Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate

כריכה קדמית
Oxford University Press, 19 במרץ 1992 - 216 עמודים
This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this problem. Their ideas include an argument for the empowerment of private and public interest groups in the regulatory process and a provocative discussion of how the government can support and encourage industry self-regulation.

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תוכן

1 The Politics of an Idea
3
2 The Benign Big Gun
19
3 Tripartism
54
4 Enforced SelfRegulation
101
5 PartialIndustry Intervention
133
6 Delegation and Participation in a Responsive Regulatory order
158
Notes
163
References
183
Index
197
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עמוד 25 - If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. "If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.
עמוד 172 - Reasonably practicable' is a narrower term than 'physically possible' and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner, in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other; and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus on...
עמוד 36 - Hence, such agencies often find themselves in the situation where their implied plea to' 'cooperate or else" has little credibility. This is one case of how we can get the paradox of extremely stringent regulatory laws causing underregulation (Mendeloff, 1979; Sunstein, 1990: 91-92).
עמוד 85 - Or as one businessman put it: 'You can settle any dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do not understand the give-and-take needed in business.
עמוד 17 - Schmitter argues that corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands...
עמוד 180 - Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage.
עמוד 16 - Stringent standards for product performance, product safety, and environmental impact contribute to creating and upgrading competitive advantage. They pressure firms to improve quality, upgrade technology, and provide features in areas of important customer (and social) concern.
עמוד 86 - It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence

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