative by Turner, really belongs to the text, or is a spurious addition. Lachmann has dismissed it. It is wanting in BDEG; and in the Peshito, Italic, and Vulgate versions,

and hence too in Pelagius and Ambrosiaster; and also in Chrysostom's text. Fritzsche suspects that it is apocryphal, and has enclosed it within brackets. Rückert too (2nd ed.) and Tholuck (5th ed.) hold it for suspected. Burton too suspects it. And Oltramare rejects it. On the other hand, it is found in AK L, and in the Philoxenian Syriac, and in Theodoret, Theophylact, and Ecumenius. And it is retained by Griesbach, Scholz, and Tischendorf. It would certainly appear to be more difficult to account for its deliberate intrusion into the text, than for its unintentional omission, or even its deliberate extrusion, (for it might seem to some to embarrass somewhat the subsequent örı): and hence we are disposed to regard it as belonging to the autograph of the Apostle's epistle. For, first.-It is as if the Apostle had said, I may well use the word much; the surplus of privilege enjoyed by the Jews is indeed much; for, first, they were intrusted with the oracles of God.

(a.) The import of the word first (πρāτov) has been considerably disputed. It is regarded by some as an adjective, and as having the signification of principal or chief. This is the view that is taken by Abelard, Beza, Rollock, Wolf, Heumann, Michaelis, Bolten, Flatt, Stuart, Greve, &c. These expositors supply the substantive verb, to fill up the construction. They are fairly represented by Beza, who translated the clause thus :-"For the principal is this, that they were intrusted with the oracles of God," (primarium enim illud est quod eis credita sunt eloquia Dei). It is, however, an objection to this interpretation, that it does not vindicate the preceding affirmation,—“ much, in every respect." We do not prove anything to be "much," far less to be "much in every way," when we merely adduce its "principal" ingredient. That which is little may have its principal ingredient, as well as that which is much. The subject, moreover, of which the quality of "principal" would be predicated, could not, according to this interpretation, be some disintegrated ingredient of the much surplus of privilege enjoyed by the Jews. It would require, according to the grammatical interrelations of the passage, to be the entire surplus itself. But in that case there would be no

room left for any secondary ingredients of prerogative. We must then abandon this interpretation of the word first.

Fritzsche, Rückert, van Hengel, T. Schott, &c., agree with the critics whose opinion we have just been considering, in regarding the word as an adjective: but they think that it means first in the order of enumeration, not chief in the order of importance. It is obvious, however, that similar objections lie against this interpretation; and more particularly does its incongruity appear, when we consider that the subject, which would be qualified by the adjectival term first, must, on the assumption of the correctness of the interpretation, be the whole surplus of privilege belonging to the Jews. But if the whole surplus be first in the order of enumeration, what part of it will remain over to be second?

There can be little doubt that we should dismiss the idea that first is an adjective. It is manifestly an adverb; and has been so regarded by the majority of critics. This majority, however, divides itself into two distinct classes. The one, represented by le Fèvre, Calvin, Este, Vitringa, Koppe, Ernesti, regard the adverb as used qualitatively, meaning chiefly, or, as Vater gives it, "before all other things," (ante omnia alia). To this class the authors of the English Geneva version (chieflye), and the French Geneva (sur tout), and our English authorized version, belong. Apparently, too, Theodoret, (μeylorη yàọ aütŋ tiμń). The other class, embracing Erasmus, Luther, Piscator, Grotius, Cocceius, Boysen, de Wette, Meyer, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hodge, Krehl, Maier, Ewald, &c., regard the adverb as used quantitatively, having its common signification, firstly, or, in the first place, and indicating an order of enumeration. This latter class would doubtless have swallowed up the greater proportion of the former, had it not been the case that in the Apostle's discourse there is no prosecution of the enumeration. There is no δεύτερον δέ οι ἔπειτα δέ, οι any similar expression.) And men who think and feel reverently on the subject of inspiration, shrink and feel repelled when the idea is thrust in upon them by such expositors as Fritzsche, that, in the ardour of composition,

the Apostle forgot to finish his discourse in the way that, at the outset, he had intended. It is certainly, to say the least of it, quite unnecessary to assume such forgetfulness. It is enough to know that the Apostle was not punctilious in the matter of rhetorical composition. He made no pretension to "wisdom of words." And, wielding as he did a foreign language, we need not marvel that his extraordinary vehemence of feeling broke loose from some of the more symmetrical forms of discourse. It is an objection to the interpretation of le Fèvre, and Calvin, and their followers, that the particle (uév) associated with this adverb, naturally leads the mind to look out for other particulars, (which might be introduced by the correlative dé). It is thus the case, as Piscator technically remarks, that it is impossible to avoid the admission that there is an anantapodoton. The Apostle's expression certainly imports, as says Cocceius, "that there are other prerogatives." And these other privileges must have actually streamed out into view before the Apostle's thoughts, while he dictated the word first. The enumeration in chapter ix. 4, 5, is evidence that his mind was full on the subject. But certainly we need not suppose, with Grotius, that the Apostle, as it were, deliberately suspends, till he reaches that advanced portion of his discussion, the specification of the remaining list of advantages. (Sermonem autem hunc hic non consummat apostolus, sed differt in cap. ix. 4.) This would be to turn. the whole intervening part of the epistle into an immense parenthesis. And yet Hammond did not hesitate to gulp such an idea:-" An objection," he says, "here diverted the Apostle's purpose for many chapters together, not permitting him to return from that digression till chapter ix., where he falls again to the same matter, and enumerates the remainder of those privileges." This is outré. But we may imagine that the real state of the Apostle's thoughts might be thus represented:-I may well aver that the surplus of privilege belonging to the Jew is much in every respect; for, in the first place, and I need not at present stop to specify the other particulars, they were intrusted with the oracles of God.