Drake. He was a short, broad-shouldered, olive-complexioned man, said to be a good rider; but if his wife was to be believed, he was of all men in Spain the least fitted to be trusted with the conduct of any critical undertaking. The Duchess, Doña Aña de Mendoza was the daughter of Philip's Minister, Ruy Gomez, and of the celebrated Princess of Eboli, whom later scandal called Philip's mistress, and whose influence was supposed to have influenced Philip in favor of her son-in-law. Royal scandals are dreary subjects. When they are once uttered the stain is indelible, for every one likes to believe them. The only contemporary witness for the amours of Philip and the Princess of Eboli is Antonio Perez, who, by his own confession, was a scoundrel who deserved the gallows. Something is known at last of the history of the lady. If there was a woman in Spain whom Philip detested, it was the wife of Ruy Gomez. If there was a man whom the Princess despised, it was the watery-blooded King. An intrigue between a wildcat of the mountain and a narrow-minded, conscientious sheepdog would be about as probable as a loveaffair between Philip and the Princess of Eboli; and at the time of her son-in-law's appointment she was locked up in a castle in defiant disgrace. The Dule had been married to her daughter when he was twenty-two and his bride was eleven, and Doña Aña, after sixteen years' experience of him, had observed to her friends that he was well enough in his own house among persons who did not know what he was; but that if he was employed on business of State the world would discover to its cost his real character. That such a man should have been chosen to succeed Alonzo de Bazan astonished every one. A commander of Gold, it was said, was taking the place of a commander of Iron. The choice was known to Santa Cruz while he still breathed, and did not comfort him in his departure.

The most astonished of all, when he learned the honor which was intended for him, was the Duke himself, and he drew a picture of his own incapacity as simple as Sancho's when appointed to govern his island.

"My health is bad," he wrote to Philip's secretary, "and from my small experience of the water I know that I am always sea-sick. I have no money which

I can spare. I owe a million ducats, and I have not a real to spend on my outfit. The expedition is on such a scale and the object is of such high importance that the person at the head of it ought to understand navigation and sea-fighting, and I know nothing of either. I have not one of those essential qualifications. I have no acquaintances among the officers who are to serve under me. Santa Cruz had information about the state of things in England; I have none. Were I competent otherwise, I should have to act in the dark by the opinion of others, and I cannot tell to whom I may trust. The Adelantado of Castile would do better than I. Our Lord would help him, for he is a good Christian and has fought in naval battles. If you send me, depend upon it I shall have a bad account to render of my trust.'

The Duchess perhaps guided her husband's hand when he wrote so faithful an account of himself. But his vanity was flattered. Philip persisted that he must go.

He and only he would answer the purpose in view, so he allowed himself to be persuaded.

"Since your Majesty still desires it, after my confession of incompetence," he wrote to Philip, "I will try to deserve your confidence. As I shall be doing God's work, I may hope that He will help me."

Philip gratefully replied: "You are sacrificing yourself for God's service and mine. I am so anxious, that if I was less occupied at home I would accompany the fleet myself and I should be certain that all would go well. Take heart; you have now an opportunity of showing the extraordinary qualities which God, the author of all good, has been pleased to bestow upon you. Happen what may, I charge myself with the care of your children. If you fail, you fail; but the cause being the cause of God, you will not fail."

Thus the Duke was to command the Armada and to sail at the earliest possible moment, for the Commissioners were sitting at Ostend, and his presence in the Channel was of pressing consequence. Sana Cruz besides had fixed on the end of March as the latest date for the departure, on account of the north winds which later in the season blow down the coast of

*Medina Sidonia to Secretary Idriaquez, Feb. 16, 1588. Duro, vol. i. p. 414.

nber that your only busit at sea. Differences bere injurious, and always to I am confident that you e cordially with the Prince demands; but I must charge v these injunctions of mine ling to the exact words. I y directed the Prince on his t, and if you two acting tosucceed in your undertaking, be honor to spare for both of I will remain at the Thames' the work is done. You may e Prince approves, take in hand which case you will leave your troops with him and exchange You will

Germans and Italians.

l in what you spend. You know tly the Armada has been to me. I also see that I am not cheated in ister rolls, and that the provisions ind and sufficient. You will watch onduct of the officers and keep them ive to their duties.

This is all which occurs to me at ent. I must leave the rest to your care and prudence, and for any furadvices which I may have to send

Much of all this was no doubt reasone and true. But Generals chosen to nduct great enterprises do not require be taught the elements of their duties. hat Philip thought it necessary to write il these details was characteristic both of imself and of the Duke. The special Commission was to cover the crossing of the Duke of Parma by defeating or dispersing the English fleet; but it was possible that the English fleet might not be so easily got rid of, and that Parma could not cross, in which case, by a second secret instruction, the Duke was told that he might take possession of the Isle of Wight and fortify it. But this was only an alternative in case of failure at the North Foreland, and in no case was to be attempted on his first advance. It was to he hoped that God would make the cause His own, however, and that there would be no need of any secondary expedients. If the negotiations failed at Ostend, and if Parma succeeded in effecting a landing, he was to advance to London and take

Philip the Second to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, April 1. Duro, vol. ii. pp. 5–13.

possession of the Government, Cardinal Allen inviting the English nobility to join in restoring the Church. But to Parma himself were given instructions, also secret, of a more temperate kind, which the Duke was to deliver to him. If the Armada won a battle, or if the enemy feared to encounter it, he was to pass over with his army in the name of God and carry out the purpose agreed upon. Should the success, however, be less complete, and should he think peace desirable, he would use the presence of the fleet to enforce favorable conditions. It was indispensable that the Catholics should be allowed their services and the ports in Holland be restored. He might demand compensation for past injuries, but this might be sacrificed if he could obtain religious liberty for the English Catholics. He might argue that the Huguenots were tolerated in France, and if it was answered that they were not tolerated in Flanders, he might say that the case was different. He might demand hostages also, and retain certain fortified positions on the coast to be held for a number of years, till it could be seen how things would go. that case the Isle of Wight might be useful, as the Armada could lie in the Solent.

In

Disaster it is evident that Philip did not anticipate. Something less than complete success he probably did anticipate, and on the whole might prefer it. Satisfied with having provided for all contingencies, he was now only anxious to see the Armada on its way; while the nuns and hermits had removed the alarms of Medina Sidonia, had convinced him that God could not neglect a business in which He was so peculiarly concerned, and that, in the fine language of theological knighterrantry, the service which he was to execute had been specially reserved by Providence for the King to achieve.*

Such thoughts and such experiences were doubtless indications of a highwrought frame of mind; but men may dwell too exclusively on the conviction that God is on their side, and perhaps forget that God will not be found there if they neglect to do their own parts. While the priests were praying and the

*Y que lo tiene guardado á V. Md. para que por su mano y con su gran zelo y christiandad, se reduzca aquel Regno al gremio y obediencia de su Iglesia." Medina Sidonia to Philip, April 11.

Portugal. The Duke at the time of his nomination was at his house at San Lucar. He was directed to repair at once to Lisbon, where his commission would reach him. An experienced but cautious Admiral, Don Diego Flores de Valdez, was assigned to him as a nautical adviser, and Philip proceeded to inflict upon him a series of instructions and advice as wise and foolish as those with which Don Quixote furnished his squire. Every day brought fresh letters as suggestions rose in what Philip called his mind. Nothing was too trifling for his notice, nothing was to be left to the Duke's discretion which could possibly be provided for. In

a secret despatch to the Duke of Parina, the King revealed alike his expectations and his wishes. He trusted that the appearance of the Armada and some moderate victory over the English fleet would force Elizabeth to an agreement. If the Catholic religion could be tolerated in England, and if Flushing and Brill were. given up to him, he said that he was prepared to be satisfied. To Medina Sidonia he reported as his latest advice from England that the Queen was inclining to the treaty, but was dissuaded by Leicester and Walsingham, and he gave him a list of the English force which he might expect to meet, which was tolerably accurate and far inferior to his own.

So far he wrote like a responsible and sensible prince, but the smallest thing and the largest seemed to occupy him equally. He directed the Duke to provide himself with competent Channel pilots, as if this was a point which might be overlooked. It laid down regulations for the health of the crews, the allowances of biscuit and wine, salt fish and bacon. Beyond all, the Duke was to attend to their morals. They were in the service of the Lord, and the Lord must not be offended by the faults of His instruments. The clergy throughout Spain were praying for them and would continue to pray, but soldiers and sailors must do their part and live like Christians. They must not swear; they must not gamble, which led to swearing. If they used low language God would be displeased. Every man before he embarked must confess and commend himself to the Lord. Especially and pre-eminent ly, loose women must be kept away, and if any member of the expedition fell into the pecado nefando he must be chastised

to the example of the rest. Returning to secular subjects, he had heard, the King said, that the gentlemen adventurers wanted staterooms and private berths. It would encumber the ships, and the Duke was cautioned not to allow it. As the Duke knew nothing of navigation, here. too, the King held himself competent to instruct. He was to make straight for the English Channel, advance to the North Foreland, and put himself in communication with Parma. If foul weather came and the ships were scattered, they were to collect again, first at Finisterre, and then at the Scilly Isles. In the Chan. nel he must keep on the English side, because the water was deeper there. Elizabeth's fleet, Philip understood, was divided, part being under Drake at Plymouth, and part in the Straits of Dover. If the Duke fell in with Drake he was to take no notice of him unless he was attacked, and was to keep on his course. If he found the two squadrons united, he would still be in superior force and might join battle, being careful to keep to windward.

66

There were limits even to Philip's confidence in his ability to guide. He admitted that he could not direct the Duke specifically how to form the ships for an engagement. Time and opportunity would have to determine. 'Only," he said, "omit no advantage and so handle the fleet that one part shall support another. The enemy will try to fight at a distance with his guns. You will endeavor to close. You will observe that their practice is to shoot low into the hulls rather than into the rigging. You will find how to deal with this. Keep your vessels together, allow none to stray or go in advance. Do not let them hurry in pursuit of prizes after a victory. This fault has often caused disaster both on sea and land. Conquer first, and then you will have spoil enough. The Council of War will order the distribution of it. What I am now saying implies that a battle will have to be fought; but if the enemy can be got rid of without an action, so much the better. The effect will be produced without loss to yourself. Should the Prince be able to cross, you will remain with the Armada at the mouth of the Thames, lending such assistance as you can. Consult with the Prince, and land none of your forces without his ap

proval. Remember that your only business is to fight at sea. Differences between leaders are injurious, and always to be avoided. I am confident that you will co-operate cordially with the Prince as my service demands; but I must charge you to follow these injunctions of mine strictly according to the exact words. I have similarly directed the Prince on his own conduct, and if you two acting together can succeed in your undertaking, there will be honor to spare for both of you. You will remain at the Thames' mouth till the work is done. You may then, if the Prince approves, take in hand Ireland, in which case you will leave your Spanish troops with him and exchange them for Germans and Italians. You will be careful in what you spend. You know how costly the Armada has been to me. You will also see that I am not cheated in the muster rolls, and that the provisions are sound and sufficient. You will watch the conduct of the officers and keep them attentive to their duties.

"This is all which occurs to me at present. I must leave the rest to your own care and prudence, and for any further advices which I may have to send

Much of all this was no doubt reasonable and true. But Generals chosen to conduct great enterprises do not require to be taught the elements of their duties. That Philip thought it necessary to write all these details was characteristic both of himself and of the Duke. The special commission was to cover the crossing of the Duke of Parma by defeating or dispersing the English fleet; but it was possible that the English fleet might not be so easily got rid of, and that Parma could not cross, in which case, by a second secret instruction, the Duke was told that he might take possession of the Isle of Wight and fortify it. But this was only an alternative in case of failure at the North Foreland, and in no case was to be attempted on his first advance. It was to he hoped that God would make the cause His own, however, and that there would be no need of any secondary expedients. If the negotiations failed at Ostend, and if Parma succeeded in effecting a landing, he was to advance to London and take

Philip the Second to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, April 1. Duro, vol. ii. pp. 5-13.

possession of the Government, Cardinal Allen inviting the English nobility to join in restoring the Church. But to Parma himself were given instructions, also secret, of a more temperate kind, which the Duke was to deliver to him. If the Armada won a battle, or if the enemy feared to encounter it, he was to pass over with his army in the name of God and carry out the purpose agreed upon. Should the success, however, be less complete, and should he think peace desirable, he would use the presence of the fleet to enforce favorable conditions. It was indispensable that the Catholics should be allowed their services and the ports in Holland be restored. He might demand compensation for past injuries, but this might be sacrificed if he could obtain religious liberty for the English Catholics. He might argue that the Huguenots were tolerated in France, and if it was answered that they were not tolerated in Flanders, he might say that the case was different. He might demand hostages also, and retain certain fortified positions on the coast to be held for a number of years, till it could be seen how things would go. that case the Isle of Wight might be useful, as the Armada could lie in the Solent.

In

Satis

Disaster it is evident that Philip did not anticipate. not anticipate. Something less than complete success he probably did anticipate, and on the whole might prefer it. fied with having provided for all contingencies, he was now only anxious to see the Armada on its way; while the nuns and hermits had removed the alarms of Medina Sidonia, had convinced him that God could not neglect a business in which He was so peculiarly concerned, and that, in the fine language of theological knighterrantry, the service which he was to execute had been specially reserved by Providence for the King to achieve.*

Such thoughts and such experiences were doubtless indications of a highwrought frame of mind; but men may dwell too exclusively on the conviction that God is on their side, and perhaps forget that God will not be found there if they neglect to do their own parts. While the priests were praying and the

*Y que lo tiene guardado á V. Md. para que por su mano y con su gran zelo y christiandad, se reduzca aquel Regno al gremio y obediencia de su Iglesia." Medina Sidonia to Philip, April 11.