The only poffible doubt is, concerning the extent
of the matter contained in them: for it must be
allowed, that there are many cafes, wherein we are
by no means obliged to grant that to others, which
we ourselves perhaps (were we in their circumftan-
ftances, and they in ours) might be willing enough,
unreafonably willing, to obtain from them. A bene-
factor is not bound to comply with the demands
of fuch as afk unmerited favours; tho' conscious,
that he himself might be apt to make as extrava→
gant requests, were it his turn to be the object of
another man's beneficence. A magiftrate is not
at liberty, much lefs under an obligation, to turn
the edge of juftice from an importunate offender;
because, if he himself were the criminal, he should
certainly and equally defire to escape unpunished.
The rule, therefore, which makes what we defire
of other men the measure of our dealing towards
them, is to be understood not of vicious and ex-
ceffive defires,, but of fuch only as are fit and rea
fonable; fuch requests as we can, in our calmeft
thoughts, juftify to ourselves; fuch as, we are
fure, may be made without indecency, and can-
not be refufed without inhumanity. And, under
this neceffary limitation, the precept of the text
may be thus understood: "Put thyfelf into fuch

a man's condition, and confider, what treat-
"ment, what favours, in that cafe, thou mightest
"fairly and juftly expect from him; and be thou
"fair to deal with him, according to thofe thy
"juft and regular expectations." And this I take
to be the true explication of that other equivalent
precept, given in the gofpel, to loveour neighbours
as ourselves; which we may then, in the most
VOL. I
proper

proper and strict fenfe of the words, be faid to do, when we, firft place ourselves in our neighbour's ftead, and, then, learn to love him; by confidering, What degre of love and good-will, of for. bearance and forgiveness, we might, under that change of circumftances, challenge from him.

It may be thought, that the rule, thus temper. ed and qualified, will not be of any fpecial ufe, or moment to us, in the direction of our practice; inafmuch as the lines of duty do not feem to be more clearly marked out, by this method of comparifon, than they would have been, by a direct injunction to us, fo to deal with others, as right reafon and our confciences inform us that we onght to deal with them. For, after all, when we have made another man's cafe our's, we are ftill left to judge, what, under fuch a change of circumftances, we might, in equity and reafon, expect from him, before we can determine, after what manner we are to behave ourselves towards him: And, therefore, which way foever we take the measure of our duty; to the bar of equity and reafon we muft, it feems, in order to the fixing it, always finally appeal.

'Tis true we muft-But the maxim of the text is that, which, of all others, doth most effectually affift us towards making a free use of our reason, and forming a right judgment of things, on fuch occafions: For, by the means of it, we are able to confider our duty without prejudice, and to ftate the bounds of it impartially and fairly. When we determine amifs concerning the obligations incumbent upon us in refpect of other men; 'tis by reason of that ftrong weight of felf-love,

which, like a biafs, inclines, and fecretly fways our minds towards that Side on which our own intereft lies. To fet this error right, we suppose ourselves to be the men, who are to receive this treatment from others, which we are about to practise towards them; and, then, the fame Telfish principle makes that appear very hard and unreasonable, which, before, it inclined us to approve; and thus our warped and perverted judgment, by being bent as much towards the oppofite fide, recovers its ftraitnefs. The rule of the text, therefore, is at the bottom, a wife art of rebating one degree of our partiality by another; it enables us to take two feveral views of our duty, to eye it in different fituations, and under different lights; and by that means, more distinctly and thoroughly to difcern it. And, in this fenfe, "Measuring ourselves by ourselves, and com" paring ourselves with ourselves,” 2 Cor. x. 12. we take the fureft way to be both just and wife.

There's nothing, we know, that gives a man fo true and lively a fenfe of the fufferings of others, or reftrains him fo powerfully from doing unrighteous and oppreffive things, as his having fmarted, formerly, himself, under the experience of them. Now, the fuppofing another man's ill ufage to be ours, is, the giving ourselves a prefent fenfe, as it were, a kind of feigned experience of it; which doth, for the time, ferve all the purpofes of a true one.

Upon these accounts it is, that the precept of the text carries greater evidence, and a fuller degree of conviction in it, than any other rule of morality; its apparent equity and reasonableness,

Cc 2

is

is what we are next to confider. And this is fo plain a point, as not to want, or indeed be capable of, a folemn proof: For the precept manifeftly aims at that, which is the known foundation of equity and juftice, in all matters of intercourfe between man and man; the reducing things to one common ftandard, by the application of which they are all to be examined and tried. "Thou shalt not have in thy bag, or in "thine houfe" (faid the Levitical law)" divers "weights, and divers measures; a great and a "fmall [i. e. one, wherewith to buy; and another, wherewith to fell:)" But thou fhalt have

a perfect and just weight, a perfect and juft "measure fhalt thou have," Deut. xxv. 13. 14. What is faid here of ordinary traffic and dealing, holds as true of the general commerce of human life, and that exchange of good offices by which fociety is upheld: hr must be a perfect weight, and a juft measure by which all men are mutually obliged to regulate their conduct, in acting and fuffering, in commanding and obeying, in giving and receiving; and this can be no other than the equal and righteous rule of the text, the Doing in all cafes, and to all perfons, even as we would be done unto. There is no one fo abfurd and unreafonable, as not to fee and acknowledge the abfolute equity of this command, in the theory, however he may fwerve and decline from it in his practice; and to agree upon it as that golden mean, which, if un verfally obferved, would make the world univerfally happy; every man a benefactor, a good angel, a Deity, as it were, to his fellowcreatures; and earth, the very image of heaven!

I need, I can fay no more, concerning the reafonableness of this precept: However, it may help to excite and quicken your defires and hopes of obeying it, if I proceed, as I proposed, to point out fome diftinguishing properties and advantages of it.

The first of which is, that it is alike eafy and obvious to all understandings, to the meaneft and moft ignorant men, as well as to thofe of the greatest parts and improvements. God is, on this as well as on other accounts, no refpecter of perfons: Having made that which is most neceffary, moft common, and, confequently, fuited this principle, which all men have equal occafion to ufe, equally to the apprehenfions of all men. They, therefore, who are incapable of long trains in deductions of reafon, and of adapting the feveral rules of morality to the various circumftances of action, are yet able (as able as the acuteft philofophers, or cafuifts) to look into their own hearts, to afk themselves this plain queftion, and to return a clear answer to it: "Would I "myfelf be content, that others fhould thus deal "with me? Why then should I fo deal with any "'man ?"

Human laws are often fo numerous, as to ef cape our memories; fo darkly fometimes, and inconfiftently worded, as to puzzle our under standings; and their original obfcurity is not fel dom improved by the nice diftinction and subtle reafonings of thofe who profefs to clear them: So that, under thefe feveral difadvantages, they, lofe much of their force and influence; and, in fome cafes, raise more difputes than, perhaps,

they