perception of their discrepancy; till the understanding becomes sufficiently enlightened to enable the man to reject the less reasonable opinions, and retain the opposites.

It may be added, that it is a very fair ground for disparaging any one's judgment, if he maintains any doctrine or system, avowedly for the sake of consistency. That must always be a bad reason. If the system, &c. is right, you should pursue it because it is right, and not because you have pursued it hitherto; if it is wrong, your having once committed a fault is a poor reason to give for persisting in it.

It only remains to observe, on this head, that (as Aristotle teaches) the place for the disparagement of an opponent is, for the first speaker, near the close of his discourse, to weaken the force of what may be said in reply; and, for the opponent, near the opening, to lessen the influence of what has been already said.

§ 6. Either a personal prejudice, such as Unfavourhas been just mentioned, or some other pas- able passion unfavourable to the speaker's object, sions to be may already exist in the minds of the hear- allayed or ers, which it must be his business to allay.

diverted.

It is obvious that this will the most effectually be done, not by endeavouring to produce a state of perfect calmness and apathy, but by exciting some contrary emotion. And here it is to be observed that some passions may be, rhetorically speaking, opposite to each other, though in strictness they are not so; viz. whenever they are incompatible with each other: e. g. the opposite, strictly speaking, to anger, would be a feeling of good-will and approbation towards the person in question; but it is not by the excitement of this, alone, that anger may be allayed; for fear is, practically, contrary to it also; as is remarked by Aristotle, who philosophically accounts for this, on the principle that anger, implying a desire to inflict punishment, must imply also a supposition that it is possible to do so; and accordingly

men do not, he says, feel anger towards one who is so much superior as to be manifestly out of their reach; and the object of their anger ceases to be so, as soon as he becomes an object of apprehension. Of course the converse also of this holds good; anger, when it prevails, in like manner subduing fear. Savage nations, accordingly, having no military discipline, are accustomed to work themselves up into a phrensy of rage by their war-songs and dances, in order to excite themselves to courage.* Compassion, likewise, may be counteracted either by disapprobation, by jealousy, by fear, or by disgust and horror; and envy, either by goodwill, or by contempt.

This is the more necessary to be attended to, in or◄ der that the Orator may be on his guard against inadvertently defeating his own object, by exciting feelings at variance with those he is endeavouring to produce, though not strictly contrary to them. Aristotle accordingly notices, with this view the difference between the Pitiable," (λɛɛvov,) and the " Horrible or Shocking," (devov,) which, as he observes, excite different feelings, destructive of each other; so that the Orator must be warned, if the former is his object, to keep clear of any thing that may excite the latter.

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It will often happen that it will be easier to give a new direction to the unfavourable passion, than to subdue it; e. g. to turn the indignation, or the laughter, of the hearers against a different object. Indeed, whenever the case will admit of this, it will generally prove the more successful expedient; because it does not imply the accomplishment of so great a change in the minds of the hearers.

See Arist. Rhet. b. ii. in his Treatises on 'Opyǹ and Þóßos.

PART III.

OF STYLE.

CHAP. I.-Of Perspicuity.

ly.

§ 1. THOUGH the consideration of Style style not to has been laid down as holding a place in a be treated Treatise of Rhetoric, it would be neither ne- of generalcessary nor pertinent, to enter fully into a general discussion of the subject; which would evidently embrace much that by no means peculiarly belongs to our present inquiry. It is requisite for an Orator, e. g. to observe the rules of Grammar; but the same may be said of the Poet, and the Historian, &c. ; nor is there any peculiar kind of grammatical propriety belonging to persuasive or argumentative compositions; so that it would be a departure from our subject to treat at large under the head of Rhetoric, of such rules as equally concern every other of the purposes for which language is employed.

Conformably to this view, I shall, under the present head, notice but slightly such principles of composition as do not exclusively or especially belong to the present subject; confining my attention chiefly to such observations on Style as have an especial reference to Argumentative and Persuasive works.

§ 2. It is sufficiently evident (though the Perspicuity maxim is often practically disregarded) that a relative the first requisite of Style not only in rheto- quality. rical, but in all compositions,* is Perspicuity; since, as, Aristotle observes, language which is not intelligible,

*In Poetry, perspicuity is indeed by no means unimportant; but the most perfect degree of it is by no means so essential as in Prose-works. See part iii. ch. iii. § 3.

or not clearly and readily intelligible, fails, in the same proportion, of the purpose for which language is employed. And it is equally self-evident (though this truth is still more frequently overlooked) that Perspicuity is a relative quality, and consequently cannot properly be predicated of any work, without a tacit reference to the class of readers or hearers for whom it is designed.

Nor is it enough that the Style be such as they are capable of understanding, if they bestow their utmost attention: the degree and the kind of attention, which they have been accustomed or are likely to bestow, will be among the circumstances that are to be taken into the account, and provided for. I say the kind, as well as the degree, of attention, because some hearers and readers will be found slow of apprehension indeed, but capable of taking in what is very copiously and gradually explained to them; while others, on the contrary, who are much quicker at catching the sense of what is expressed in a short compass, are incapable of long at. tention, and are not only wearied, but absolutely bewildered, by a diffuse Style.

When a numerous and very mixed audience is to be addressed, much skill will be required in adapting the Style, (both in this, and in other respects,) and indeed the Arguments also, and the whole structure of the discourse, to the various minds which it is designed to impress; nor can the utmost art and diligence prove, after all, more than partially successful in such a case; especially when the diversities are so many and so great, as exist in the congregations to which most Sermons are addressed, and in the readers for whom popular works of an argumentative, instructive, and hortatory character, are intended. It is possible, however, to approach indefinitely to an object which cannot be completely attained; and to adopt such a Style, and likewise such a mode of reasoning, as shall be level to the comprehension of the greater part, at least,

even of a promiscuous audience, without being distasteful to any.

It is obvious, and has often been remarked, that extreme conciseness is ill suited to hearers or readers whose intellectual powers and cultivation are but small. The usual expedient, however, of employing Brevity and a prolix Style by way of accommodation to prolixity. such minds, is seldom successful. Most of those who could have comprehended the meaning, if more briefly expressed, and many of those who could not do so, are likely to be bewildered by tedious expansion; and being unable to maintain a steady attention to what is said, they forget part of what they have heard, before the whole is completed. Add to which, that the feebleness produced by excessive dilution, (if such an expression may be allowed,) will occasion the attention to languish; and what is imperfectly attended to, however clear in itself, will usually be but imperfectly understood. Let not an author, therefore, satisfy himself by finding that he has expressed his meaning so that, if attended to, he cannot fail to be understood; he must consider also (as was before remarked) what attention is likely to be paid to it. If on the one hand much matter is expressed in very few words to an unreflecting audience, or if, on the other hand, there is a wearisome prolixity, the requisite attention may very probably not be bestowed.

It is remarked by Anatomists, that the nutritive quality is not the only requisite in food;-that a certain degree of distention of the stomach is required, to enable it to act with its full powers;-and that it is for this reason hay or straw must be given to horses, as well as corn, in order to supply the necessary bulk. Something analogous to this takes place with respect to the generality of minds; which are incapable of thoroughly digesting and assimilating what is presented to them, however clearly, in a very small compass. Many a one is capable of deriving that instruction from a