fragments of whose writings found in the Vatican Library Emanuel a Scheelstrate tells us, and Saint Gregory of Nyssa; Cum nocti ad longitudinis, summum provectae nulla fieri potest accessio, tunc nobis in carne apparit, qui cuncta complectitur. Saint Gregory of Nyssa, and Theophylact, and a hundred others that might be mentioned, all agree in attesting this Tradition; counter to which there is found no Writer amongst the Greek Fathers, save possibly Saint Epiphanius, whose opinion however neither appeareth clear, nor escapeth being sharply assailed by Saint Jerome. Nay the Church at Antioch, in which, when the ancient records had been lost, there had arisen some uncertainty touching this point, had in the fourth Century documents of the highest authority from the Churches at Constantinople, and at Rome, by which to assure itself of the truth; as was preached to the Innovators with defiant jubilation by Saint John Chrysostom.25

The Latins were even more in agreement on this head. Saint Augustine in the fourth book of his De Trinitate, on the one hundred thirty-second Psalm, in the twenty second Sermon De Tempore, in the twenty-first De Sanctis; Saint Ambrose in his eighth, tenth, and twelfth Sermons; Saint Jerome, Saint Fulgentius, Prudentius,20 and then the whole company of those, that follow in the later Centuries, all mention the twenty-fifth day of December as the Natal day of the Lord, as a thing, of which there neither ever hath been, nor can be a doubt. With the Holy Fathers agree all, so to speak, of the Chronologists, and the Writers of what sort soever; if those alone be excepted, whom we have named; whose opinion, apart from their being so few in number, when placed in comparison with the rest, hath been stigmatized not only by the Catholic authors, but also by many able, and learned Protestant Authors, as capricious, and inconsistent. In fact Wilhelmus Langius was a Protestant; and yet in the Work, that he wrote on the life of Christ, in the second part, second book, second chapter, he stateth it as a thing not only probable, but certain and demonstrated, that the true Natal day of Christ fell on the twenty-fifth day of December. Isaac Casaubon was a Protestant; and yet in the Work, that he wrote with such ardent controversy against Cardinal Baronius, he had to declare, convinced by the evidence, that one must not too easily set aside the most ancient Tradition of the Church, which celebrated the birth of the Saviour on the twenty-fifth day of the twelfth month. Richard Montagu was a Protestant; and yet in his 25 Homil. cit.

26 Hymn 11.

Ecclesiastical Origins he criticizes as highly ridiculous and inappropriate the view of Joseph Scaliger,27 and of those who held with him, that Christ was born at the Autumnal Equinox. And yet as that is of all opposing views the one most applauded, so is it the least ill founded: Perridiculum est (frankly writes the above mentioned author), perridiculum est quod Scaliger, aliique ineptissime scripserunt. Among the Protestants may also be placed Jan Gerard Vos previously cited (who if he was not avowedly a Calvinist, was certainly still less a Catholic), a Writer in his Scholarship bold and fearless, who never concealed what seemed to him true, out of respectful deference to Authors holding a different opinion. And yet he, in the first part of his De tempore Natalis Christi, in the last chapter, after examining the arguments of one who as to the Natal day of Christ did not conform his opinion to the Tradition of the Church, decideth for the old System, against which, he saith, the opinions of the Ancients are too few, and too much at variance with one another, and the arguments of the Innovating Scholars are too weak, which much as they have undertaken, have proved nothing to destroy a conviction so ancient, and so widely diffused.

It remaineth therefore, O most learned Academicians, it remaineth well established upon the universal consensus of all the Fathers, of all the Centuries, of all Nations, even of all Sects, as against the uncertain and outgrown views of a few either foolish, or capricious persons, that the Birth of our Redeemer took place in the night, which preceded the twenty-fifth day of December; the which was assumed by me as a hypothesis one year ago, though I could not, for want of time, demonstrate its truth.

It ought, in order to complete the subject, to be determined on what day of the week, in what phases of the Moon this grand Mystery befell; all the objections ought to be heard, and resolved which have been brought forward by those that support opposing systems; but to do that would be an ill-judged abuse of your gentle sufferance, O learned Fellow-shepherds; there would be risk of consuming a far longer time, than that prescribed for an Academic Discussion; and beyond this:

"Behold, night falleth, and all Heaven groweth dark;

And the lofty Mountains cast their shadows o'er the fields:

The Stars yield us their company, and the Moon,

And my little sheep are coming from the grove."28

27 Part i., p. 47.

28 Sannazaro, Arcad. Eglog. 2.

SPECULATION IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

A

BY JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

MONG laymen natural science is supposed to be strictly nonspeculative, factual, practical. It has the reputation of being concerned solely with facts, not with theories. How far this is from the truth all who have the slightest acquaintance with modern science know. Natural science is intensely speculative. No freer confession and abler justification of speculation in the field of science has been made, perhaps, than that of George J. Romanes in the introductory chapter of his Darwin and After Darwin. After pointing out how seriously science was limited, from the sixteenth century onward, by the notion that "science ought to consist in a mere observation of facts, or tabulation of phenomena," Romanes goes on to show that it was no less a person than Darwin himself who broke this bondage. "To begin with," he writes of Darwin, "he nowhere loses sight of the distinction between fact and theory, so that thus far he loyally follows the spirit of revolt against subjective methods. But, while always holding the distinction clearly in view, his idea of the scientific use of facts is plainly that of furnishing legitimate material for the construction of theories." "Not facts, then, or phenomena, but causes or principles," concludes Romanes, "are the ultimate objects of scientific quest." "The spirit of speculation is the same as the spirit of science, namely a desire to know the causes of things."

Whether one agrees with this estimate of the value of speculation or not, he cannot but be struck by the extraordinary prevalence of speculation in present-day science. A good instance is that of Arrhenius's theory of the transmission of life. How the imagination exults in trying to follow one of those infinitesimal life spores falling for eighteen hundred years or more through space, conveying life from planet to planet. It is interesting, not to say romantic, suggestive, yes, and in a sense scientific, but boldly, strikingly, speculative. Even more speculative, because more intricate and involved, is Weismann's germ-plasm theory of heredity. Biophors and determinants and a sturdy struggle for existence within

the spacious domain of a single cell,-has speculation ever gone to greater length than this? And yet if it explains the facts better than any other theory it will win the right to stand.

The test of scientific speculation, Professor Romanes goes on to say, is "adequate verification," "an appeal to objective proof." But is not this too heavy a demand for even scientific speculation to meet? Surely neither of the above theories can appeal to objective proof, and adequate verification is a very flexible standard. Can science really verify her hypotheses? They stand until some as yet undiscovered fact appears to overthrow them. Their truth is empirical, relative, contingent. Verification is always progressive, never complete. It is not impossible that some fact may be discovered that will modify or annul the undulatory theory of light, or even the descent of species.

Moreover scientific explanation is at best partial, never thoroughgoing and exhaustive. The unreflective mind may think that science has a complete and sufficient understanding of electricity, but the physicist understands very well that, as for any knowledge of what electricity really is, science is as ignorant as a child and is likely to remain so for some time to come. And as for the most familiar forces and objects in nature, it is very little at best that is known of them. Light may be defined as ether waves, but what is ether? The definitions of science are at best but descriptive. The law of gravitation-what is it in itself? How it works we know, how to measure it, how to use it, but what is its nature and how did it come to be? Science bulks large, its deeds are mighty, its conquests marvelous, but after all it works in a world of mystery, handling forces that it cannot comprehend, dealing freely and familiarly with facts that it grasps only in part.

What then? Should science cease to experiment, to achieve, to speculate? Surely not. Experiment, application, speculation, have accomplished marvels. Together they have won great things for humanity. Only let not science assume that her interpretation of the universe constitutes the sole and absolute truth. Self-sufficiency and dogmatism tempt her to-day as they once tempted theology.

When we turn to the realm of the rational, the moral, the spiritual,-lying quite outside the realm of natural science and belonging to philosophy, ethics and theology, we find that we start, as in the realm of science, with certain facts of experience (though facts of a very different order from those of science), such as

consciousness of self, worth, freedom, other selves, God. These experienced facts of consciousness, though invisible and intangible, are not less real than those of science, but more real. They touch more nearly our integrity, our happiness, our higher life. Without them science itself would be but an inconsequence, not to say an impertinence.

To understand, correlate, interpret, and thus to make best use of these facts of personality, it is necessary to speculate concerning them, just as it is necessary to speculate concerning the phenomena of the outer world. Speculation will not disclose their ultimate nature any more than in the realm of science, but it serves to throw light upon them and to render them more intelligible.

There will always be protest against speculation in the realm of the spirit, just as there has been, and ever will be, in that of science. "Stick to the facts, let theories alone," is a plausible and appealing cry. But it is timid and reactionary. It is not thus that progress is made. There may be temptations and dangers in speculation but it has an important office to fulfil. Two virile movements at the present time represent the reaction from over-speculation, -pragmatism and Ritchlianism,-the one in philosophy, the other in theology. Both have a mission, but both are partial, short-sighted, and if persisted in will prove paralyzing. It is such pleas of nescience and counsels of caution that keep philosophy and theology behind science in the path of progress. Science has dismissed her fear of the unknown; let not philosophy and theology retreat into the cave of agnosticism.

And yet when all has been said in defense of speculation, as legitimate, illuminating, essential to progress, the only defensible plea in its behalf is for freedom, not license, in its use. To be an illumination of truth, not an obscuration, an aid and not a hindrance, speculation must recognize its limitations and observe its boundaries. Verification, as far as it can be applied, is the indispensable test and regulator of speculation. And verification is just as possible and just as essential in philosophy and in theology as in science. The facts of self-consciousness are the stable foundation of truth here, just as the facts of sensation-consciousness are in science. Immediately one of these facts is contradicted, speculation needs revision.

A word in closing as to the relation of the two fields of speculation to one another. These fields are contiguous but distinct. Confusion comes from disregarding either their contiguity or