ceived than the work of a Logician, the author of it must yet labour under still greater disadvantages. He may be thought to challenge criticism; and his own performances may be condemned by a reference to his own precepts; or, on the other hand, his precepts may be undervalued, through his own failures in their application. Should this take place in the present instance, I have only to urge, with Horace in his Art of Poetry, that a whetstone, though itself incapable of cutting, is yet useful in sharpening steel. No system of instruction will completely equalize natural powers; and yet it may be of service towards their improvement. A youthful Achilles may acquire skill in hurling the javelin under the instruction of a Chiron, though the master may not be able to compete with the pupil in vigour of arm.

As for any display of florid eloquence and oratorical ornament, my deficiency in which is likely to be remarked, it may be sufficient to observe, that if 1 had intended to practise any arts of this kind, I should have been the less likely to treat of them. To develope and explain the principles of any kind of trick, would be a most unwise procedure in any one who purposes to employ it; though perfectly consistent for one whose object is to put others on their guard against it. The juggler is the last person that would let the spectators into his own secret.

It may perhaps be hardly necessary to observe, that the following pages are designed principally for the instruction of unpractised writers. Of such as have long been in the habit of writing or speaking, those whose procedure has been conformable to the rules I have laid down, will of course have anticipated most of my observations; and those again who have proceeded on opposite principles, will be more likely to pass censures, as it were in self-defence, than laboriously to unlearn what they have perhaps laboriously acquired, and to set out afresh on a new system. But I am encouraged,

partly by the result of experiments, to entertain a hope that the present system may prove useful to such as have their method of composition, and their style of writing and of delivery to acquire. And an author ought to be content if a work be found in some instances not unprofitable, which cannot, from its nature, be expected to pass completely uncensured.

Whoever indeed, in treating of any subject, recommends (whether on good or bad grounds) a departure from established practice, must expect to encounter opposition. This opposition does not indeed imply that his precepts are right; but neither does it prove them wrong; it only implies that they are new; since few will readily acknowledge the plans on which they have long been proceeding, to be mistaken. If a treatise therefore on the present subject were received with immediate, universal, and unqualified approbation, this circumstance, though it would not indeed prove it to be erroneous, (since it is conceivable that the methods commonly pursued may be altogether right,) yet would afford a presumption that there was not much to be learnt from it.

On the other hand, the more deep-rooted and generally prevalent any error may be, the less favourably, at first, will its refutation (though proportionably the more important) be for the most part received.

With respect to what are commonly called Rhetorical Artifices contrivances for "making the worse appear the better reason,”—it would have savoured of pedantic morality to give solemn admonitions against employing them, or to enter a formal disclaimer of dishonest intention; since, after all, the generality will, according to their respective characters, make what use of a book they think fit, without waiting for the author's permission But what I have endeavoured to do, is clearly to set forth, as far as I could, (as Bacon does in his Essay on Cunning,) these sophistical tricks of the Art; and as far as I may have succeeded in this, I shall

have been providing the only effectual check to the employment of them. The adulterators of food or of drugs, and the coiners of base money, keep their processes a secret, and dread no one so much as him who detects, describes, and proclaims their contrivances, and thus puts men on their guard; for " every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be made manifest."

To the prevailing association of the term " Rhetoric," with the idea of these delusive contrivances, may be traced the opinion (which I believe is also common) that the power of eloquence is lost on those who themselves possess it; or at least that a critical knowledge of the art of Composition fortifies any one, in proportion to his proficiency, against being affected by the persuasive powers of another. This is undoubtedly true, as far as sophistical skill is concerned. The better acquainted one is with any kind of rhetorical trick, the less liable he is to be misled by it. The artifices, strictly so called, of the orator, are,

-like tricks by sleight of hand,

which to admire one should not understand:

and he who has himself been behind the scenes of a puppet-show, and pulled the strings by which the figures are moved, is not likely to be much affected by their performance. This is indeed one great recommendation of the study of Rhetoric, that it furnishes the most effectual antidote against deception of this kind. But it is by no means true that acquaintance with an art-in the nobler sense of the word-not as consisting in juggling tricks-tends to diminish our sensibility to the most excellent productions of art. The greatest proficients in music are usually the most enthusiastic admirers of good music: the best painters and poets, and such as are best versed in the principles of those arts, are in general (when rivalry is out of the question) the most powerfully affected by paintings and by poetry, of superior excellence. And none I believe are more

open to the impression of sound, honest, manly eloquence, than those who display it in their own compositions, and are capable of analysing critically the mode in which its effects are produced.

I may add, that I have in one place (Part II. ch. 1. § 2.) pointed out an important part of the legitimate art of the orator, in respect of the minds of his hearers, as coinciding exactly with the practice of a wise and good man in respect of his own mind.

A few passages will be found in the following pages which presuppose some acquaintance with Logic; but the greatest part, will, I trust, be intelligible to those who have not this knowledge. At the same time, it is implied by what I have said of that science, and indeed by the very circumstance of my having written on it, that I cannot but consider him as undertaking a task of unnecessary difficulty, who endeavours, without studying Logic, to become a thoroughly good argumentative writer.

It should be observed, however, that a considerable portion of what is by many writers reckoned as a part of Logic, has been treated of by me not under that head, but in Part I. of the present work.

It may be thought that some apology is necessary for the frequent reference made to the treatise just mentioned, and, occasionally, to some other works of my own. It appeared to me, however, that either of the other two alternatives would have been more objectionable; viz. either to omit entirely much that was needful for the elucidation of the subject in hand; or, to repeat, in the same or in other words, what had been already published.

Perhaps some apology may also be thought necessary for the various illustrations, selected from several authors, or framed for the occasion, which occur both in the present treatise, and in that on Logic; and in which, opinions on various subjects are incidentally conveyed; in all of which, it cannot be expected that every one of

my readers will concur. And some may accordingly be disposed to complain that they cannot put these works into the hands of any young person under their care, without a risk of his imbibing notions which they think erroneous. This objection, I have reason to believe, has been especially felt, though not always explicitly stated, by the most decidedly antichristian writers of the present day. But it should be remembered, that Logic and Rhetoric having no proper subject-matter of their own, it was necessary to resort to other departments of knowledge for exemplifications of the principles laid down; and it would have been impossible, without confining myself to the most insipid truisms, to avoid completely all topics on which there exists any difference of opinion. If, in the course of either work, I have advocated any erroneous tenet, the obvious remedy is, to refute it. I am utterly unconscious of having in any instance resorted to the employment of fallacy, or substituted declamation for argument; but if any such faults exist, it is easy to expose them. Nor is it necessary that when any book is put into the hands of a young student, he should understand that he is to adopt implicitly every doctrine contained in it, or should not be cautioned against any erroneous principles which it may inculcate: otherwise indeed, it would be impos sible to give young men what is called a classical education, without making them Pagans.

That I have avowed an assent to the evidences of Christianity, (that, I believe, is the point on which the greatest soreness is felt,) and that this does incidentally imply some censure of those who reject it, is not to be denied. But they again are at liberty—and they are not backward in using their liberty-to repel the censure, by refuting, if they can, those evidences. And as long as they confine themselves to calm argumentation, and abstain from insult, libellous personality, and falsification of facts, I earnestly hope no force will ever be employed to silence them, except force of argument. I am