such instances would have had weight as an argument; but as it is a fiction, and no reason is shown why the result should be such as represented, except the supposed superiority of a public education, the Argument involves a manifest petitio principii, and resembles the appeal made, in the well-known fable, to the picture of a man conquering a lion; a result which might just as easily have been reversed, and which would have been so, had lions been painters. It is necessary, in short, to be able to maintain, either that such and such an event did actually take place, or that, under a certain hypothesis, it would be likely to take place.

On the other hand it is important to obSupposed cases assert serve, with respect to any imaginary case, nothing. whether introduced as an argument, or merely for the sake of explanation, that, as it is (according to what I have just said) requisite that the hypothesis should be conceivable, and that the result supposed should follow naturally from it, so, nothing more is to be required. No fact being asserted, it is not fair that any should be denied. Yet it is very common to find persons, "either out of ignorance and infirmity, or out of malice and obstinacy," joining issue on the question whether this or that ever actually took place; and representing the whole controversy as turning on the literal truth of something that had never been affirmed. [See treatise on Fallacies, ch. iii. § “Irrelevant conclusion" of which this is a case.] To obviate this mistake more care must be taken than would at first sight seem necessary, to remind the hearers that you are merely supposing a case, and not asserting any fact: especially when (as it frequently happens) the supposed case is one which might actually occur, and perhaps does occur.

I can well sympathize with the contempt mingled with indignation expressed by Cicero against certain philosophers who found fault with Plato for having, in a case he proposes, alluded to the fabulous ring of

Gyges, which had the virtue of making the wearer invisible. They had found out, it seems, that there never

was any such ring.*

It is worth observing, that Arguments from Example, whether real or invented, are the most easily comprehended by the young and the uneducated; because they facilitate the exercise of abstraction; a power which in such hearers is usually the most imperfect. This mode of reasoning corresponds to a geometrical demonstration by means of a diagram; in which the figure placed before the learner, is an individual, employed, as he soon comes to perceive, as a sign, though not an arbitrary sign,t representing the whole class. The algebraic signs again, are arbitrary; each character not being itself an individual of the class it represents. These last therefore correspond to the abstract terms of a language.

Under the head of Invented Example, a Fable and distinction is drawn by Aristotle, between illustration. Parabole and Logos. From the instances he gives, it is plain that the former corresponds (not to Parable, in the sense in which we use the word, derived from that of Parabole in the Sacred Writers, but) to Illustration; the latter to Fable or Tale. In the former, an allusion only is made to a case easily supposable; in the latter, a fictitious story is narrated. Thus, in his instance above cited, of Illustration, if any one, instead of a mere

* Atque hoc loco, philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone: quasi vero ille, aut factum id esse, aut fieri potuisse defendat. Hæc est vis hujus annuli et hujus exempli, si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, cum aliquid, divitiarum, potentiæ, dominationis, libidinis, caussa feceris-si id diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Quanquam potest id quidem; sed quæro, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent? Urgent rustice sane: negant enim posse, et in eo perstant. Hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quærimus, si possint celare, quid facturi sint, non quærimus, possintne celare, &c. (Cic. de Off. b. iii. c. 9.)

The words, written or spoken, of any language, are arbitrary aigns; the characters of picture-writing or hieroglyphic, are natural signs.

allusion, should relate a tale, of mariners choosing a steersman by lot, and being wrecked in consequence, Aristotle would evidently have placed that under the head of Logos. The other method is of course preferable, from its brevity, whenever the allusion can be readily understood and accordingly it is common, in the case of well-known fables, to allude to, instead of narrating, them. That, e. g. of the horse and the stag, which he gives, would, in the present day, be rather alluded to than told, if we wished to dissuade a people from calling in a too powerful auxiliary. It is evident that a like distinction might have been made in respect of historical examples; those cases which are well known, being often merely alluded to, and not recited.

Fable

The word "fable" is at present generally and tale. limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct, but analogical; the other class being called novels, tales, &c. Those resemblances are (as Dr. A. Smith has observed) the most striking, in which the things compared are of the most dissimilar nature; as is the case in what we call fables; and such accordingly are generally preferred for argumentative purposes, both from that circumstance itself, and also on account of the greater brevity which is, for that reason, not only allowed but required in them. For a fable spun out to a great length becomes an allegory, which generally satiates and disgusts; on the other hand, a fictitious tale, having a more direct, and therefore less striking resemblance to reality, requires that an interest in the events and persons should be created by a longer detail, without which it would be insipid. The fable of the Old Man and the Bundle of Sticks, compared with the Iliad, may serve to exemplify what has been said: the moral conveyed by each being the same, viz., the strength acquired by union, and the weakness resulting from division; the lat

*

A novel or tale may be compared to a picture; a fable, to a device.

ter fiction would be perfectly insipid if conveyed in a few lines; the former, in twenty-four books, insupportable.

Of the various uses, and of the real or apparent refutation, of Examples, (as well as of other arguments,) I shall treat hereafter; but it may be worth while here to observe, that I have been speaking of Example as a kind of Argument, and with a view therefore to that purpose alone; though it often happens that a resemblance, either direct, or analogical, is introduced for other purposes; viz. not to prove any thing, but either to illustrate and explain one's meaning, (which is the strict etymological use of the word Illustration,) or to amuse the fancy by ornament of language: in which case it is usually called a similie: as, for instance, when a person whose fortitude, forbearance, and other such virtues, are called forth by persecutions and afflictions, is compared to those herbs which give out their fra grance on being bruised. It is of course most important to distinguish, both in our own compositions and those of others, between these different purposes. 1 shall accordingly advert to this subject in the course of the following chapter.

CHAP. III. Of the various use and order of the several kinds of Propositions and of Arguments in different

cases.

satisfaction.

§ 1. The first rule to be observed is, that Arguments it should be considered, whether the princi- of Confutapal object of the discourse be, to give satis- tion and of faction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it, or to compel the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent. For, cases may occur, in which the arguments to be employed with most effect will be different, according as it is the one or the other of these objects that

we are aiming at. It will often happen that of the two great classes into which Arguments were divided, the "a priori or Argument from cause to effect, will be principally employed when the chief object is to instruct the learner, and the other class, when our aim is to refute the opponent. And to whatever class the arguments we resort to may belong, the general tenour of the reasoning will, in many respects, be affected by the present consideration. The distinction in question is nevertheless in general little attended to. It is usual to call an argument, simply, strong or weak, without reference to the purpose for which it is designed; whereas the arguments which afford the most satisfaction to a candid mind, are often such as would have less weight in controversy than many others, which again would be less suitable for the former purpose. E. G. There are some of the internal evidences of Christianity which, in general, are the most satisfactory to a believer's mind, but are not the most striking in the refutation of unbelievers the arguments from analogy on the other hand, which are (in refuting objections) the most unanswerable, are not so pleasing and consolatory.

:

My meaning cannot be better illustrated than by an instance referred to in that incomparable specimen of reasoning, Dr. Paley's Hora Paulina. When we take into our hands the letters," (viz. Paul's Epistles,) "which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be; if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances; I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out