Modern Industrial OrganizationAddison-Wesley, 2000 - 780 עמודים Written by two of the field's most respected researchers, the third edition of Modern Industrial Organization provides a unified structure for analyzing theories and empirical evidence about the organization of firms and industries. It goes beyond the traditional structure - conduct-performance framework by using the latest advances in microeconomic theory including transaction cost analysis, game theory, contestability, and information economics. The third edition includes discussion of recent important applications, policies, and new theories; new and updated examples to illustrate the role of theory in current policy debates; substantial condensation of the text proper; a two-color interior design and two-color figures throughout; and an all-new extensive Online Course Companion Web site.*In depth coverage, including strategic behavior and game theory*Definitive analysis of such other key advances in microeconomic theory as transaction cost-analysis, contestability, and information theory*NEW! Up-to-date applications and discussion of the latest policies and new theories throughout*NEW! Fresh, updated examples and statistics throughout*NEW! Substantial condensation of the entir |
תוכן
The Firm and Costs | 11 |
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS | 19 |
COST CONCEPTS | 28 |
זכויות יוצרים | |
63 קטעים אחרים שאינם מוצגים
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
advertising antitrust laws barriers to entry benefit best-response function brand buyers cartel Chapter charge collusion competitive equilibrium competitive firm consumer surplus Cournot Court customers deadweight loss differentiation distributor dominant firm earn economists effect efficient elasticity of demand entrant Equation example Figure Firm 2's firm's firms produce fixed costs fringe firms higher incentive increase incumbent industry Journal of Economics long-run lower price manufacturer marginal cost marginal revenue market power market structure maximizes its profits merger monopolistic competition monopoly profits monopsony Nash equilibrium natural monopoly number of firms oligopoly optimal output level p₁ patent percent perfect competition period predatory pricing price discrimination price-cost margin problem purchase q₁ quantity rate of return regulation residual demand curve result rivals sell shows strategy sumers supply curve Suppose tariff theory tion trade two-part tariff units vertical integration vertical restrictions welfare zero