jects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures, on each fide of the queftion, are often fo equally poised, that the wifeft judgments may be held in suspense: these I call fubjects of indifference. But again, when the fubject is not indifferent in itself, it will appear fuch to a great part of those to whom it is propofed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either fide is fupported. These are fubjects of apparent indifference. This indifference occurs ftill more frequently in personal contests; in which we do not often difcover any reafon of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to another. These cases compose the province of influence; that is, the decifion in these cases will inevitably be determined by influence of fome fort or other. The only doubt is, what influence shall be admitted. If you remove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for influence from a different quarter. If motives of expectation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fucceed in their place, acting probably in an oppofite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the queftion. There exift, as we have seen, paffions in the human heart, which will always make

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make a ftrong party against the executive power of a mixed government. According as the difposition of parliament is friendly or adverse to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the businefs of empire will be tranfacted with ease and convenience, or embarraffed with endless contention and difficulty. Nor is it a conclufion founded in justice, or warranted by experience, that, because men are induced by views of intereft to yield their confent to measures, concerning which their judgment decides nothing, they may be brought by the fame influence to act in deliberate oppofition to knowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country fince the revolution, will find few even of the moft questionable measures of adminiftration, about which the best inftructed judgment might not have doubted at the time; but of which he may affirm with certainty, that they were indifferent to the greatest part of those who concurred in them. From the fuccefs, or the facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage of the crown carried measures like these, ought weto conclude, that a fimilar application of honours and emoluments

would

would procure the confent of parliament to councils evidently detrimental to the common. welfare? Is there not, on the contrary, more reafon to fear, that the prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be long able to support itfelf? For when we reflect upon the power of the house of commons to extort a compliance with its refolutions from the other parts of the legislature; or to put to death the constitution by a refufal of the annual grants of money to the fupport of the neceffary functions of government-when we reflect alfo what motives there are which, in the viciffitudes of political interefts and paffions, may one day arm and point this power against the executive magiftratewhen we attend to these confiderations, we shall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth in that important, but much decried apophthegm,“ that "an independent parliament is incompatible with "the existence of the monarchy."

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

HE first maxim of a free state is, that the

TH

laws be made by one fet of men, and administered by another in other words, that the

:

legislative and judicial characters be kept separate. When these offices are united in the fame perfon or affembly, particular laws are made for particular cafes, fpringing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends: whilft they are kept feparate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom they may affect; and, when made, must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will.

For the fake of illuftration, let it be fuppofed, in this country, either that, parliaments being laid afide, the courts of Weftminfter-Hall made their own laws; or that the two houses of parliament, with the king at their head, tried and decided caufes at their bar: it is evident, in the

first place, that the decifions of such a judicature would be so many laws; and, in the second place, that, when the parties and the interests to be affected by the law were known, the inclinations of the law-makers would inevitably attach on one fide or the other; and that, where there were neither any fixed rules to regulate their determinations, nor any fuperior power to control their proceedings, these inclinations would interfere with the integrity of public justice. The confequence of which muft be, that the subjects of fuch a conftitution would live either without any conftant laws, that is, without any known pre-established rules of adjudication whatever; or under laws made for particular cafes and particular perfons, and partaking of the contradictions and iniquity of the motives to which they owed their origin.

Which dangers, by the divifion of the legiflative and judicial functions, are in this country effectually provided againft. Parliament knows not the individuals upon whom its acts will operate; it has no cafes or parties before it; no private defigns to ferve: confequently its refolutious will be fuggefted by the confideration of univerfal effects and tendencies, which always produces impartial, and commonly advantageous regula